

Tallinn  
Conference on  
Conceptualising  
Integration

October  
18-19, 2007.

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# Introduction

On October 18-19, 2007, the Tallinn Conference on Conceptualising Integration was held that focused on the Estonian integration policy. While being in the middle of composing the new state programme for the years 2008-2013 at the time of the conference, I'm glad that the conference gave us an opportunity to share our ideas with others and at the same time learn from the experience of other countries.

The first conference of this kind took place already in 1999, when the programme for the years 2000-2007 was being developed. Renowned international scholars as Will Kymlicka and David Miller expressed their ideas at that conference. The second conference took place in 2002 and focused on eliciting the Estonian model of multiculturalism and comparing it with models adopted in other countries. World-class scholars like John Berry, David Laitin and Normand Labrie participated in the conference.

Since then Estonia has come a long way. We have learned a lot and we are grateful for the support and advice we have received from our friends. The purpose of the conference in 2007 was to analyse the draft of the programme for the years

2008-2013, look at what has been achieved in the past seven years and what should be focused on in the coming years. Eleven well-known scholars and top experts in their field talked about different aspects of integration: the challenges multiculturalism poses to the nation-state, how integration is managed in different parts of the world, how integration can be measured and what role education plays in the process of integration. Estonia is not the only country facing these questions. Most contemporary societies are faced with issues related to the ways of accommodating cultural diversity and it is important to share these experiences.

This compilation holds the presentations made at the international conference on integration held in Tallinn on October 18-19, 2007. Some of the authors come from our neighbouring countries, some from places that are further away, some of them have been to Estonia before and are familiar with our situation, some visited Estonia for the first time in October. This combination of ideas gave us very valuable expertise that helped us in putting together the new programme and will further help us to assess the developments and processes that take place in Estonia.

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## **Urve Palo**

*Minister of Population and Ethnic Affairs*



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# “Estonian Integration Strategy 2008-2013”

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**Tanel Mätlik**

*Director of the Integration Foundation*

Recent important steps in integration policy at the national level date back to the end of the nineties and the year 2000. To be exact, on June 10, 1998, the Parliament of Estonia approved the starting points for the Estonian national integration policy for the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society. For the first time, the aforementioned document set out a conceptual basis for national policy. At that time the concept largely focused on problems and challenges of non-Estonians. Integration was defined as involvement of an individual in social life at all levels: “Integration is not a change of ethnical identity; it is the removal of barriers that hinder many non-Estonians from full participation in Estonian societal life”. At the same time, a role for Estonians was already included in this document where integration was seen as a challenge for both Estonians and non-Estonians: “Integration is a very serious endeavour for non-Estonians since language skills and competitiveness are closely related and they do not develop by themselves. At the same time, it is a challenge for openness and tolerance on the part of Est-

nians. If Estonians do not see the need for such new developments and are not ready for taking new steps, the integration targets are meaningless. There is no doubt that the integration strategy is a serious responsibility for the Estonian state and politicians as the internal targets of Estonia as a democratic nation-state have to be defined”.

On March 31, 1998, the Government of the Republic founded the Non-Estonian’s Integration Foundation which became a channel for the government of Estonia in financing integration activities. In the beginning, governmental support was quite limited (eg. six million kroons in 1998), but during subsequent years, amounts increased considerably, mostly owing to support from several foreign countries and the European Union.

On March 14, 2000, the Government of the Republic approved the state programme: “Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007”, which set out the areas of integration, measures, responsible ministries and a budget. The state programme was the basis for further national activities in the field of in-



tegration; in addition it has been the basis for local authorities in the preparation of their own integration plans, whereas the conceptual section of the programme has been examined in a large number of academic studies.

### ***The most important outcomes starting from 2000***

Below are presented the most important outcomes from the state programme "Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007" starting from 2000. It should be pointed out that it is only a very small selection of the almost 170 activities that make up the action plans of the state programme.

#### ***Sub-programme I: "Education"***

Within the framework of sub-programme I: "Education", a course was taken towards the expanding of the list of subjects which are being taught in Estonian in Russian basic and upper secondary schools as well as in vocational schools. As a result of this, all 63 Russian upper secondary schools (forms 10-12) were prepared for transition to partial teaching of subjects in Estonian (covering at least 60% of all subjects), starting from the school year 2007/ 2008. Additionally, partial teaching in Estonian has been systematically supported in the form of language immersion; by now, nearly fifty nursery schools and basic schools have joined the immersion programme. In addition to the command of Estonian, the active participation of Estonians in educational integration should be ensured. A good example of this is a common curriculum development and other forms of cooperation between Estonian and Russian schools. Additionally, about 20,000 Estonian and Russian children have participated in summer language camps and have been learning the language in families since year 2000. A clearly growing challenge, albeit one that is still relatively minor, is the integration of the children of new immigrants, including preparation for relevant special study materials and teacher handbooks, as well as offering further training programmes to teachers, in order to prepare for teaching in a multicultural classroom.

#### ***Sub-programme II: "The education and culture of ethnic minorities"***

Sub-programme II: "The education and culture of ethnic minorities" was designed in order to provide ethnic minorities with separate opportunities for maintaining their language and culture, which also constitutes one of the cornerstones of the conceptual part of the process of integration. For this purpose, about 35-40 national cultural societies have received annual support for various culture projects, about fifteen Sunday schools of national cultural societies have received annual support for teaching their language and culture to members of minorities, and teachers of Sunday schools have received annual training. In addition to this, the Estonian government started the annual allocation of assistance to most national cultural societies (this amounted to about 200 national cultural societies in previous years) to aid in basic costs, which gives more security for associations in the planning of their everyday work in the future.

#### ***Sub-programme III:***

##### ***"Estonian language training for adults"***

Within the sub-programme: "Estonian language training for adults", special attention has been paid to improving the command of Estonian language of adult non-Estonians by offering language training and learning materials at favourable conditions. In total, about 12,000 persons have been reimbursed for 50% of their language training costs and about 2,000 public sector employees (policemen, rescue workers, medical staff) have participated in free language courses starting from 2000.

#### ***Sub-programme IV: "Social competence"***

Sub-programme IV: "Social competence" focused on increasing the social competence of both Estonians and non-Estonians. What does social competence mean? It means the ability of a person to be active on all levels of social life. The state programme considers the ability of people to organise on the basis of common interests (the third

sector), the availability of objective information and a change of attitudes in society (in the media and in public opinion) to be the most important factors of social competence. A person's legal status is also an indicator of his or her social competence (in Estonia this is Estonian citizenship). For this purpose, nearly 2,800 citizenship applicants have participated in preparatory courses for tests on the Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship Act. Additionally, 125,000 persons with no citizenship have been informed of the opportunities and conditions for applying for citizenship. In the media sector, at least one radio or TV series has been supported annually, including TV serials and programmes in Russian or in bilingual programmes, or radio broadcasts in the languages of minorities (Ukrainian, Hebrew, Yiddish, Belarusian). At the time when the state programme was launched in 2000, it was important to bring the issue of integration into the centre of public discussion. For this purpose, several media campaigns were organised, such as, "Friendship starts with a smile", and "Many nice people". As mentioned above, the social competence of all members of society is important. Therefore, several activities have been addressed to all people living in Estonia, irrespective of their nationality. An example of this is the "Citizen's Handbook", which is aimed at bringing information on the functioning of the state and communications with state authorities in a practical form to as many people as possible. The handbook was first published in 2004 and the following issues have been reviewed with regard to amended laws and have been supplemented with new topics. The handbook has been surprisingly popular and is being distributed to ministries, civil society organisations, local authorities, libraries, vocational schools and county development centres.

#### ***"Estonian Integration Strategy 2008-2013"***

The previous state programme ended in 2007. Logically, the question of what would happen in the future arose. It is clear that many targets - such as the command of Estonian among many adults or a common field of information - are still far away. The re-location of the World War II memorial at the end of April 2007 and the discussions that

surrounded it have drawn the attention of the society to the need for a continuous promotion of integration. The need to continue the work was already foreseen in 2006 during which a conceptual part of the new strategy was prepared (problem and target setting, main measures and management scheme). Since 2007, this draft has been available in Estonian, Russian and English on the Internet via the web page of the Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs. In 2007, an implementation plan for the strategy was prepared, setting out the responsibilities of ministries with regard to the activities and the budget for the strategy together with a time frame and other relevant information. Since integration concerns practically everybody in society it is without doubt necessary to achieve a general consensus with regard to goals for the strategy. In this sense the strategy has quite a lot in common with a social agreement. In order for integration to advance, a common understanding has to be found within society as it requires a change of the skills, attitudes and opinions of people and concerns almost everybody. As with every agreement, the strategy has to have a common objective and specific conditions that the parties of the agreement have to accept and follow in order to achieve the objective of the agreement. For that purpose, an extensive public discussion and the eventual amendment of the draft strategy took place in 2007. At this point, attention should be drawn to the fact that the present conference also has an important role in this work, as a very representative group of international and local experts take part in this event.

How is integration defined in the new strategy? According to the text of the strategy, "Integration of Estonian society means the involvement of Estonian inhabitants into social life based on equal opportunities and mutual tolerance, irrespective of nationality. The most important result of successful integration is a rapid reduction of persons with undetermined citizenship and the strengthening of shared state identity among the residents of Estonia based on the principles of a democratic state and rule of law, protection of Estonian language as the official and main language of communication in society and protection of minority cultures". Based on this, what then should the so-

ciety we want to reach be like? As the draft strategy describes, the general objective of the integration policy is the forming of a cohesive society in which opportunities for minorities to maintain their cultural differences have been created next to common interests, social institutions and values. An outcome of the integration process supported through the state programme is a culturally diverse democracy with a strong Estonian common core". In other words, similarly to the previous state programme, the new strategy tries to respond to the challenges of how to ensure a balance between the differences and the shared things in society in a way that is acceptable for all ethnic groups.

#### ***Integration programmes 2000- 2007 and 2008-2013: similarities***

What are the similarities and differences between the new strategy and the previous state programme? Does the new strategy have a completely new point of view towards achieving a cohesive society or is it rather a continuation of the old way? The answer is 'yes' and 'no'. The new strategy has both similarities and new things, both in target setting and in activities. With regard to similarities, the conceptual basis – the integration paradigm - is the same, meaning:

- » a two way approach with regard to target groups, ie. both Estonians and non-Estonians participate in integration;
- » departing from two principles with regard to measures: supporting the homogenisation of society on the basis of the Estonian language and citizenship and enabling the maintenance of ethnic differences;
- » the expected final result is characterised by the principles of: 1) cultural pluralism/ tolerance, 2) a strong common core, and 3) the maintenance and development of the Estonian cultural space.

With regard to measures, the division between three areas of integration will remain, although with different wording: educational and cultural, legal and political, social and economical inte-

gration. In all three areas, a lot of attention is still paid to upgrading the command of the official language among both young and adult non-Estonians, and to increasing application for citizenship in the form of distribution of information and training. The support for language and cultural activities of ethnic minorities will definitely be continued in order to give people the opportunity to maintain and develop their ethnic identity should they wish to do so.

#### ***Integration programmes 2000-2007 and 2008-2013: differences***

A major difference is the attempt to more clearly define what it is that all people living in Estonia have in common. In the new strategy, this keyword is the Estonian state identity. It is characterised by: 1) acceptance of the principles of a democratic state based on the rule of law, 2) a command of the Estonian language as the official and main language of communication in society, and 3) ensuring the protection of minority cultures. At the same time, this definition is too abstract at the moment and needs to be clarified. The creation of a practical meaning for the state identity which is understandable to all people is still to be carried out. We can argue that the common identity of Estonians and non-Estonians - the feeling of "togetherness" - is rather unclear at the moment. The state identity should definitely foster the understanding that all ethnic groups living in Estonia are our compatriots, and that there are more things that unite us than those that separate us. Amongst others, we have to agree on one name for all the inhabitants of Estonia and use it persistently - for example, compatriots. Also, it is very important to keep in mind that a more accurate definition and construction of the state identity is a great challenge. This process will last for several generations. In other words, no quick solutions exist for finding a common element between people in a society. This, however, does not mean that we do not need to set such clear targets. Therefore, I will take advantage of the present conference and make a call to all participants to think actively of what the state identity could include in addition to the above.

As a logical continuation to the above, new activities focusing on the creation of a common state identity are included in the action plan of the strategy, in order to increase the value of Estonian citizenship as a symbol, improve the knowledge of Estonian history and the state, and increase contacts and joint activities between Estonians and non-Estonians.

Although it is a state policy document, it is important to include more non-governmental organisations, ie. civil society, by supporting cooperation between Estonian and Russian NGOs in all areas (work with young people, environmental protection, neighbourhood watch, entrepreneurship), in order to replace the landscape of NGOs that is mostly based on language. The new strategy has to find new solutions for challenges that have been there for a long time: how to ensure a better and more objective way of informing representatives of other nationalities living in Estonia about the Estonian culture, history, traditions, and of what is happening in Estonian society on the one hand, and how to introduce the different cultures in Estonia, their individuality, and their achievements for the whole society, on the other hand.

Finding a balance between the common and different interests of the members of society is a challenge that should be focused on by both the state as a whole and the individual members of society. It must not be forgotten that both the change

of attitudes and the acquisition of new skills that help adapt individuals to society start from the individuals themselves - in the head and in the heart of a person. The will to learn or acquire something new has to come from inside every the person, integration cannot be something that is forced upon the whole society from above. The state can create conditions or motivate people, but the next stage will happen spontaneously in society, which is natural. But today we have to think what the conditions offered by society should be like. Estonia is not alone in this challenge – many states face a similar test, which is why the present conference with the many foreign presenters is a good opportunity for taking a look both into the theory and practice of integration.



# Is a Multicultural Nation State an Oxymoron?



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## ***The context of discourses***

Let us begin with the notion of context when trying to understand ongoing discourses on multiculturalism. There is a discourse on the other side of the Atlantic connected to the fact that Canada and USA are countries of immigration. In Europe, there has been an ongoing process of immigration for a very long time, but most European states have refused to define themselves as immigration countries. This long history, initially of labour migration, latterly of asylum seekers, has formed the basis for the European discourse. What is clear is that a sharp distinction was made between immigrants and minorities. Even when some states declared that they were multicultural, like Sweden, this was not connected to a discussion about minority rights. Another feature of the discourse is that the politics of integration has been regarded as the internal problem of a nation state, and the European Union has not created a common policy in this field.

## ***What is a Nation State?***

Traditionally, a nation-state is a specific form of state, which exists to provide a sovereign territory for a particular nation. The state is a political and geopolitical entity and the nation is a cultural and/or ethnic entity. In an ideal world, there would be little immigration or emigration, few ethnic minorities and few members of the 'home' ethnicity living in other countries. In reality, however, most nation states are far from 'ideal'.

Most nation states contain different linguistic or ethnic minorities. Nowadays, most nation states also contain large immigrant groups. They are usually not regarded as minorities.

What complicates the matter is that it seems clear that the notion of a national identity also extends to many countries which host multiple ethnic or language groups. For instance, Switzerland is a confederation of cantons and has four official languages, yet a Swiss national identity seems to exist.

Besides the connection between culture/ ethnicity and politics, nation states are also characterised by a central state power with control over the whole territory, which may be seen as semi-sacred and non-transferable. This state has a unique role in maintaining national unity: politically, economically, socially and culturally. In most cases there is also only one state language, even when other minorities are recognised.

William (Rogers) Brubaker (1990) has discussed the ways in which the concept of the nation state has influenced immigration policy, especially with regard to naturalisation rates.

As an idealistic model of membership, it can be characterised in terms of six membership norms. Membership should be egalitarian, sacred, national, democratic, unique and socially-consequential.

Egalitarian membership means that there should be a status of full membership and no other. That membership should be sacred, means that people must be ready to make sacrifices for the state. Third, membership of the state is also membership of a nation, which means that the political community should also be culturally united. The democratic aspect of membership means that it carries with it significant participation in political life. That membership should be unique, means that it should be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Everybody should belong to one and only one state. Finally, membership should be socially-consequential, meaning it should entail not only sacrifices, but also important privileges.

In the present situation, the challenges of a nation state come from an increased amount of dual citizenships, the decreased value of citizenship and the weakening of the sacred value of citizenship as it has become possible to calculate the advantages and disadvantages of different possible citizenships, the increasing amount of people with partial citizenships; the increasing demands on full citizenship without cultural assimilation and the fact that a great number of residents are excluded from political participation, both by voting and by being able to stand as a candidate in elections.

What can be said today is that we tend to continue to talk about nation states in spite of the fact

that they are more often than not far from the ideal. The fact remains that one nationality is normally in a dominant position. It also seems clear that ethnic diversity can be combined with a shared national identity.

### ***Integration***

Integration, in current discourses about immigrants and minorities, seems to contain a lot of different meanings.

In social science, the classic meaning of the word refers to society as a whole and how it holds together. One classical sociologist who considered this problem was Emile Durkheim, who was concerned about the risks associated with a lack of integration in modern society, characterised by growing differentiation, division of labour, mobility and individualism. A lack of integration is both a problem for the individual and for society as a whole, because insufficient integration between different parts of society threatens to undermine the basis for communal solidarity. Integration is a quality of the social system, not only of its individuals.

One consequence of this is that since integration is about the relationship between the whole and its parts, we can isolate different types of more or less integrated societies. Firstly, we have the ideal state where all parts are fairly equally integrated into a network, where everybody has a direct or indirect connection with everybody else. Another possibility is a society where different groups form well-integrated subsystems with varying degrees of connections between these subsystems. If the connections between the subsystems are very weak, we come close to the notion of 'plural society', a society where different groups live separately from each other and the only interaction between members of different groups happens when 'meeting at the market'. Despite this, I believe that we can talk about an integrated society, as long as the connections between different groups are not too weak, and the differences regarding wealth and power not too dramatic. This means that, in a society, people can be well integrated without having direct ties to members of all subgroups.

Another understanding of integration is more political: integration is the process of becoming an accepted part of society. This is an open-ended definition, emphasising the developing character rather than an end situation, and it does not define the particular requirements for acceptance. This definition may be useful when discussing integration policies.

### **Multiculturalism**

There are, no doubt, risks connected to multiculturalist agendas. One is the risk of looking at culture as something homogenous and static. Another might be an over-emphasis of cultural difference and an under-emphasis of differences connected to social conditions and political claims-making. Many years ago Stephen Ryan (1990) stated that the new interest in these matters has turned researchers from an underestimation of the importance of ethnicity to a more pessimistic view as regards the future of multi-ethnic states.

The multiculturalist prescription is a set of normative notions on how to shape a multicultural society politically. According to multiculturalists, institutions and rules are historical and cultural products that are not neutral for newcomers and thus may need to be revised in order to accommodate a new situation. We might call this an ethno-national community.

The opposite idea is the French one that says that newcomers must adapt to existing public institutions. This means a *de facto* pressure towards assimilation. To my mind, this has been the policy not only of France, but also of Sweden, despite Sweden's official declaration of multiculturalism. This policy includes a denial of minority rights and group rights in the liberal tradition. We might call this the civic-republican model.

The notion *multicultural society* has a large variety of meanings in ongoing discourses. Sometimes it only means a recognition of diversity. Sometimes it means that diversity is a good thing, but that it belongs in the private sphere; but it also can be related to demands for institutional changes, degrees of cultural autonomy and even demands for a multicultural public sphere.

The multi-ethnic state, however, has often been contested; especially the theory of *the plural society*, which stresses the lack of a common will or over-arching loyalty that can transcend ethnic differences in multi-ethnic societies. The plural society is defined by John Furnivall as a medley of peoples - European, Chinese, Indian and native, who do mix but do not combine. Each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only at the marketplace level. Such a society is certainly not a nation state. (See for instance Furnivall, 1948, Smith, 1986.)

### **Collective identities**

Collective identities are formed by ongoing practices and discourses, as well as memories, narratives and concepts of the past. School books as well as the media and popular culture are important for our understanding of the world and our self-understanding. If different groups have very differing views, this may become a problem for a rational dialogue. Collective identities are not only cognitive, but also contain normative elements that affect everyday behaviour.

Another aspect of collective identities is their connection to personal identities. Everybody wants to be proud of themselves and respected by others. If a person has not much to be proud of, there is a risk that this can be compensated for by an aggressive emphasis on the honour of the group (for example, in the USA: 'I may be poor, but at least I am white').

### **Citizenship**

The content and meaning of citizenship can be regarded as something that is in a constant process of change and which is negotiated between different players, interacting with the structures and institutions of the society. In other words, there is ongoing claims-making connected to the concept of citizenship.

The special feature of Estonia is the amount of people with undetermined citizenship which is very problematic despite the fact that it has di-

minished. The goal must be that all permanent residents are either recognised as foreign citizens or citizens of the country in which they live.

### ***Integration policies***

Integration policies can be studied on different levels: neighbourhood, municipality, regional, state and supra-state level.

Immigration policies of European countries have been adhoc, reactive and control-oriented. After WWII, Austria and Switzerland in particular pursued a *Gastarbeiterpolitik*, with severely restricted rights for immigrants. Later, countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium and France acknowledged that migrants were settling, mostly for good. Over time, naturalisation policies have become more inclusive; political rights on the local level were developed for non-citizens and dual citizenship has been introduced as an option, to name a few developments. Yet there are still many differences as regards immigration policies in different European countries.

One crucial question for the success of integration policies is what happens at the level of institutions? We have general, public institutions: education, public health, labour market, and politics; laws, regulations and executive organisations, including written rules and practices. Such institutions may not formally exclude, but may still sometimes hinder access or equal outcomes by their ways of operating, by not taking into account special characteristics of the immigrant/ minority group, caused by migration history, cultural or religious background, or language.

Beyond that, we have specific institutions formed by the immigrants/ minorities themselves. They may be important participants in organisations within civil society, like churches, trade unions, cultural institutions, institutions of professions etc. They may become an accepted part of the society on the same level as comparable institutions of the majority society, or they may isolate themselves, or become unrecognised.

It also seems clear that regional and residential segregation will affect the integration process. In-

dividuals living in regions or areas where Estonian is seldom spoken will live their lives in a different environment. If ethnically different regions develop unequally, this may also cause strain. The historical residential policy of the Soviet Union created ethnic enclaves, which are a challenge to integration. But as I stated earlier, a society can be integrated even if members of different groups mostly interact within their own group, as long as both groups feel that they are a part of the society and as long as there are links between the groups.

I believe that media consumption is also of great importance, or more generally, communication and information. In a multicultural nation state, there must be a core of shared understanding among most citizens.

If we look at integration on an individual level, I think it is fair to say that cognitive adaptation seems to be much easier than adaptation on the aesthetic or normative level, including ethos, habits and traditions. The second generation, however, may experience a 'double socialisation', one in the immigrant/ minority community, and one in the dominant society. Under favourable conditions, such socialisation may lead to an ability to combine roles, identities and loyalties of these different worlds. This, however, does not come about automatically, but is formed by patterns of interaction and interpersonal relations.

The local level is very important in the integration process, because it is at this level that the consequences of integration are felt primarily, and it is there that integration takes place.

We also face a methodological problem: integration is a long-term process, we may have to wait a considerably long period of time to assess if a practice has been successful, and the process itself is affected by several factors. In the Estonian case, I think it is unrealistic to expect immediate results on all levels.

### ***Does size matter?***

Yes, in some cases it does, but of course, size is not the only important factor. A large amount of people cannot be neglected or easily 'forgotten'. They



have an advantage when creating their own institutions and organisations; and if they speak a language which is widely spoken internationally, it gives them stronger reasons to preserve it. A lesser-used language is always under more threat. People who are not born speakers of a lesser-used language, may not find much incentive to learn it. One example is Belgium, where Dutch-speaking Flemings most often also learn French, while French-speaking Walloons do not bother to learn Dutch. Therefore, when the majority language is not widely spoken, the majority may feel an uncertainty about the strength of its own culture, which affects attitudes and patterns of behaviour towards people who speak another language.

The importance of size can be exemplified with two cases:

**1.** Irish Gaelic in the Republic of Ireland. Gaelic is an official state language of the republic and is compulsory in school. However, the small number of everyday speakers of Gaelic, and the position of English as the leading world language, make it nearly impossible to make Gaelic any more than a second language with a symbolic value for Irish identity.

**2.** Swedish is not a minority language in the Finnish constitution, but one of the two national languages on equal grounds. However, the fact that less than six percent speak Swedish as their mother tongue and the fact that Swedish is a fairly minor language in the world, makes Swedish a *de facto* minority language in Finland.

### **Cultural diversity and conflict**

Focusing too much on cultural differences can often lead one astray when analysing ethnic conflicts. Different claims regarding ethnic mobilisation do not need fundamental differences in culture. Relatively big differences can coexist in harmony, while very small differences can be a source of real conflict. Relative deprivation or feelings of unequal status can be one source of conflict, lack of trust and communication, another. Perceived differences in socio-economic conditions and social problems may also be a stumbling block. Conflicting claims which are connected to collective identities

are not always easy to solve. It is certainly not a simple question of information, but communication is still important. Conflict is, after all, a natural element in social life; but a feeling of belonging remains essential.

### **Three case studies for illustration purposes**

I will end by illustrating some of my ideas with three case studies. These are Belgium, Northern Ireland and Estonia.

#### **Belgium**

Belgium illustrates well the potential conflict when regions develop differently. Historically, the French-speaking *Wallonie* was the richer, developed, industrialised part of Belgium and the French language had a higher status than the Dutch language spoken in *Vlaanderen*. Since then the economic development has been much better in *Vlaanderen* and this has led to a relative deprivation experienced by the inhabitants of *Wallonie*. At the same time, they still seem to regard their language to be 'superior', and are not interested in learning Dutch.

#### **Northern Ireland**

People there speak the same language, they look the same and are in many respects the same. The symbolic difference is connected to two varieties of Christianity; collective identities, however, are strong. Protestant Loyalists are regarded by Catholics as siding with the former oppressor, Britain. Catholics are seen by the Loyalists as people more loyal to the Catholic Irish Republic than to their own region. There is a lack of trust and feelings of not being treated equally. But should we call the conflict 'ethnic' or 'cultural'?

#### **Estonia**

The biggest group among non-Estonians is that of Russian-speakers. The size of their group makes it difficult to see them as 'only one of the many non-Estonian groups'. The situation for Russian-speakers in Estonia changed rapidly in the sense

that they became 'strangers' overnight. Before this happened, they spoke the core language of the Soviet Union and most often did not see any reason to learn the local language. Many had emigrated fairly recently. As speakers of the language of power in the Soviet Union, they experienced relative deprivation when Estonian independence was restored. Attitudes among both Estonians and Russian-speakers seem to show a lack of trust, acceptance and respect for the other group. Is the number of non-citizenship cases partly an indicator of a non-acceptance of the restoration of Estonia among Russian-speakers? Are there sentiments towards the Estonian language among Russian-speakers of the same kind as among the Walloons towards the Dutch language? Are there fears among Estonians of a lack of loyalty to the Estonian state and thence a perceived threat to the Estonian culture? At least, it seems that collective identities, narratives and memories are very different, and lack of common media and other common sources of knowledge do not always make a rational dialogue easy.

#### **What about the oxymoron?**

Yes, a multicultural nation state may be an oxymoron, if we follow the orthodox concept of a nation state. However, with a wider definition of the nation state, this does not have to be the case. Many states seem to have a strong common national identity, in spite of cultural diversity, and most nation states are culturally diverse.

However, since every case has its unique features, there are no 'standard' solutions available. What seems clear is that cultural difference per se is perhaps not the key factor. What also seems clear is that communication is important, as well as the consideration of collective identities.

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# Estonia: Multiculturalism and the Nation State



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## **Introduction**

Since 1991, the Western media has periodically raised the issue of the alleged mistreatment of Russian minorities in the Baltic Republics. The information leads the public to think that, since there is no smoke without fire, the Baltic governments are probably not entirely innocent in this respect.

## **The Estonian approach to the question**

Estonia is in the unusual position of being a democratic country confronted with serious problems concerning national integration and education.

Following several years of debate and pressure from various sides (including the Council of Europe, OSCE and the EU) and, taking into consideration the Estonian Founding Principle – ‘one people, one language and one territory’ – the Es-

tonian authorities have recently ‘invented’ an Estonian form of multiculturalism based on two simultaneous processes:

- » A ‘homogenisation’ of society based on knowledge of the national language and on the corresponding rejection of the principle of a dual official language (Estonian and Russian);
- » The maintenance of ethnic ‘differences’ through the recognition of cultural rights for minorities.

## **Two Communities still largely living side by side**

Before trying to understand what went wrong in the integration process, let us have a look at the way Russians and Estonians live together in Estonia. Generally speaking, the inter-personal relations between the ‘locals’ and the ‘aliens’ are rather good and, at least, peaceful. With the exception of the incident concerning the relocation of the

Bronze Soldier last spring, there has practically never been any violence. And yet the two communities remain mostly apart as separate groups.

### ***What has caused the integration difficulties?***

Whilst the problems of the first years of Estonian independence may be fairly easily understood, the continuation of these difficulties is less comprehensible now that the naturalisation process is underway, and considering that the country is a member of the EU and is doing extremely well economically...

The explanation may lie in one of two directions.

The Estonian authorities have been rather slow in making their position clear vis-à-vis the issue of integration. The concept of integration was initially largely imported from Brussels and therefore may not be accepted by the Estonian population.

This hesitation with regard to policy, whilst not pushing Russian-speakers to leave the country, has nevertheless failed to give them a chance to take full advantage of their new situation.

Currently, it is possible to identify three different groups within the population:

- » Large areas of rural Estonia where Estonian is absolutely dominant;
- » Urban Ida-Virumaa where Russian is practically the only spoken local language and where the vast majority of Russians do not speak the national language;
- » Tallinn, which is rapidly becoming a cosmopolitan and multilingual metropolis.

The real risk for the future is that this situation may become definitive!

The major problems with the current situation stem from the fact that the Russians lack a clear feeling of national identity and pride following the perceived shameful conclusion of the Cold War. They are torn between a motherland (Russia) which is no longer their real home and the Estonian state which fails to make them feel really welcome. The situation is aggravated by the fact that one of the traditional historical episodes provid-

ing a validation for Russian dignity is the USSR victory over Germany in the *Great Patriotic War* which is precisely a period which – due to its connection with the annexation of 1945 – is demonised by official Estonian history.

Confronted with the marginalisation of the Russian language and culture in Estonia, there is a risk of radicalisation of a fringe group of young Russian-Estonian activists. The Estonians have not completely changed their minds; they still often see the Russians as ‘occupiers’ and inferiors, and tend to remain reluctant when it comes to integration of these ‘aliens’.

### ***Whilst some things went wrong, others went rather well!***

Fortunately the situation seems to be changing in favour of a more realistic perception. There are increasing suggestions that the Russian presence might after all present some advantages.

In the *Riigikogu*, the radical parties advocating nationalist stands regarding the ‘aliens’ are losing ground. Among other examples of positive news, one can add the fact that a growing number of young Russian-speakers are becoming fluent in Estonian. The knowledge of Estonian is becoming less ethnic and the Russian language, previously widespread and despised, will progressively become an important asset, mostly in the hands of Russians. The growing number of Russian economic success stories in Estonia should be mentioned among the positive aspects of the improved attitudes towards Russians living in Estonia.

If we look at the geo-political aspect of the question, we see that Moscow is less and less perceived by the Estonian-Russians as their natural protector and is increasingly seen as ‘foreign’. Estonia is a stable and free land where the standard of living and levels of personal security are good, and is now frequently considered by the young Russians as their country regardless of questions of history and language.

In many ways the Estonians and Russians living in Estonia, having engaged in the process of developing new values in the European context, seem

to be moving towards a mutual acceptance. Last but not least, the passing of time and the disappearance of the strongly antagonistic older generation should progressively help to improve the situation.

***Possible ways to improve the situation even further***

In the autumn of 2007, life remains quiet and none of the drama threatened by Russian militants has occurred. It still remains that the situation is far from satisfactory. What conclusions can be drawn from this?

Since regaining independence, much has been achieved in Estonia to establish a democratic and peaceful society. Globally, considering the short timescale, the results are remarkable. Recently, however, largely owing to the unrest around the educational reform and the decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier, a sharp increase in inter-ethnic tension has become apparent. We have also seen that, despite recent improvements, the naturalisation process remains too slow. The question is, what could be done to improve the situation?

***Some possible steps which could be taken are as follows:***

The Estonian and Russian communities apparently now largely agree on the fact that there are two complementary aims to be reached.

***To build an Estonian society ...***

- » as embodied in the very nature of the post-Soviet Estonian state and corresponding to the aims stated by the Estonian draft integration strategy for 2008-2013. This appears to be a non-negotiable objective.
- » without a clearly defined national identity, a newly formed multi-ethnic state may have the tendency to be split between factions trying to impose their views and ideology on the nation. The initial adoption of a "nationalisation policy" has compelled Russian-speakers to consider themselves as a minority, and thence define their identity and establish their position with regard to the majority.

***... which is at the same time an integrated society.***

- » The presence of an important population of Russian speakers is a fact which cannot be ignored.
- » Integration is good for the country and its future development. Diversity is more and more recognised as an asset – for example, as stated in the 2004 United Nations Development Programme report.

***How can the achievement of these objectives of integration in society be facilitated?***

The Estonian and Russian communities, whilst in regular contact within the workplace, still often spend their private lives apart and tend to ignore and even to some extent fear each other. The situation is particularly apparent in Ida-Virumaa where Estonian is scarcely used in everyday life. The aim of any integration programme must therefore be to inform each community about the point of view and culture of the other and thus promote the beginning of mutual recognition. Several steps can be suggested to help with this.

- » Facilitate the interconnection and mutual recognition of the Estonian and the Russian communities. The differing perspectives of both groups regarding the history of the Sovietisation of Estonia is an obvious stumbling block in this regard. Whereas 60% of Estonians consider it to be a brutal military occupation, the majority of Russians continue to see it as an unavoidable consequence of the Soviet victory over fascism. The simultaneous prohibition of Nazi and Soviet emblems is resented as a further blow to what currently still constitutes the heart of the Russian identity.
- » Consider what could be described as a social urban planning approach to the problematic Soviet housing developments. The recently introduced French policy of the restructuring (both physical and social) of urban areas, currently in the process of implementation, might be worth consideration.

- » Give non-citizens symbolic recognition, such as allow to use the Russian language officially at town council level.
- » Estonia is a tolerant and not overtly religious country (Lutheranism is widespread and inclusive). Orthodoxy, a traditional icon of Russian identity is thus well-tolerated. Considering that the Russians lack a national identity, religion could maybe play a certain symbolic role in this regard.
- » Promote freedom of movement within the territory of the republic (particularly between the north-eastern cities and the rest of the country) to lessen differences between the groups.

Of course, none of these measures can be effectively implemented without the co-operation of representatives of Russian-speakers. Improved communication with these individuals is vital.

#### **Public secondary schools**

As can be expected, the problem in this field lies not so much in what has been done (or not done) by the authorities rather than in the way in which it has been achieved or presented. Here are some suggestions which could help.

- » Be comprehensive and tolerant. Do not demonise the other group. Avoid all arrogance and radicalism when addressing members of the other community. The Russian activists should try to take into consideration what the 'silent parents' want and avoid exaggerations when describing the situation!
- » Seek help and co-operation from existing pro-Estonian Russians. Do not underestimate their influence. Keep in mind that ignoring or neglecting their role may be counterproductive.
- » Beware of assuming that all members of each group will have the same motivation; make a clear distinction between the realistic and

co-operative individuals and the radical ones. Chose your main partners among the tough but loyal ones.

- » Avoid handling the situation in all counties the same way. The differences should probably be more precisely observed and taken into consideration.
- » Bear in mind that not all Russian schools are alike and study each situation case by case. Maintain a constant dialogue with teachers. Finland and Hungary may also offer useful fields of observation and possible benchmarks of success.

#### **Conclusion**

The aim of the Estonian state should be to build up an open society based on pluralism and mutual recognition. If this is not achieved rapidly, there might arise the risk of a doubly ghettoised society. With the progression of the naturalisation process, a large proportion of the citizens (not to mention the remaining non-citizens) will not recognise Estonia as theirs; and their discomfort will only increase, endangering the stability of the state as a whole.

Successful integration would on the contrary imply that:

- » Russian speakers who want to retain their Russian roots find it possible to be both citizens of Estonia while simultaneously keeping their Russian cultural identity;
- » Estonians consider their Russian neighbours to be members of the same community and see them as a benefit for the nation.

There is obviously still a long way to go, but Estonia has already accomplished so much and has so many assets that such an aim is not unrealistic.



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# Integration: a Psychological and Cultural Perspective

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Integration can take place in the context of relations between nation states (internationally), between groups (within culturally-diverse nation states), and between individuals (who are members of these collective entities). All three levels can be examined using social science concepts and methods, and they can also be studied using psychological ones. This paper focuses on the psychological (individual) and cultural (group) dimensions of integration at the latter two levels, while not losing sight of the broader international political, economic and socio-cultural contexts within which integration phenomena develop and are expressed.

This broader context is the worldwide existence of culturally plural societies, many of which are products of international phenomena such as colonisation and slavery, refugee and immigration movements. Culturally plural societies are those in which a number of different cultural or ethnic

groups reside together within a shared political and social framework (Brooks, 2002). All contemporary societies are now culturally plural; no society is made up of people having one culture, one language, and one identity (Sam & Berry, 2006). There has been a long-standing assumption that such cultural diversity within societies will eventually disappear. This is because contact between cultures is a creative and reactive process, generating new customs and values, and stimulating resistance, rather than simply leading to cultural domination and homogenisation.

The phrase *intercultural strategies* refers to the core idea that groups and individuals (both dominant and non-dominant) living in plural societies engage each other in a number of different ways (Berry, 1974, 1980). Whether it is the coloniser or the colonised, immigrants or those already settled, individuals and groups hold preferences with respect to the particular ways in which they wish to


engage their own and other groups. When examined among non-dominant ethno-cultural groups that are in contact with a dominant group, these preferences have become known as *acculturation strategies*. When examined among the dominant group, and when the views held are about how non-dominant groups *should* acculturate, they have been called *acculturation expectations* (Berry, 2003). Finally, when examined among the dominant group, and when the views held are about how they *themselves* should change to accommodate the other groups in their society, the strategy is assessed with a concept called *multicultural ideology* (Berry et al, 1977).

All three sets of views are based on the same two underlying issues: 1. the degree to which there is a desire to maintain the group's culture and identity; and 2. the degree to which there is a desire to engage in daily interactions with other ethno-cultural groups in the larger society, including the dominant one. Underlying these two issues is the idea that not all groups and individuals seek to engage in intercultural relations in the same way (Berry, 1980, 1984); there are large variations in how peo-

ple seek to relate to each other, including various alternatives to the assumption of eventual assimilation. They have become known as *strategies* rather than *attitudes* because they consist of both attitudes and behaviours (that is, they include both the preferences and the actual outcomes) that are exhibited in day-to-day intercultural encounters.

Four strategies have been derived from these two basic issues facing all acculturating peoples: a relative preference for maintaining one's heritage culture and identity; and a relative preference for having contact with and participating in the larger society along with other ethno-cultural groups. These two issues are presented in **Figure 1**, where they are presented as independent of (ie. orthogonal to) each other. Their independence has been demonstrated empirically in a number of studies (eg. Ben-Shalom & Horenczyk, 2003; Ryder et al, 2000).

These two issues can be responded to on attitudinal dimensions, represented by bipolar arrows. For purposes of presentation only, generally positive or negative orientations to these issues intersect



**Figure 1.** Intercultural Strategies of Ethno-cultural Groups and the Larger Society



to define four strategies. These strategies carry different names, depending on which ethno-cultural groups (the dominant or non-dominant) are being considered. From the point of view of non-dominant groups (on the left in **Figure 1**), when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the *Assimilation* strategy is defined. In contrast, when individuals place a value on holding on to their original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the *Separation* alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both maintaining one's original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups, *Integration* is the option. In this case, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking, as a member of an ethno-cultural group, to participate as an integral part of the larger society. Finally, when there is little possibility of, or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of enforced cultural loss), and little interest in having relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination), then *Marginalisation* is defined.

This presentation was based on the assumption that non-dominant groups and their individual members have the freedom to choose how they want to acculturate. This, of course, is not always the case. When the dominant group enforces certain forms of acculturation, or constrains the choices of non-dominant groups or individuals, then a third element becomes necessary. This is the power of the dominant group to influence the acculturation strategies available to, and used by, the non-dominant groups (introduced by Berry, 1974). As a result, there is a mutual, reciprocal process through which both groups arrive at strategies that will work in a particular society, and in a particular setting. For example, integration can only be chosen and successfully pursued by non-dominant groups when the dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity. Thus a mutual accommodation is required for integration to be attained, involving the acceptance by both groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different peoples. This strategy re-

quires non-dominant groups to adopt the basic values of the larger society, while at the same time the dominant group must be prepared to adapt national institutions (eg. education, health, labour) to meet the needs of all groups now living together in the plural society.

These two basic issues were initially approached from the point of view of the non-dominant ethno-cultural groups. However, the original anthropological definition of acculturation clearly established that *both* groups in contact would become acculturated (Redfield et al, 1936). The concern for the role that the dominant group played in the emergence of these strategies (Berry, 1974) led to a conceptualisation portrayed on the right side of **Figure 1**. Assimilation, when sought by the non-dominant acculturating group, is termed the *Melting Pot*. When separation is forced by the dominant group it is called *Segregation*. Marginalisation, when imposed by the dominant group, is *Exclusion*. Finally, for integration, when cultural diversity is a feature of the society as a whole, including all the various ethno-cultural groups, it is called *Multiculturalism*. With the use of this framework, comparisons can be made between individuals and their ethno-cultural groups, and between non-dominant peoples and the larger society within which they are acculturating. The ideologies and policies of the dominant group constitute an important element of research into ethnic relations (see Berry et al, 1977), while the preferences of non-dominant peoples are a core feature in acculturation research, (Berry et al, 1989). Bourhis and colleagues (Bourhis et al, 1997; Montreuil & Bourhis, 2004) have recently expanded on this interest, examining situations where the two parties in contact may have different views about how to go about their mutual acculturation. Inconsistencies and conflicts between these various acculturation preferences are sources of difficulty, usually for acculturating individuals, but also for members of the dominant group. Generally, when acculturation experiences cause problems for acculturating individuals, or conflicts between acculturating groups, we observe the phenomenon of *acculturative stress* (Berry & Ataca, 2007).

### **Integration: psychological and cultural**

From these recent research programmes, we can see the evolving complexity of the meaning of the term integration, both as a process and as a set of alternative outcomes. What follows is my attempt to draw together these various threads into a more comprehensive picture, at both the individual/ psychological and group/ cultural levels. In seeking this coherence, I follow in the footsteps of William of Ockham who advised: "Do not multiply entities endlessly".

#### **Psychological level meaning**

With respect to psychological meaning, I draw on the well-established distinction in psychology between *process, competence and performance* (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2004). Processes are those psychological features of individuals that are the fundamental ways in which people deal with their day-to-day experiences, such as perception, learning, and categorisation. Competencies are those features of individuals that develop with experience, such as abilities, attitudes and values. Performances are those activities of individuals that are expressed as behaviour, such as carrying out projects, and engaging in political action.

*Processes.* It is widely assumed that psychological processes are universal. That is, all human beings have these basic features, regardless of culture or experience (Berry et al, 2002). Competencies are built up on the basis of the interaction of underlying processes and people's encounters with the outside world. Performances are those expressions of competencies that are appropriate to, or are triggered by, particular contexts. For exam-

ple, all immigrants have the process available to them of learning the language of their new society. The competence in the language will depend on a number of factors, including opportunities to learn it (through formal instruction or informal social interaction). The actual performance will depend, not only on the competence, but also on a host of situational factors, such as the language of the interlocutor, and the requirement to speak the new language in any particular situation (such as at work or in one's ethno-cultural community). **Table 1** provides these distinctions on the horizontal dimension.

*Cognitive Activity.* Applying these distinctions to the concept of integration, we may identify two of the core cognitive processes involved (Berry, 1992, 1997, 2004). First is *learning*, using the processes of enculturation and acculturation; individuals have the capacity to acquire the main features of their societies including the language, norms, values, skills important to their survival. Second is *memory*, in order to retain those features that have been learned in either cultural community. The converse of memory is *shedding (forgetting)*, in which some of these features are selectively cast aside. See **Table 2** for an outline of these cognitive processes involved in intercultural strategies.

*Affective processes* are those that link the individual emotionally (positively or negatively) to a particular aspect of their life. See **Table 3** for an outline of these affective processes involved in intercultural strategies. For people living interculturally, two important ones are the *attitudes* and *identities* that individuals have, with respect to their heritage culture and their new society.

PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPONENT	PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITY		
	Process (Underlying)	Competence (Developed)	Performance (Expressed)
Cognitive	Culture Learning, Culture memory	Cultural knowledge, Abilities	Work performance, Actions
Affective	Liking, identifying	Values, attitudes	Social action

**Table 1.** Psychological Components and Activities in Intercultural Strategies

COGNITIVE PROCESSES, COMPETENCE, PERFORMANCE				
Intercultural Strategy	Own Culture Retention	Own Culture Shedding	New Culture Learning	New Culture Rejecting
INTEGRATION	High	Low	High	Low
Alternation (Code switching)				
Merging (Hybrid)				
ASSIMILATION	Low	High	High	Low
SEPARATION	High	Low	Low	High
MARGINALISATION	Low	High	Low	High

**Table 2.** Cognitive Activities in Intercultural Strategies

### Competencies

*Cognitive competencies* refers to a cultural knowledge about how to carry out daily activities. These can range from some rather mundane abilities (such as knowing how to use the phone or transport systems) to much more complex sets of knowledge (such as the laws pertaining to taxation or hate speech). Once again, integration involves knowledge of both sets, assimilation and separation of one set, and marginalisation of neither.

*Affective competencies* include such aspects as *attitudes* towards one's own group and other groups, *identities* within both groups, and *values* of both groups. Integration involves the positive evaluation of, identification with and acceptance of the values of both groups. Assimilation involves positive attitudes towards the dominant group (and the rejection of one's own group), identification with the dominant group but not with one's heritage group, and acceptance of the values of the dominant group rather than that of the heritage group.

### Performances

As noted above, not everything a person is capable of doing is actually carried out; the stage needs to be set appropriately for any competence to be performed. Cognitive performances may or may not be expressed if they are not appropriate to the situation. In some cases, speaking one's moth-

er tongue in front of others who do not understand it may be considered by them an affront or insult. Attitudes, identities and values may or may not be expressed depending on the social context. Dress or head wear that expresses one's religion or ethnicity can even be illegal or prohibited in certain situations. Skills that have been acquired (for example to speak, or to engage in social interactions) may be advantageous for a person in some situations but not in others. Integration involves performing in settings where both sets of competencies are valued and allowed; assimilation and separation in places where only one set is accepted, and marginalisation, where neither set is allowed, or even suppressed.

*Integration* involves the optimal learning and retention by individuals and minimal shedding/forgetting of previously established ways of living. See **Table 2** for these patterns of cognitive activity. Applying these distinctions to the concept of integration, we may identify two of the core *processes* involved (Berry, 1992, 1997, 2004). First is *learning*, using the processes of enculturation and acculturation; individuals have the capacity to acquire the main features of their societies including the language, norms, values and skills important to their survival. Second is memory, in order to retain those features that have been learned in either cultural community. The converse of memory is *shedding (forgetting)*, in which some of these features are selectively cast aside.

For *cognitive activity*, *Assimilation* involves optimal learning of *features* of the dominant society by

AFFECTIVE PROCESS, COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE				
Intercultural Strategy	Own Culture Liking/Identity	Own Culture Rejection	New Culture Liking/Identity	New Culture Rejection
INTEGRATION	High	Low	High	Low
Alternation (Code switching)				
Merging (Hybrid)				
ASSIMILATION	Low	High	High	Low
SEPARATION	High	Low	Low	High
MARGINALISATION	Low	High	Low	High

**Table 3.** *Affective Activities in Intercultural Strategies*

non-dominant individuals, combined with minimal memory for (increased shedding/ forgetting of) features of one's heritage culture. *Separation* involves minimal learning of features of the new society, combined with optimal retention of features of one's heritage culture. *Marginalisation* involves the combination of minimal learning of the new culture, and forgetting of one's heritage culture.

These affective activities are often considered to be at the core of intercultural relations (Berry, 2004). While there is widespread agreement that cognitive activities can be developed in multiple forms (eg. a person can learn to be competent in and speak more than one language, or develop more than one set of culturally-appropriate behaviours), it is also widely believed that ethnic group attitudes and cultural identities may be conflicting or even opposed to each other. However, this is not necessarily the case. In the international study of immigrant youth (Berry et al, 2006) the correlations between ethnic identity (with one's heritage cultural group) and national identity (with the larger society) were positive in the established "settler societies" (such as Australia, Canada, and the USA), whereas in societies with more recent histories of immigration, the correlations were negative. That is, young immigrants in some societies have figured out that it is possible to have compatible identities, while in others, they are seen as incompatible. In national surveys in Canada (eg. Kalin & Berry, 1995), there is evidence

that multiple identities are "nested". That is, when respondents were asked to indicate their *categorical identity* (which group they felt they most belonged to), and then their *correlated identity* (their strength of identification with each of a number of groups), the strength of their identity with their main category was highest, but many of the other identity strengths were also high. That is, even though individuals can say which their main identity is, they do not feel that all other possible identities are to be rejected; while one identity is superordinate, others are comfortably nested with in it. More recently (Cameron & Berry, 2007), re-analysis of a national survey in Canada showed that the degree of "national pride" (essentially, the strength of one's positive identity within Canada), is positively correlated with the acceptance of a multicultural ideology. That is, a strong national identity as 'Canadian' is compatible with the acceptance of cultural diversity and equitable participation of all ethno-cultural groups. It is not known whether this pattern exists in other societies; however, its presence in one society demonstrates that there is no necessary incompatibility between these affective activities. Current research in eighteen other societies (the MIRIPS project) will seek an answer to this question.

Another affective process is that of *security*. In the multicultural policy statement, we saw that there is a concern for creating a sense of confidence among everyone who resides in a plural society. We have considered that this confidence involves

a sense of *security*, or conversely a sense of *threat*, to one's ethno-cultural group. The *multiculturalism hypothesis* (Berry et al, 1977: 192) is that such a sense of security in one's identity will be a psychological precondition for the acceptance of those who are culturally different. Conversely, when one's identity is threatened, people will reject others, whether they are members of other ethno-cultural groups or immigrants to the society.

To summarise, these affective activities appear to be variably related to each other, depending on the social and political circumstances. In some societies, cultural identities are positively correlated; elsewhere, cultural identities may be nested within each other, or contained within the broader notion of multiculturalism. However, in some societies they are incompatible, especially when there is a perceived lack of security or overt threats to an individual's, or a group's cultural identity. The challenge for Estonia is to create a set of social and political circumstances where positive and mutually-compatible affective activities (intercultural attitudes and cultural identities) are established and maintained.

#### **Cultural level meaning of integration**

The cultural level of *integration* was referred to as *multiculturalism* in **Figure 1**. Components of this way of living are shown in **Table 4** for both the dominant larger society and the non-dominant ethno-cultural groups. This vision of how to live

in plural societies incorporates three basic social processes. The first is the acceptance of the value of *cultural diversity* for a society by all constituent cultural communities. Such diversity is to be seen as a resource, to be prized and nurtured. The second is the promotion of *equitable participation* by all groups in the larger society. All groups have the right to access all aspects of the larger society, including culturally-appropriate education, work, health care, and justice. These two components are the basis of the Canadian multicultural policy (see Berry 1984, for a psychological analysis), as well as of the two dimensions that underlie the intercultural strategies framework (**Figure 2**).

In order to accomplish these two goals, multiculturalism requires a third process: *social and institutional change* to meet the needs of all the groups living together in the plural society. All groups should be prepared constantly to reassess their ways of living together, and to engage in compromise. That is, attaining the multicultural vision requires *mutual accommodation*, rather than change on the part of only one of the groups. This accommodation requires that the institutions of the dominant group/ larger society should *evolve*, so that the needs of all (dominant and non-dominant) groups can be met. It also requires that the non-dominant groups *adopt* the basic (but evolving) values of the larger society, and to *adapt* to the existing (but evolving) social institutions and structures.

Components of Multiculturalism	Dominant Society	Non-Dominant Ethno-cultural Groups
Cultural Diversity	Policy and programme acceptance and promotion of all cultures as valuable resources for larger society.	Retention of heritage culture; acceptance of basic values of the larger society.
Equitable Participation	Promotion of full access for everyone to all domains of the larger society.	Seek contact, participation and knowledge of main domains of larger society.
Institutional Change in Larger Society to Achieve "Mutual Accommodation"	Accept that major institutions will evolve to accommodate all ethno-cultural groups.	Participate in changing institutions so that they also reflect heritage culture needs.

**Table 4.** Cultural Level Meaning of Integration/ Multiculturalism

The cultural level meaning of integration corresponds with the psychological level in a number of ways. First, they both are based on the acceptance of the two underlying values of diversity and equity. If there is diversity without the acceptance of equity, the result is separation/ segregation; if there is equity without the acceptance of diversity, the result is assimilation/ melting pot; if there is acceptance of neither value, then marginalisation/ exclusion is the result. Only when there is a balance between the two values, within individuals and in society at large, can personal integration and societal multiculturalism be achieved.

Second, the process of change is inherent in the two levels. Intercultural relations take place over time, during which individuals explore, learn, forget, adapt and eventually settle into a preferred way of living. Similarly, societies evolve their positions over time, often beginning with a preference for an ethnically-homogeneous nation state, then coming to realise that this is not a realistic vision. Alternatives are then explored, sometimes with a view to segregating or excluding others from full and equitable participation in the public life of the larger society. Others may seek to balance the interests and needs of all the cultural communities, while still favouring those of the dominant cultural community.

Canada has tried all of these, but eventually settled on a balanced approach, with some residual linguistic privilege for those of British and French origin. The current Estonian integration plan appears also to seek a balance, but with substantial privilege reserved for those of Estonian ethnicity and citizenship. The future will tell...

### Conclusions

In this paper, I have outlined some concepts derived from cross-cultural, social and intercultural psychology, and applied them to the 'meaning of integration'. To these, I have added some discussion of the cultural level meaning of the concept, and pointed out two fundamental similarities between these two levels. If the findings from social and intercultural psychology eventually prove to be valid in Estonia, then some lessons may be de-

rived: first, that successful management of a plural society requires *mutual accommodation*. The recognition that all groups have a valid claim to maintaining their cultural ways of life, and on this basis, equitable participation in the daily life of the larger society is essential for the well-being of everyone. Attempts to assimilate, segregate or marginalise any person or group will be accompanied by poor psychological and socio-cultural adaptation. The evidence from the studies reviewed shows that the integration/ multicultural way of living together is usually the one that leads to the most positive outcomes.

Second, the personal and collective search for *security* by Estonians (if achieved) should promote positive intercultural relations in the country as a whole. However, if this security is achieved by undermining or threatening the security of other ethno-cultural groups in Estonia, then intercultural relations will deteriorate. For me, *diversity* and *equity*, accompanied by *mutual accommodation* are the core values that need to be incorporated in any successful integration strategy. I wish you luck!

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# Dominant Ethnicity and Integration: the Estonian Case

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A well known theorist of nationalism, Rogers Brubaker, argues in his article 'The Return of Assimilation', that integration and assimilation have both returned as important concepts in academic and centre-Left discourse since the 1990s, displacing some of the previous emphasis on multiculturalism and difference (Brubaker, 2001). Multiculturalism's emphasis on difference and its preservation is questioned increasingly in academic circles in Europe and the United States. More stress has been placed on integration and less on preserving difference. Why is this the case?

One reason is connected to my subject of dominant group ethnicity. Most western societies have an ethnic majority, a dominant ethnic group which sees the state as an extension of itself. The dominant group (ie. the English in Britain, the French in France) wants to see itself reflected in the state. Yet multiculturalism often portrays 'diversity' as everything that is different from the 'bad' old ma-

jority group. In North America, this means that any ethnic groups which are not white, Anglo-Saxon or Protestant can lay claim to being part of a spicy new 'diversity' that is unfolding to replace the bland old monoculturalism. The new groups should be celebrated, and the old group derided as boring and oppressive. This arose, somewhat understandably, from a left-wing determination to supersede shameful episodes in the national past, in which dominant groups stole land from aboriginals and excluded or repressed minorities (Kaufmann, 2004). In addition, a strongly conformist culture, like the puritanical Protestant America of the 1920s or the Catholic conformity of Ireland in the 1950s, has been viewed by liberals as limiting the potential for individual self-expression.

Naturally enough, many members of ethnic majorities do not identify with multiculturalism because they do not see themselves as being represented in it – indeed, they often see themselves

criticised by it. This is one of the forces that led to the increasing success of far-Right parties in Western European societies like Norway, Italy, Austria and France. The centre-Right sought to win back these voters by appealing not to a *völkisch* ethnic nationalism, but rather to civic nationalism (Bale, 2003). The debate over integration was further magnified by 9/11, the Madrid bombings, the 7/7 bombings in London in 2003, the Van Gogh murder in Amsterdam, the Danish cartoons controversy and the rise of the so-called 'war on terror'.

Where does integration lie as a concept? According to Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, integration is a policy for regulating ethnic conflict that stands between assimilation on the one hand, which involves immigrants or minorities melting fully into the dominant group, and multiculturalism on the other, whereby ethnic groups maintain their own distinctiveness (O'Leary & McGarry, 1993).

An extreme form of multiculturalism is found in societies where politics is primarily organised on the basis of group rights. A current example is Northern Ireland. If you are a politician in the Northern Ireland Assembly, you must declare yourself either a *Unionist*, a *Nationalist* or *Other*. The composition of the Northern Ireland Assembly mirrors the composition of the Northern Ireland population. Schooling is entirely separate – Protestant schools and Catholic schools. In addition, sports, media and social life is lived apart while residential segregation is the norm. There is integration in Northern Ireland at work and in the commercial centres of towns, but not beyond that.

Integration, then, is something between assimilation and the full-blooded multiculturalism that we see, for example, in Northern Ireland. In addition, integration is linked to the idea of civic nationalism – immigrants should become like natives, but only at the level of economics, politics and mass culture, not at the level of private beliefs and behaviour.

I want to go back to a work which is referenced often – Milton Gordon's book *Assimilation in American Life* (Gordon, 1964). Gordon broke up the assimilation process into a number of steps which I

have simplified here into cultural, structural (economic and political), marital and personal assimilation. Assimilation typically begins at a cultural level, ie. immigrants come to the United States and learn to speak English. This helps them to succeed in the economy, to participate and vote in civic life at local and federal levels, leading to structural assimilation. This is what I think we can call civic integration, the new mantra of most modern western governments. But one cannot maintain private diversity so easily when public unity is on the march. 'Unity in diversity' thus contains contradictions which cannot be held back any more than Canute could command the tides.

When people are getting along so swimmingly at work and in public, chances are they are also going to start interacting in private. When you have good civic integration, you also have intermarriage, which starts the process of marital and personal (ie. ethnic) assimilation. A lot of people are finding that white Americans in particular are becoming an intermarried group – 50% of Catholics, Protestants and Jews marry outside their own cultural circle and are creating what Richard Alba coined a new 'Euro American' group. Asian, African and Hispanic Americans are also blending into the edges of this new group. There are still quite clear Jewish-American communities and there always will be. Not everybody is blending in, but there is definitely a process of voluntary assimilation, which Brubaker remarks upon (Brubaker, 2001). The same is true in Canada: like most young Canadians, I am of multiple ethnic origin, and this tends to weaken the discrete 'cultures' of multiculturalism, leading to more of a melting pot. Thus Canada, despite its multiculturalism policy, is actually an excellent example of a successful melting pot, albeit one in which newcomers or their descendants voluntarily (rather than coercively) blend into mainstream English or French-speaking national cultures.

The last stage of this process is identification with the host society. I am not saying that this is the way things *should* unfold, but it is what has tended to occur, at least in English-speaking societies. This happens voluntarily, and must be distinguished, as Brubaker notes, from coercive assimilation policies such as Franco's ban on the use of minori-

ty languages like Catalan in Spain, or a policy of forcing ethnic minorities to declare themselves a member of majority, eg. the way Kurds in Syria must declare themselves Arab in order to get citizenship rights. Clearly these are negative policies to be condemned.

That said, what we find in most western countries are statist policies aimed at cultural and structural assimilation, ie. integration policies. These have taken on an almost formulaic quality: citizenship ceremonies, as in the United States; national holidays (eg. Bastille Day in France); 'sacred' constitutions, such as the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights; and statements of national 'values' and common institutions and projects, as found in Gordon Brown's recent pronouncements on Britishness. If we look at the Estonian draft integration policy document, we find similar phraseology: "The strong common core of Estonian society consists of the following elements: general humanistic and democratic values, common information space, the Estonian language, importance of being a citizen, common institutions". From this perspective, the Estonian integration document is very similar to what we find in other western societies: a list of common denominators that will not ruffle too many feathers. The big question is whether this actually makes any difference on the ground when it comes to interaction between ethnic groups?

For example, the aforementioned components of Estonian identity are held to furnish a "strong common core", yet this may be viewed quite differently by the main ethnic groups in Estonia. Native Estonians will see nothing of their long history of resistance to the Russian 'Bear' or their linguistic connections to the Finns and Hungarians. Ethnic Russians will consider the Estonian 'common core' as an Estonian imposition that fails to recognise the country's bicultural character. They would desire instead to have some of the rights enjoyed by the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland or the Flemings in Belgium. Separate schools and a guaranteed share of the legislature, civil service and police force jobs, not to mention official language status and recognition of Estonia as a bicultural society.

At this point, it behoves us briefly to consider terminology. I am not a huge fan of the word *nation*. I would rather talk about the *state* and *ethnic groups*. The *nation* is sometimes used to mean the former, and sometimes the latter, so let us bypass it here. The *state* tries to promote its own community of solidarity and identity. Civic nationalism – I prefer the words the *state community* – is the result. The state wants to create a community based on the land, flag, constitution, welfare state, values, and an official language. In many ways this can seem a bit abstract for an ordinary citizen in terms of their daily life. It may just be the official culture that surrounds them 'out there' but fails to reflect their deeper attachments. The question is: will this construct satisfy a true Estonian nationalist on the one hand, and ethnic minorities on the other? Most likely it will not satisfy either, which does not, however, mean it should not be promulgated.

The ethnic group is a creature of a different stripe to the state community. We can think of the Estonian state as promoting one identity, and the Estonian ethnic group as advancing another. If the two projects overlap – as they did in the interwar period – you get ethnic nationalism. Today, however, the state and ethnic groups are much further apart. Ethnic groups consider themselves to be of shared genealogical descent, with a specific language, ethno-history and sometimes religion – we came here, we had great battles, suffered great losses, we resisted, and we got our freedom.

Thus the state identity – shaped by political considerations – and the dominant ethnic identity, more driven by spiritual and cultural concerns, diverge. For instance, in Quebec, the nationalism of the *Parti Québécois* (PQ) is about the French language and the integration of immigrants into this civic culture. However, in reality, there also exists a French-Canadian ethnic group largely descended from 10,000 settlers in the early 1600s that has 250 years of what it calls 'la survivance' vis à vis the English. That narrative of resistance is distinct to the French-Canadian ethnic community and does not transmit as easily as language. The alienation of many ethnic French-Canadians from the PQ's abstract civic nationalism is one of the factors be-


hind the recent rise of the populist ADQ, which has cut deeply into the PQ's vote share. Similarly, in Estonia, the Estonian ethnic group maintains a collective memory stretching back hundreds of years, and mainly oriented against Russian/ Soviet aggression. This is very different from the statist idea of being part of Europe, doing well economically, and so forth. Therefore the Estonian state community and the Estonian dominant ethnic community are not the same.

One of the ways of thinking about Estonians and Russians within Estonia is to use an optical metaphor of identity based on the way the human eye operates. Light from objects is refracted through our lenses and is filtered through the mental concepts we have learned to recognise. We construct our sense of national (read: state) identities in the same manner. Different interpretive lenses will dis-

tort the light of reality in different ways to produce different national images. Thus ethnic Russians and Estonians look at Estonia (land, state, people) differently. The ethnic Russians look at Estonia and say, 'we came here and saved Estonia from the Nazis, we have a long history going back to the Russian empire', etc. The ethnic Estonians peer through a different interpretive lens, seeing a history of resisting the Russians, recently culminating in freedom – but a freedom which is precarious and must be zealously defended. The Bronze Soldier episode neatly encapsulates the different perspectives on what are often the same events - but which are nonetheless interpreted differently because of different, distorting, ethnic lenses (See **Figure 1**).

Dominant ethnic groups see themselves as the indigenous population, and the Russian population as interlopers: a fifth column introduced by a hostile foreign power. They view the Estonian state as an extension of their ethnic selves. As the integration report states: "Estonians regard Estonia primarily as a society that belongs to the dominant group, ie. Estonians, and assume that non-Estonians should have a lower social position in that society" (p. 39). Ethnic Russians see the Estonian state as a state for ethnic Estonians and not for them, and wish for it to be more of a neutral, and, ultimately, bicultural state. One of the most important factors for dominant groups is thus the idea of indigenesness – we were here first, we are the natives.

Estonia clearly wants to move towards the direction of being a neutral, civic state. But can it ever be neutral? Will Kymlicka makes a clear distinction between immigrant groups and national minorities. National minorities see themselves as indigenous, whereas immigrant groups do not. Indigenesness is crucial – it is part of the logic of international law, informed decolonisation and ideas about indigenous land rights. French *colons* in Algeria were held to be non-natives, foreign settlers who should rightly leave. For Kymlicka and other political theorists, indigenesness makes a big difference as to whether a group should be recognised and given a whole series of rights – including self-determination. The Russians are am-



**Figure 1.** Two Lenses of Estonian Identity

biguous in this respect: on the one hand, they are more of an immigrant group since their past largely dates from 1940. On the other hand, there were Russian communities in Estonia (such as the Old Believers) going back hundreds of years. So perhaps ethnic Russians are an indigenous minority, in which case they can make a case for collective rights, biculturalism, etc. This is a difficult question that cannot be resolved easily.

So what to do – are there any suggestions? Whatever the status of the ethnic Russians, in reading the Estonian draft integration policy, I was struck by the low rate of naturalisation among ethnic Russians. Survey evidence showed that those who are Estonian citizens have more positive attitudes towards the Estonian language and the state. So perhaps the rate of naturalisation should be increased, and the language requirement perhaps replaced by a loyalty oath – because it seems that higher rates of naturalisation would lead more ethnic Russians to have a stake in the society, and see it as their own. If the ethnic Russians had a much higher birthrate or were still actively emigrating to Estonia, a more cautious approach could be justified in the name of responding to the legitimate demands of the dominant Estonian ethnic group. But Estonians are no longer ethnically or culturally threatened, hence are able to relax restrictions, like the Lithuanians.

I would make the same argument for French in Quebec or Catalan in Catalonia. Policies concerning language and street signs should be based on trends in hard numbers rather than exaggerated fears. The number of speakers of Estonian in Estonia is rising, which would suggest that the country could be more relaxed about assimilation and afford more rights to the Russian minority on the linguistic front.

The Estonian state is right to promote a relatively abstract and thin concept of national identity, but there remains the question of the native Estonians – the dominant ethnic group. They need to be recognised in any multiculturalism policy, they have to be mentioned explicitly as the root of the state upon which diversity has been grafted. The lessons of the West show that multiculturalism cannot simply be about minorities and how

wonderful they are: the ethnic Estonians have to be mentioned as part of the story so they can see themselves reflected in multiculturalism. Otherwise, multiculturalism comes to be seen as an imposition of urban cosmopolitans, minorities and the EU, a foil for ethnic nationalists. Estonian ethnicity is a valid identity and it needs to be recognised, but the state should not be an Estonian state promoting the Estonian ethnic group, the way Israel is a Jewish state. There has to be a bifurcation between state and ethnic group.

Assimilation should be voluntary and not coerced. The Russians and Estonians should be competing for members in the way that religious denominations like Lutherans and Catholics compete for communicants. Some ethnic groups are more open, some are more closed. For example, in Northern Ireland, intermarriage is a taboo, however in the US or Britain, it is common. Elsewhere, I have coined the term *liberal ethnic group* to describe the way ethnic groups should handle their boundaries. I stress that ethnic groups can be very exclusive when it comes to guarding their traditions from foreign cultural influence, but should be open to new members (Kaufmann, 2000). The English as an ethnic group are thus more liberal than the Ulster Protestants. The Estonians should emulate the English rather than the Ulster Protestants – it would make a lot of sense for ethnic Estonians to be open to intermarriage and association with ethnic Russians and others. At the same time, ethnic Estonians should continue to reproduce their collective memory going back hundreds of years. But I think ethnic Estonians should use private associations, churches and families to promote their identity rather than the Estonian state. Ethnic Estonians would merely comprise one ethnic lobby among others whose interests must be balanced by Estonian state policy.

What does the future hold? If integration proceeds, I envision a Gordon-like scenario of assimilation in the private sphere. The future of the Estonian melting pot could involve a fusion of ethnic Estonians and Russians into something entirely new. However, barring a huge volume of non-European immigration, this outcome is unlikely. Instead, the most likely scenario will be a slow assimilation

of much of the Russian minority through intermarriage, with more ethnic Estonians carrying non-native surnames as can be seen in Catalonia or the Basque country. We even find this in Northern Ireland – Catholic nationalists like Gerry Adams (English surname) and John Hume (Scottish surname) clearly have non-Irish ancestors. That said, the Russian minority, unlike the Baltic Germans, will survive into the future as a vibrant, albeit smaller, minority. But there are caveats. The quickest route to preventing and reversing assimilation is to securitise the Russian minority by threatening to assimilate them coercively, or withdraw their state benefits. In the absence of sustained evidence of Russian demographic growth or declining Estonian language proficiency, policy should be readily relaxed. If ethnic Russians feel comfortable in Estonia and are welcomed into the dominant culture with open arms, they are much more likely to embrace their new home and ultimately – over generations – their new identity.

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# Social Integration for 21st Century Europe: Minority Empowerment through De-territorialisation

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Minority empowerment involves both improving the social and personal status of the members of minorities and enabling minorities to make use of opportunities which are offered to them. The ultimate objective of empowerment is therefore to enable the members of minorities to improve their own lives whilst also allowing them to contribute to society. This twofold objective is closely linked to the integration policies that ethnically-divided states adopt. Integration involves both people and institutions, at a social level as well as nationally. The empowerment of minorities involves both the members of the minorities and the institutions through which they participate. An integration policy that pays attention to only one of these is lopsided and unlikely to be successful.

Integration strategies are usually a response to change. Change in society involves all members of society, and any change in divided societies can be disruptive if not properly managed. Integration strategies are thus both functional tools for fostering social cohesion and philosophical ideals for social unity, involving the public and the private spheres, and they must include law and morality. Their overall aim is to create social order; but change happens not only within societies, but also in the wider context of the global society. Global phenomena influence the way in which states adapt both internally and externally, therefore integration strategies must adapt to change from within and without. Thus, integration is always a two-way street both in terms of territorial and non-territorial integration.

In the European Union, removing the territorial aspect of social integration strategies is furthering empowerment of minorities. This trend is apparent in both the so-called Social Agenda and in the area of Territorial Co-operation for regional development. Although this is not a purposeful shift towards empowerment, it puts minority politics in a very different perspective in Europe. Where the decade of the 1990s was devoted to codifying provisions for the protection of minorities outside the EU, the first decade of the new millennium has seen the EU addressing the empowerment of minorities inside the Union both in terms of personal development and development of communities.

Attention is therefore on improving both social and personal status, particularly that of immigrant communities in the Social Agenda, and in the areas of Territorial Co-operation in which the focus is on bringing neglected social and individual status to the agenda in regional and cross-border development. The overall goal of these objectives is to reach the Lisbon Strategy goals by 2010.

### ***De-territorialising integration***

The de-territorialisation of integration strategies is usually a result of globalisation and internationalisation, and in Europe, of Europeanisation. Geopolitics also play a part. Both systemic integration and social integration is afflicted. While systemic integration will experience fundamental disruption at its core definitions of, for instance, responsibility, political identity, normality, imperatives, and opportunities, social integration will be challenged in its concepts of collective identity, loyalty, citizenship, etc. But when the rationale of this integration effort becomes part of a larger change, there is a risk that this rationale may have to be re-defined. De-territorialisation challenges the confinement of power to the governmental institutions of the territorial state. There is no doubt that the new world order puts integration strategies under stress, but it also seems feasible that it offers opportunities.

As a basis, the political argument is that there is no reversal of this trend and states have to find ways in which to deal with this fact, both in terms of a threat and an opportunity. The challenge is to overcome the narrow scope of the state. De-territorialisation of integration strategies is precisely concerned with how to think creatively about issues for which the state normally takes sole responsibility. Social integration from a global and European perspective would mean to think of social openness, inter-cultural learning and cultural exchanges as values that put the state in an attractive light abroad. Non-territorial integration therefore also includes foreign ministries of the state.

The idea that integration at the international level is settled through 'soft' power is now held in high esteem. Foreign ministries engage in pub-

lic diplomacy to overcome problems of clashes of civilisation resulting from international terrorism. The 'soft' power that foreign ministries set out to use is the soft social power of successfully integrated states with social integration strategies that involve empowering all members of society. An example of such soft social power is the creative class. The EU has already acknowledged this in the Lisbon Strategy.

### ***The EU and social integration of minorities***

In the areas of Social Inclusion and Social Protection, the EU is requiring member states to learn from each other through the Open Method of Coordination. The target group is immigrants, newcomers to the EU. Gradually, it is becoming apparent that these communities contribute economic capital to the EU but that this capital is not being utilised. Because many national integration strategies are not working well, the EU is now suggesting that the aspect of culture may help improve social integration. Culture is rarely seen as a necessary component of social integration, but experts are arguing that cultural sensibility, and indeed ethno-sensibility in social sectors such as health care, are needed. Here it is further argued that ethno-sensitivity is more than just a language issue.

In the area of Territorial Co-operation the scenario is slightly different. Territorial co-operation involves many regions where national minorities have traditionally and historically resided for a considerable period of time. For years the EU has supported regional development particularly in those regions where national minorities reside. The rationale for this is economic and continues to be economic. As with the Social Agenda and the Lisbon Strategy, the development of peripheral regions is considered one of the largest obstacles to growth and hence to reaching the Lisbon Strategy goals; and here, too, culture plays a strong part. It is recognised that national minorities are often 'culture experts' meaning they have the ability to act as a go-between, or as unofficial ambassadors, between public authorities divided by the border.

A number of Western European member states have recognised this potential in receiving both



moral support and human resources from minorities for the Lisbon Strategy. In Germany the local government of Schleswig-Holstein has recognised this potential. When it comes to economic performance towards the Lisbon goals, the EU is seeing national minorities as contributors, rather than as a drain on resources. They are seen now as an inner resource. They represent very strong social assets, often stronger than that of the average majority population; because, as we all know, the importance of social status is diminishing among the general public in most countries. Not so for national minorities in many parts of Europe. Social status is the force that the EU is looking for to achieve the Lisbon goals. The EU is indirectly challenging the way member states foster social integration in terms of difference and ethics. This implicit challenge relates directly to the Estonian draft integration strategy for the years 2008-2013.


### **Social integration and difference**

Difference is intrinsically linked to personal identity, in that it is established in relation to a series of differences.<sup>1</sup> Without difference, personal identity cannot exist. Simultaneously, within the process of personal self-identification, identity is fixed into a permanent form often thought to be the only true identity. However, in order to protect and maintain personal identity, differences may become converted into 'otherness'. This conversion happens through a process of negation.

### **Difference and Contingency**

Identity is thus a slippery, insecure experience; and dependent on its ability to define difference it will counter, resist, overturn or subvert definitions of difference in order to eventually negate the difference. Identity stands in a complex, political relation to the differences it seeks to fix. It is an endless play of definition, counter-definition, and countering of counter-definitions. The contingency of identity is thus a stable part of identity itself.

It is for this reason that identity has a troubled relationship with ethics. To act ethically is often to call some comforts of identity into question.<sup>2</sup> To be ethical is often to put identity at risk. Hence, to be ethical one has to go beyond tolerance and



### *Difference and Contingency*

show respect. In doing so one enters the space of the intertwining between identity and difference. The implication is, therefore, that a reassessment of one's true identity may be required.

For this reason many seek to balance the demands of morality with the identity they have already established, but clearly this is a bad strategy. To ensure ethical behaviour in integration processes, identity has to be made non-essential through the incorporation of contingency rather than the negation of difference. Thus respect is the focus. Respect does not appear as an ethical virtue in the draft Estonian integration strategy 2008-2013. There is a reference to the ideal of respect for individual freedom. The ethical value highlighted as a building block for Estonian integration is tolerance. However, mere tolerance in the social and cultural spheres can create problems. Toleration of non-approved cultural practices can result in contempt and resentment. The people who decide to tolerate a certain foreign culture within their social realm may feel themselves absolved from further moves towards better understanding. Such

<sup>1</sup> This argument follows the theory of William Connolly, as proposed in William E Connolly, *Identity\Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Expanded Edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991/2002)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, xix

groups rarely conceive of themselves as requiring equal doses of toleration from the minority and thus may come to wear their toleration as an additional badge of superiority.<sup>3</sup> Toleration in this example clearly does not celebrate difference as an asset in society. Once the feeling of superiority is prevalent in the majority of a society, contempt and resentment are not far behind.

### ***Politics of resentment***

Resentment here refers not to the generalised resentment that many excluded members of society can feel at times but to the existential resentment held by people or groups unwilling to explore necessary injustices in their own ideals. These injustices are usually undeserved and can be systemic or necessary. Often these injustices cannot be eliminated. But what is alarming is that if these injustices are not recognised by the individual or the group unknowingly afflicting them on others, they conceal the fact that they foster a feeling of existential resentment in the person unwilling to take the steps to self-scrutinise. In other words, from the base of a political ideal emanates – without consciously wanting to do so – a politics of resentment that legitimises these injustices.<sup>4</sup>

### ***The agonistic respect approach***

Agonism is the response to those democratic integration systems which are antagonistic, and which create environments where no positive social vision is enunciated and where competition takes priority over every other aspect of politics. Antagonistic integration fosters conquest and conversion of the other, whereas agonism fosters respect for the other under his or her own terms. Agonistic respect seeks to cultivate reciprocal respect across difference and to negotiate larger forums to set general policies. Agonistic respect is a reciprocal virtue, appropriate for a world in which people find themselves in intensive relationships of political inter-dependence.<sup>5</sup>

Agonism, nevertheless, has a dimension of detachment through which each party maintains a “pathos of distance” from others.<sup>6</sup> This is often needed in deeply divided societies. Agonistic respect is the dimension through which self-limits are acknowledged and connections are established across lines of difference. What this theory actually draws on is the idea of the homo duplex promoted by both Augustine and Kant. Agonistic respect is thus compatible with a model of pluralism. It does not allow for the consolidation of a majority identity around which a set of minorities is tolerated as satellites. Rather, it argues for going beyond toleration, because toleration is antagonistic. It thus provides minorities with the possibility of surging into being from below the threshold of tolerance. Agonistic respect moves towards recognition without actually taking that step.

However, to be successful, agonistic respect must also be accompanied by a sense of critical responsiveness.<sup>7</sup> Critical responsiveness is a virtue that helps the majority assess the legitimacy of the minority groups that are seeking to become equal members of society. Critical responsiveness requires individuals to be willing to redefine their own identity in the ongoing interaction with others. It does not therefore mean that the individual responds paternalistically, or humbly and warmly to the other, in order to prepare the other to convert to the universal identity of the majority. Critical responsiveness does away with the “us-them” syndrome so often afflicting societies and instead offers a view that opens up cultural space and allows the other to consolidate itself into something that is not afflicted by negative cultural markings. Agonistic respect requires the individual to deal with his or her identity in a different manner than most commonly known, through a de-essentialised process.

### ***Dogmatisation of collective identity***

Personal identity and collective territorial identity are connected through the channel of freedom.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 43.  
<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25-26.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 178-79.  
<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p.179.

<sup>7</sup> Connolly, W. E. *The Ethos of Pluralization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995, xv-xviii.

Individual freedom is one of the four components of the common core of the multicultural Estonian society described in the draft integration strategy. People must be able to believe that state institutions carry with them sufficient efficacy to promote the collective ends we prize. Thus one's self-identification as a free individual is bound up with a common belief in the capacity of the state to promote publicly-defined purposes. Similarly, if one knows that one's choices and judgements matter in the public realm, this also informs the orientation one takes to a variety of other social roles. Therefore, when circumstances are favourable, the personal to collective identity relationship is one of loyalty. When they are unfavourable, they degenerate into either disaffection with the state, or a nationalism in which the tribulations of history are attributed to an evil 'other' who must be neutralised.<sup>8</sup>

Serious threats to freedom can grow out of these links between personal and collective identity in relation to freedom. First, the politics of collective identity may organise the idealisms and egoisms of its legitimate members into a collective egoism;<sup>9</sup> and the politics of collective egoism becomes more intense whenever it is faced with internal or external affronts to its self-assurance, including de-territorialising forces. Second, in believing that one's identity or the collective identity of one's group is the best and only true identity for these, the function of converting difference into otherness sets in. Collective dogmatism therefore happens when it is confronted by disruptive contingencies. Next it constructs minorities as objects of resentment to protect its own collective identity. Finally, it is rewarded by those who harbour the resentment. In effect, electoral politics contain powerful pressures to become a closed circuit for the dogmatism of collective identity through the negation of difference into threat, and threat into

energy, for the dogmatisation of identity. Hence, the politics of resentment is born.

The dogmatising of identity can have severe ramifications in divided societies. In the effort to realise a vision of a unified citizenry, nation and sovereignty, an educational elite of marginalised groups may emerge. Radicalised minority elites is one example.<sup>10</sup> However, an integration process where the contingencies of personal identity are taken into consideration, ethnic closure can be avoided and under good circumstances, collective identity and thus culture can be redefined. In the process of redefinition, opportunities for agonistic respect may come to play, thus resulting in a more democratic integration process. Therefore, a robust social integration strategy neither evades nor confirms difference.<sup>11</sup> This system depends in turn on the successful politics that helps us to see our identities as ambiguous, contestable and contested. Integration then appears as an exciting engagement with difference, the challenge of the other, the disruption of certainties, the recognition of ambiguities within one's self as well as one's differences with others.

### ***Ethical system integration***

An approach that is often cited as ideal is John Rawls's overlapping consensus model of integration.<sup>12</sup> However, this approach is problematic for deeply divided societies as it maintains the divide between the public and the private thus also leaving large parts of society excluded. Even though this approach allows for a common area of human interaction, it assumes that when you enter the public arena you leave behind the part of your personal identity which pertains to your culture. In a similar manner as you leave your hat at the cloakroom in the theatre, the overlapping consensus approach assumes that you leave your personal identity at the doorstep when you enter the

<sup>8</sup> Connolly, W. E. *Identity/Difference*, 65-68.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 198-200.

<sup>10</sup> Wimmer, A. *Dominant Ethnicity and dominant nationhood*. In E. Kaufmann (Ed.), *Rethinking Ethnicity. Majority groups and dominant minorities*. London: Routledge, 2004, 40-58, (lk 45).

<sup>11</sup> Phillips, A. *Dealing with Difference: A Politics of Ideas, or a Politics of Presence?* In Seyla Benhabib (Ed.), *Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, 139-152, (lk 143).

<sup>12</sup> Rawls, J. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

public space. This is clearly not acceptable when you have to mobilise all your personal strengths towards competing and indeed surviving in an ever-globalising world.

Separating the public and the private may result in lack of social cohesion. Crime is an example where the public and the private cannot be separated into watertight compartments. If a crime is committed in the private sphere, it becomes a public concern. Moreover, the public and the private interrelate on the issue of child rearing. Women receive preferential treatment in labour law and health care due to their ability to rear children. A woman does not leave her motherhood at the doorstep when she enters the public arena. Families with children receive benefits and support either through tax legislation or direct transfers from public funds. The state and its law, therefore, are the guardians of an entire social order and of all the values which the social order requires.

The public/ private problem therefore also relates to our understanding of culture.<sup>13</sup> This argument has also been adopted by economists who ar-

gue that in the economy, culture counts. Culture in the economy supports the view that individual economic action is based on culturally-engendered capabilities. The idea that capabilities are fostered through culture relies on the view that certain functions are particularly central in human life, and these functions render the human being a dignified free person, capable of shaping his or her life in co-operation and reciprocity with others. A human life is shaped by these human powers of practical reason and sociability, and each human being is thus a bearer of cultural value.<sup>14</sup> In other words, the value of culture must be appreciated as a valuable contribution to the individual's development and capability to function in society, especially the individual's potential to act in the economic sphere.

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<sup>13</sup> Kymlicka, W. *Liberalism, Community, and Culture*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

<sup>14</sup> Raz, J. *The Practice of Value*. Edited by R. Jay Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.

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# Conceptualising Citizenship: the Experience of Estonia in European Comparative Perspective

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As the breadth of Estonia's draft integration strategy makes clear, integration is a complex process which requires the active involvement of minority and majority populations alike, and where many factors – political, legal and societal – play a role. This paper focuses on the role of one particular factor in the integration process: the role of citizenship policy. More precisely, it examines the relationship between societal integration and the rules that govern the acquisition of citizenship by non-citizens who are long-term residents in a state. The aims of the paper are two-fold. Firstly, to offer an assessment of the way Estonia perceives the relationship between citizenship and integration; and secondly, to compare Estonia's perception of the role of citizenship to existing European norms in this field.

## **1. General considerations regarding citizenship and integration**

Before moving on to the empirical discussion of Estonia and European normative developments, some general remarks on the relationship between citizenship and integration are in order. Integration can be defined, in the most general sense, as the process of ensuring the full participation of an individual in a society's economic, social, cultural and political life. All models of integration – wherever they are located on the multiculturalism versus assimilation spectrum – depict the acquisition of citizenship as a crucial step for individuals who enter and wish to be integrated in a society. Although there is a trend in international law to provide permanently residing non-citizens with an ever greater number of socio-economic and

cultural rights, the citizens of a state continue to remain privileged in having exclusive access to an important set of political rights. In the case of Estonia, the Constitution explicitly restricts three political rights to Estonian citizens: the right to be a member of a political party, the right to stand for local, parliamentary or presidential elections, and the right to vote in parliamentary elections. Whatever other rights non-citizens in Estonia may enjoy, therefore, without access to citizenship they will remain excluded from democratic process processes of the country.

Where the different models of integration diverge, is in the role that they ascribe to citizenship within the integration process. In the assimilationist model, citizenship is viewed as the 'reward' to be handed to individuals who have proven their loyalty to the state, often by renouncing their previous 'national identity'; individuals can acquire the citizenship of a state only when they are understood to have 'completed' the integration process. States that subscribe to this view will generally demand that immigrants pass arduous naturalisation tests, including high levels of proficiency in the dominant language, knowledge of a state's history/ constitutional system and subscribing to the 'public values' of a state. In the multicultural model, citizenship is understood as an important "tool for integrating societies of heterogeneous origin", to borrow the words of Rainer Bauböck.<sup>1</sup> According to this concept, the rights and responsibilities that come with citizenship are themselves a factor encouraging further integration; the acquisition of citizenship helps to shape individual loyalties, not in an exclusive way but by accepting the likelihood of multiple identities. The naturalisation requirements of states that subscribe to this view will often be limited to modest residency requirements and simple language tests, which immigrants can pass with little effort.

## **2. Citizenship and integration in Estonia**

In order to understand the origins of Estonia's current citizenship policy we must look back to Feb-

ruary 1992, less than six months after the proclamation of Estonian independence, when a Resolution on Citizenship was passed that denied automatic citizenship to any person living in Estonia that had not been an Estonian citizen (or a descendant of an Estonian citizen) prior to 1940, when the territory of Estonia was brought under Soviet control. Anyone who entered Estonia in the Soviet period – ie. the vast majority of Estonia's Russian population – was therefore an immigrant and should apply for naturalisation accordingly. However, by imposing Estonian language requirements on the process of naturalisation, the new legislation denied Estonian Russians, whose knowledge of Estonian was minimal, the chance to become citizens for many years to come.

This situation was compounded by the scarcity of opportunities during the 1990s for Estonian Russians to learn the Estonian language. State funded language courses were rare and a combination of economic hardship, residential segregation and lack of motivation meant that few Russians in Estonia were able or willing to devote the necessary time and resources to improving their knowledge of Estonian. In 1995 a new Citizenship Law was adopted in Estonia that introduced even stricter naturalisation criteria, including a longer residence requirement and a new written examination on the Constitution. Not surprisingly, throughout the 1990s the rate of naturalisation remained very low: in 1992, the number of persons with 'undetermined citizenship' was over 300,000; in the year 2000 there were still more than 175,000 persons with this status.

Later I argue that Estonia's citizenship policy has, more recently, begun to experience a limited process of liberalisation. In this section, what I wish to emphasise is that Estonia's restrictive approach to citizenship during the 1990s became reflected in the first Estonian State Integration Programme, adopted in March 2000. This programme gave negligible attention to the role that the acquisition of citizenship could play in the integration process. Whilst the programme identifies the "reduction of the number of persons without Estonian citizen-

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<sup>1</sup> Rainer Bauböck, *Who are the citizens of Europe?*, [www.eurozine.com](http://www.eurozine.com), 23 December 2006.

ship” as one of the key aims of the so-called ‘political-legal dimension of integration’, the activities outlined in the programme with a view to achieving this aim focus entirely on identifying the necessary resources (financial, technical, human) needed to help non-citizens learn the Estonian language. This connection between citizenship and language acquisition suggests that citizenship is perceived in the integration programme as a reward to be handed to those non-citizens who have already ‘completed’ the integration process, understood in terms of acquiring proficiency in Estonian.

It is therefore a curiosity of Estonia’s first Integration Strategy that the ‘legal-political’ and ‘cultural-linguistic’ dimensions of integration involve virtually the same type of activities. From 2000 onwards, these activities were carried out in earnest by the Government of Estonia, which invested considerable amounts of funding in the development of Estonian language text books, language courses and in training Estonian language teachers. The effectiveness of these policies, however, remains unclear. In 2006, there were still more than 127,000 ‘stateless’ persons in Estonia, just under 10% of the country’s total population. According to the Estonian government’s own mid-term appraisal of the integration programme, the average Estonian-language ability of Estonian Russians has not improved significantly (we are told that approximately 60% of adult Estonian Russians have less than average proficiency). Moreover, those who have acquired citizenship through naturalisation (mostly Estonian Russian youth) do not seem to be participating actively in Estonian political life, as there are only six Estonian Russians in the Estonian parliament and none at all in the government.<sup>2</sup>

### **3. European normative developments**

Let us now analyse the development of European norms in the field of citizenship. My analysis will focus on a number of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law developments undertaken by the Council of Europe and

European Union in this field since the 1990s. Before examining where and how these norms are expressed, it is important to note that the development of European norms in the field of citizenship has met – and continues to meet – considerable resistance. In contrast to other dimensions of social integration, including non-discrimination and recognition of the right of persons belonging to minorities to maintain and develop their particular cultures, attempts to reach common European standards in the field of citizenship have proceeded very slowly and with difficulty.

Nevertheless, in the 1990s, as migration flows into Europe increased, and as migrants began settling permanently in their ‘host’ societies, European governments began to acknowledge the benefits of developing more coordinated approaches to certain aspects of their citizenship policies. In 1997, the Council of Europe took an important step in this process by initiating a new European Convention on Nationality. This Convention did not remove the right of states to regulate their own citizenship policies. Nevertheless, it broke new legal ground by proclaiming it a duty for states to facilitate naturalisation for immigrants living permanently within their borders as an important measure to encourage their integration. States are to fulfil this duty by tolerating dual nationality, requiring less stringent language requirements for naturalisation, and conferring automatic citizenship on children born within the territory of a state, who would otherwise be ‘stateless’. To date, 27 states have signed the Convention, with sixteen ratifications, although Estonia has not yet adhered to it.

The European Union’s involvement in citizenship policy debates formally began in 1992, with the establishment of the status of ‘European citizen’ by the Maastricht Treaty. However, by restricting access to European citizenship to persons already holding the national citizenship of one of the EU member states, the new status was carefully devised to avoid challenging the right of EU member states to set their own naturalisation criteria. These political sensitivities have forced the European Commission to try to influence the citizen-

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<sup>2</sup> State Integration Programme “*Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007*” Mid-Term Appraisal Report, pp. 5-6.

ship policies of member states indirectly, relying on 'soft' law mechanisms such as communications concerning the legal status of third country long-term residents, rather than on legally binding directives. In an important communication on immigration, integration and employment, adopted in 2002, the European Commission for the first time broke its silence on questions relating to naturalisation by suggesting that member states should provide automatic or semi-automatic access to citizenship to second and third generation immigrants.<sup>3</sup> In this document, the Commission explicitly states that "acquiring nationality [or citizenship] is a means of facilitating integration" because it "encourages a sense of belonging in national life".

#### **4. Impact on Estonian citizenship policy**

Returning to the case of Estonia, in recent years the Estonian government's conception of the role of citizenship in the integration process appears to be aligning itself more with the above-mentioned European norms. This alignment can be seen in the most recent changes made to Estonia's citizenship legislation. Whereas during the 1990s, the Estonian government's efforts to reduce the number of 'stateless' persons in Estonia were limited to providing Estonian Russians with increased Estonian language training opportunities, by the end of the decade, measures began to be taken to facilitate access to citizenship for certain groups by lowering the conditions they had to meet for naturalisation. The first change took place in 1999, when children under the age of fifteen, born in Estonia after 1992 to 'stateless' parents, were allowed to obtain citizenship without any examinations at all. Since then, further efforts to facilitate access to citizenship have been adopted for disabled persons, who are now allowed to apply for naturalisation without the need to pass any examinations.

In 2005, in its mid-term appraisal report, the Government of Estonia spelled out its new appreciation of the role of citizenship as a tool for in-

tegration by noting that "Today it is obvious that obtaining Estonian citizenship helps many people to feel more secure in Estonia and that positive attitudes thereby form among non-Estonians".<sup>4</sup> This new position is also observable in the draft integration programme that forms the basis of this conference's discussion. The draft programme gives much more attention to the 'legal and political' dimension of integration, pointing out that creating an adequate legislative environment is a crucial enabling condition for integration. In particular, the draft programme explicitly cites as an objective the need to develop 'an effective naturalisation process'. Compared to the previous programme, it seeks to make a greater contribution to the naturalisation process and cites a number of activities – beyond language training – to support this aim, ranging from support for state and non-profit organisations that facilitate the regularisation process for individuals and training for civil servants working in the citizenship and migration fields. Underlining this increased awareness about the importance of citizenship is the new emphasis given in the draft programme to 'participatory democracy', a concept which did not feature at all in the first integration programme.

#### **5. Recent developments in other EU member states**

Before finishing my paper, I would like to consider briefly the implications of European norms of recent developments in Western European countries. My analysis will focus in particular on the Netherlands and Britain, two countries whose liberal citizenship policies and multicultural conceptions of integration during the 1990s helped to influence the above-mentioned European normative developments. The trend in question is the tendency to introduce (stricter) language requirements and additional examinations on the history, constitution and so-called 'public values' of the countries for naturalisation. It is worth noting, at this point, that while my analysis focuses on the restrictive direction of citizenship policies in the

<sup>3</sup> Commission Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (COM(2003)336 final).

<sup>4</sup> Mid-Term Appraisal report p.96



Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the conditions for naturalisation in these two countries still remain relatively generous compared to the conditions imposed by some other EU member states, as a recent study by the Migration Policy Group, in cooperation with the British Council, has recently indicated.<sup>5</sup>

In the last five years, the Dutch and to a lesser extent the British governments have amended their citizenship laws in a more restrictive direction. This shift has been part of a broader set of policy changes in response to a widespread perception that previous multicultural approaches to integration have failed. Evidence of residential segregation and social and economic disadvantage among certain groups (especially non-European and Muslim groups) was blamed on the 'excessive tolerance' for cultural differences which characterised earlier policies. While this perception was already gaining ground in the late 1990s, it was the new security environment created by 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks in European countries that formalised these views. By 'securitising' debates on immigration, the so-called 'threat' of Islamic fundamentalism has made it almost impossible to voice dissent against the new orthodoxy. There is no space here to examine all the policy ramifications of this shift; my focus is on the consequences it has had for the role of citizenship in the British and Dutch integration policies. In both countries, I would argue, there has been a move away from conceiving citizenship as a tool for integration towards the concept of citizenship as a reward. In both countries, this has been done by creating a stronger connection between citizenship and language, and by moving language to the centre of debates about integration. In 2003, Britain introduced language tests for naturalisation – for the first time in the history of British citizenship policy. While 'citizenship programmes' designed to help immigrants integrate into the labour market have existed in the Netherlands since the 1990s, in recent years the emphasis of these programmes has shifted to Dutch language training. This has been accompanied by a wholesale

change in official discourse on integration in both countries, which has become much more exclusionary, putting responsibility for integration on the immigrant and emphasising the need to 'protect' and promote adherence to 'British (or Dutch) values'.

This is not the place to comment on the implications of this shift for immigrant groups in Britain and the Netherlands. What I would like to focus on here is the potential setback this shift can represent for European norms on immigrant naturalisation, which, as we have seen, are still at a nascent stage. The impact of European norms often does not lie in their binding nature, but in their legitimacy; and this legitimacy in turn depends on their reflection of a consensus of opinion both among governments and the public at large. In the early 1990s, the Council of Europe and the European Union, backed by their Western European member states, did not hesitate to issue recommendations to Estonia based on the idea that states should facilitate citizenship to long-term residents, and that, far from representing a security threat, extending the option of naturalisation to immigrants was good for their security by giving them a stake in the societies in which they lived. Now this message appears to be falling on deaf ears in Western European governments, who are veering away from this logic in their own integration policies. If more and more European states begin to see citizenship as a privilege to be conceded only to immigrants who have 'completed' the integration process, the conception of citizenship as a 'tool' for integration enshrined in the Convention on Nationality, and in the Commission's communications on immigration and integration, will begin to sound increasingly hollow. The implications of this shift could extend beyond European norms to undermine the positive advances made in Estonia and other European countries.

### **Conclusions**

In conclusion, I would like to return to Estonia, and reiterate the key message of this paper: by act-

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<sup>5</sup> For more details, see the Migration Integration Policy Index website: <http://www.integrationindex.eu/>

ing as a gateway for immigrants to participate in the political life of their host societies, citizenship should be seen as a tool, rather than a reward, for integration. By participating in the decision-making processes which affect their lives, naturalised immigrants are more likely to identify with, and develop a sense of loyalty towards, the state in which they live. In Estonia, as we have seen, progress is still needed in terms of reducing the number of persons without Estonian citizenship. The draft integration programme's treatment of citizenship is a step in the right direction. While a large 'stateless' population remains in Estonia, it is important for the government to ensure that other means for participating in decision-making at the national level are available for non-citizens, including by strengthening existing consultation structures.

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# Measuring Integration in Latvia



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### **Measuring integration: purposes and assumptions**

The endeavour of measuring social integration has generated considerable scholarly interest in recent years, but it is first and foremost a policy tool serving several purposes. Firstly, by measuring integration, decision-makers can monitor the progress (or the lack thereof) and assess the effectiveness of policy. Secondly, measuring integration can assist in determining how well resources have been used and where they should be channelled in the future. Finally, measuring integration can provide a knowledge base that can inform and justify policy changes. This, of course, assumes that policy-makers and the political elite want effective integration policy, can change policy if it is to be found in some way wanting, and are

willing and able to devote resources to integration policy. This cannot always be assumed in Latvia.

For example, researchers in Latvia have found that political parties – especially those at either end of the political spectrum – have played a crucial role in maintaining ethnic tension.<sup>1</sup> In other words, effective integration policy might force them to develop completely new repertoires or, at the extreme, make them irrelevant. A number of Latvian laws (on citizenship, language, education) represent fragile compromises adopted only after intense consultation with, and often, considerable pressure from, international organisations. Over the last fifteen years, a political consensus often prevailed that these laws, once adopted, could not be amended, lest the fragile compromises unravel. Finally, for much of the 1990s, the government

<sup>1</sup> See Jānis Ikstens, "Eastern Slavic Political Parties in Latvia," in Nils Muižnieks, ed, *Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions* (Rīga: LU Apgāds, 2006), 53-63, available at [http://szf.lu.lv/sites/szf/module\\_data/introduction/SPPI/Petijumi/latvian-russian\\_relations\\_final\(1\).pdf](http://szf.lu.lv/sites/szf/module_data/introduction/SPPI/Petijumi/latvian-russian_relations_final(1).pdf); Ilga Apine, "Etnopolitikas analīze," in Leo Dribins and Aleksejs Šņitnikovs, eds, *Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: cēloņi un sekas* (Rīga: LU FSI and IUMSILS, 2007), 19-43, and Brigita Zepa, ed, *Integration Practice and Perspectives* (Rīga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2006), 179-197, available at [http://www.bszi.lv/downloads/resources/integrācijas\\_prakse/brosura\\_EN.pdf](http://www.bszi.lv/downloads/resources/integrācijas_prakse/brosura_EN.pdf), last accessed on 7 January 2008.

was hesitant to devote considerable resources to integration policy, reflecting both budgetary constraints, the political sensitivity of the issue, and the availability of alternative, international sources of funding.

### ***What is integration and what affects it?***

Trying to use measurements of integration to craft more effective policy is a complicated endeavour, insofar as integration policy is only one of many factors affecting the pace and nature of integration. For example, the economic situation can affect ethnic relations, people's sense of identification with the state, and the quality of democracy. At the same time, a country's international position (eg. membership in the European Union, the tenor of relations with Russia), can also have a critical impact on integration by affecting individual identities and shaping incentives to naturalise or learn the national language. What is more, political decisions not based on detailed analysis or measurements (eg. changing an education law, moving a monument) can also spark unpredictable socio-political processes with a significant impact on integration. In the end, detecting the unique contribution of integration policy can be quite difficult.

Measuring integration is also complicated by differing understandings of the meaning of the term. In 2001, the Latvian government adopted an official definition of integration that is not without problems. It held that "the foundation for integration of society is loyalty to the state of Latvia ... and a willingness to accept the Latvian language as the state language [...] The goal of integration is to form a democratic, cohesive civil society founded on shared basic values".<sup>2</sup> The key words in this definition are loyalty, language, and common values.

This definition raises a number of thorny questions. Whose basic values will form the basis of civil society? What exactly does loyalty entail? How does one promote and measure it? The focus on

language is understandable in the Latvian context and it is easy to measure, but it is also very divisive. Does integration have nothing to do with welfare or equity?

Regardless of these problems, Latvia sought to promote cooperation, Latvian language acquisition and common values through a number of different mechanisms after 2001.<sup>3</sup> In 2001, the Social Integration Fund was created to finance integration projects. The following year, a new cabinet post, the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration Affairs, was created to coordinate integration policy. A number of local governments developed their own integration policy frameworks and funding mechanisms that developed independently of policy at the national level. Other agencies, such as the Naturalisation Board, the National Agency for Latvian Language Training, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Welfare, and others also engaged in their own integration initiatives often independent of the work of the integration fund or minister. Thus far there has been little coordination, no consensus on priorities, and considerable politicisation of the process.

There have also been a number of attempts to monitor and measure integration in Latvia since 2001. From 2001 to 2004, there were a number of inconclusive inter-ministerial discussions about developing indicators. The Secretariat of the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration Affairs (hereafter, more simply referred to as the integration ministry) developed a large database of integration projects and has commissioned numerous studies, including overviews of municipal integration programmes, sociological surveys, and more. The Social Integration Fund itself has funded a number of studies on minorities, education reform, tolerance, etc.<sup>4</sup> Various municipal governments have funded local studies on various issues related to social integration. Moreover, a number of externally funded studies on social integration have also been conducted.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For an English version of "The National Programme for the Integration of Society in Latvia", see [http://www.np.gov.lv/en/faili\\_en/SIP.rtf](http://www.np.gov.lv/en/faili_en/SIP.rtf).

<sup>3</sup> See Nils Muižnieks, "Government Policy and the Russian Minority," in Muižnieks, ed, *Latvian-Russian Relations*, 11-21.

<sup>4</sup> One frequent recipient of Social Integration Fund funding for research has been the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences. See its web site at [www.bszi.lv/](http://www.bszi.lv/).

Despite the wealth of data available, there are a number of problems with measurement efforts to date. For one, there has been no consensus on indicators. The studies have used a wide variety of methodologies and approaches. Involvement by various stakeholders has been irregular and there has been little coordination between ministries. At the same time, the primary Latvian sources of funding – the integration ministry and the social integration fund – have a vested interest in the results. Latvian approaches in general have been marked by an ignorance of measurement efforts elsewhere, particularly of methodologies developed within the Council of Europe and the European Commission.

### ***A new departure?***

In 2007, the integration ministry prepared new draft guidelines for implementing the integration programme from 2008 to 2018.<sup>6</sup> These guidelines contain a new definition of integration that differs from the 2001 definition. The new document defines integration as a “process in which all of society is involved”, aimed at “securing long-term welfare for all members of society”. Furthermore, the document notes that “the goal of the social integration policy is to strengthen a democratic, inclusive civil society – one in which the primary values are the observance of the human rights of all groups in society, mutual respect, understanding, social responsibility and social justice”. Here, the key words are welfare, inclusive civil society, human rights, and social justice. To a large extent, this definition echoes the Council of Europe’s definition of social cohesion.<sup>7</sup>

The new guidelines envisage two primary directions of activity: 1) “creating an inclusive society” and 2) “strengthening a democratic and civil society”. The former envisages activities such as ensuring inter-cultural knowledge, promoting gen-

der equality, furthering wheelchair accessibility, reducing poverty, and promoting immigrant integration. The latter envisages activities such as reforming citizenship policy, promoting more public discussion of draft policy documents, reforming party financing, and supporting NGO development. While each of these activities has a progress indicator, the document as a whole has seventeen indicators with concrete targets for the years 2007, 2012, 2015 and 2018 (see **Table 1**).

The limited number of indicators suggests a desire to keep the measuring process manageable and doable. However, selected indicators appear to be imprecise measures of social processes. For example, a decline in the share of non-citizens to citizens could just as soon reflect non-citizen mortality rates or emigration, rather than naturalisation. While the share of those able to use Latvian could reflect integration, it could also be a sign of assimilation. Oddly, the authors suggest measuring those who think the society is not integrated, rather than those who think the society is integrated! On this measure, the authors have set themselves rather limited goals (a decline of 10% over ten years), while setting much more ambitious goals in achieving all-around happiness! Clearly, there is still much work to do in devising a system of measuring integration in Latvia.

### ***The ASPRI project on measuring integration***

In 2007 the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI) at the University of Latvia began a three-year project funded by the Open Society Institute aimed at developing a system for measuring integration in line with the best European practices. Subsidiary goals of the project include promoting awareness of the best European practices, accumulating and disseminating knowledge about measuring integration, reconnecting researchers and other stakeholders to the integra-

<sup>5</sup> See, in particular, the various studies conducted by the European Centre for Minority Issues at [www.ecmi.de](http://www.ecmi.de) and those by the Open Society Institute at [www.eumap.org](http://www.eumap.org).

<sup>6</sup> The guidelines should be available shortly on the Integration Ministry web site at [www.integracija.gov.lv](http://www.integracija.gov.lv).

<sup>7</sup> The Council of Europe has defined social cohesion as “society’s ability to secure the long-term well-being of all its members, including equitable access to available resources, respect for human dignity with due regard for diversity, personal and collective autonomy and responsible participation.” See Council of Europe, *Concerted Development of Social Cohesion Indicators: Methodological Guide* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2005), 23.

Policy Results	2007	2012	2015	2018
The number of NGOs per 1000 persons grows and the distribution in Latvia's regions becomes more even	4,4	6	7	8
NGO income as a share of GDP increases	1,3	1,4	1,5	1,6
The percentage of inhabitants who have donated or otherwise got involved in charity increases	19	30	40	50
The percentage of citizens participating in parliamentary elections increases	60,98	65	70	75
The percentage of inhabitants participating in political parties increases	1,4	2	3	4
People are informed about their rights to equal opportunities*				
Women receive the same remuneration for the same work as men (women's salaries as a % of men's salaries)	80	90	95	100
The percentage of women in leadership positions has increased	20	35	40	50
The relation of non-citizens to citizens as a percentage of the total population has declined	17/83	15/85	13/87	10/90
The relation of emigrants to returnees is in balance	50/50	55/65	60/70	65/75
The percentage of inhabitants who can use Latvian as a language of communication has increased	75	80	85	90
The share of enterprises employing persons with disabilities has increased	5	7	8	9
The share of persons involved in activities related to the Latvian language and culture has increased	20	25	27	30
The share of inhabitants who think that society is not integrated has declined	57	54	50	47
The share of inhabitants who consider themselves happy and satisfied with their lives has increased	66	75	85	95
The share of those emigrating because of socio-economic reasons has declined	80	70	65	60
The share of the population whose incomes are below the poverty line has decreased	19	18	16	15

\* the draft document has not yet proposed a baseline measurement and targets for this indicator  
Source: Draft Integration Policy Guidelines 2008-1018, p 25

**Table 1.** Core Indicators in the Draft Integration Policy Guidelines.

tion policy process and generating new information and analysis about the integration of society. Of course, ASPRI also hopes to have some modest influence on the policy process through these goals.

The project began by creating an inventory of existing integration research in Latvia (including sociological surveys, localised studies, gen-

der/ integration analyses, discourse analyses, etc), consulting with stake-holders, and engaging researchers and policy-makers in a number of seminars and conferences. In parallel, the team made a review and analysis of the approaches to measuring integration of the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Migration Policy Group. The team arrived at the following working definition

of integration: a process characterised by 1) democratic participation and representation, 2) equal rights, obligations and outcomes, and 3) intercultural competence and cooperation.

Subsequently, the team commissioned focus group research to ascertain perceptions of barriers to participation, equality and intercultural cooperation. The team intends to develop a set of draft integration indicators based on the definition above, the results of the focus groups and best practices identified elsewhere. A forthcom-

ing sociological survey will be employed to fill data gaps. The integration indicators and the intellectual rationale behind them will be fleshed out into a large research report provisionally entitled "How Integrated is Latvia? A Tolerance and Social Cohesion Audit". The report will also include the first ever impact assessment of the work of the Social Integration Fund. We hope that this will mark some progress in our ongoing attempts to understand whether and in what realms Latvia is moving towards becoming a more integrated society.



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# Migrant Integration Policy Index – Benchmarking Policies in Europe

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**Thomas Huddleston**

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The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), launched in Brussels on October 15, 2007, is an instrument for benchmarking successful integration policies in Europe. MIPEX is a bi-annual assessment of integration policy, which examines an enlarging number of policy areas critical for a migrant's opportunities to participate in his or her country of residence. The study uses the official EU definition of migrants, third-country nationals, which can be generally understood as persons without EU citizenship. In the case of Estonia, the study considers the policies that affect immigrants as well as non-citizens. The study covers the member states of an enlarging European Union (EU 25, prior to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania) as well as selected countries of immigration outside the European Union. The study opens up direct comparisons

between two countries by benchmarking their policies to the highest European standards.

The study has grown immensely since the pilot version of 2004 to become the largest study of its kind, from 80 to 140 policy indicators, 30 to almost 100 national experts, and 15 to 28 countries, including Canada, Norway, and Switzerland. The study is undertaken alongside an extensive network of 21 national partners, from think-tanks to large-scale NGOs and foundations, who contribute to the research design and launch debates in each of their countries. MIPEX is co-financed by the European Commission and co-managed by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group (MPG). The research is led by the MPG, along with two research partners – the University of Sheffield



in the United Kingdom and the Free University of Brussels.

The paper will situate the MIPEX project within the methodological framework of *benchmarking* as well as within the recent political context of *European co-operation* on issues of integration. The paper will then review the MIPEX key findings for the EU member states in general and for Estonia in particular. Based on the priorities laid out in the draft documents of the Estonian integration strategy for 2008-2013, the paper will conclude by drawing out certain areas of interest from Estonia's MIPEX results.

Benchmarking is a methodology for good governance that can be defined as the systematic and continual improvement of policies and practices based on the identification of high standards and the application of lessons learned from best practice. The process is broken down into four stages, which can then be applied to the progress made by the European institutions on integration issues. In an initial *planning* phase, migration, integration, and citizenship have become areas of increasing European competence, be it through the Council of Europe or the European Union, particularly for the latter since the 1999 Tampere Conclusions and the launch of the 2004-2009 Hague Programme. Member state governments, European-wide networks of academics, social partners, and umbrella-NGOs have been drawn into a *mapping* process of defining integration, establishing a comparable vocabulary, and identifying areas of improvement for national policies across Europe, such as family reunion, long-term residence, and anti-discrimination law.

Successful mapping exercises lead directly to the *analysis* phase, where new European measures set common European standards for these areas of improvement. In all cases, policy recommendations entailing high European standards have emerged from the mapping exercises led by European-wide networks of academics, proposal directives from the European Commission, or proposals from networks of stakeholders and NGOs. For instance, the Migration Policy Group helped bring together the Starting Line Group for the anti-discrimination directives as well as the Amster-

dam Proposals for the migration and integration directives.

Where have these recommendations for high European standards led to? The member states have incorporated these standards into the high, but open-ended, principles of many of Europe's non-binding measures, such as the Lisbon Strategy and the Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration Policy, which serve as general guides (rather than fixed standards) for national policies. In addition to non-binding European measures, European co-operation has also provided integration participants with binding legislative actions, such as EC directives on family reunion, long-term residence, and anti-discrimination or Council of Europe conventions on access to nationality and political participation at the local level. Certain directives, notably on anti-discrimination, retain high standards introduced in Commission, academic, or stakeholder proposals, whereas the negotiation process on other directives has watered high standards down to minimum standards, which leave EU member states great room for manoeuvre.

If one assumes that the analysis phase on integration is completed within the remit of the 2004-2009 Hague Programme, then the European institutions have progressed onto the *implementation* phase. On the one hand, the institutions have tasked networks of legal experts to undertake *monitoring* of the transposition of EC directives (and their alternatively high or minimum standards). For example, due to the monitoring work of the European Commission's network of legal experts in the field of non-discrimination, the Commission has sent formal requests for 'reasoned opinions', the first step towards legal infringement proceedings, to fourteen member states, including Estonia, who have not correctly implemented the Racial Equality Directive.

On the other hand, numerous integration participants can undertake *benchmarking* in order to identify instances of best practice across Europe that correspond to the highest possible common standards. This exercise enables countries to go beyond minimum standards and develop their own pathways to policy improvement in an objective and transparent manner. Governments

and stakeholders may also track progress along these pathways as policies improve or backtrack over time. Successful monitoring and benchmarking exercises generate policy feedback, whereby new areas of improvement are identified, gaps in vocabulary remedied, and calls for European standard-setting and action initiated.

Governments concentrate too often exclusively on outcome indicators – the endpoint or the targets of policies. Such a focus allows some to claim success for improvements in integration that had little to do with policies. For instance, are lower unemployment rates a sign of successful labour market integration policies, or a cyclical upturn in the economy that ‘raises all boats’? Rather, the entire policy process needs to be benchmarked, from policy to outcomes, including all the other factors at play in the integration process.

MIPEX, as one critical part of a benchmarking process, provides integration participants with comparable policy indicators, which measure to what extent a government’s policies meet high European standards on promoting integration. It reveals where the legal and policy framework affords migrants the opportunities to participate in their country of residence.

Cross-national scientific analysis and additional research may later link MIPEX scores with additional national implementation and outcome indicators as well as contextual data. Areas of strength or weakness can be identified in policy itself, its implementation, target group, public perceptions, the effect of the labour market model, etc. Follow-up benchmarking exercises can help to explain why a migrant does, does not, or cannot in practice take up the opportunities provided under the law. Benchmarking enables social scientists and policymakers to observe how successful integration measures lead to successful integration outcomes in many local, regional, and national contexts.

The current version of MIPEX builds policy indicators for six policy strands – labour market access, family reunion, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. For each strand, the research partners identify the highest European standards suitable

for benchmarking. 142 policy indicators are designed, each relating to very specific components of one of the six policy strands. For each, these high standards are translated into three answer options, which are weighted with points 1, 2 or 3. This questionnaire of policy indicators is reviewed by scientific advisors, completed in each country by a leading independent national expert, and then peer reviewed by a second independent expert. These indicators are then weighted and aggregated together to capture the different dimensions of each policy: eligibility, conditions, security of status, and associated rights. The clear, concise, and comparable data provided through scoring allows policymakers and stakeholders to observe how their country’s different policies measure up to best practice standards, differ from their European neighbours or the EU on average, and change over time. Comparable information is likewise collected regarding the migrant populations, major integration events, and public perceptions in each EU member state.

The current edition of MIPEX, which presents the legal and policy situation as of March 1, 2007, maps the areas of strengths and weakness for all EU member states and, for the purpose of this paper, Estonia. The country’s full results are searchable and downloadable from the web site at: [www.integrationindex.eu](http://www.integrationindex.eu).

If the scores for the 25 EU member states surveyed in MIPEX are aggregated together, the EU member states score ‘halfway to best practice’ on each of the six policies. Their greatest ‘area of strength for promoting integration’, that is, where it receives the highest score, is long-term residence. Their greatest areas of weakness, where they receive the lowest scores, are access to nationality and political participation. Only Sweden’s policies score high enough to be considered favourable for promoting integration. The top 10 scoring countries include the Nordic countries (with the exception of Denmark), the BENELUX countries (with the exception of Luxembourg), the Western Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal), and the ‘Anglophone’ countries like Canada and the UK (with the exception of Ireland). This list includes both old and new countries of immigration. However, no Central and Eastern European countries’ poli-

cies receive even a 'slightly favourable' score. All score either halfway to best practice or slightly unfavourable.

Estonia falls halfway to best practice, with a ranking of 19th out of 28, just ahead of Lithuania (20th) and far ahead of Latvia, which scores 28th. Estonia's greatest area of strength is labour market access for non-nationals, which is the most favourable in the EU-10. Its policies on family reunion and long-term residence receive the same slightly favourable score for promoting integration, while policies on political participation, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination are found to be slightly unfavourable, when compared with the MIPEX normative framework. Nationality policies are the third lowest scoring of the 28 countries surveyed, just ahead of policies in Austria, Greece, and Latvia. Although anti-discrimination laws that promote integration are the greatest area of strength of the countries of Western Europe, they are the greatest area of weakness for Estonia, which on this policy receives the lowest score out of the 28 countries surveyed.

On labour market access, some of the EU's most favourable policies on eligibility and measures to facilitate integration in the labour market are found in Estonia, which receives a ranking of 6th, interestingly the same as Belgium and Switzerland. Estonia scores quite differently from the other EU-10 countries, which tend to lag significantly behind the Western European countries.

On family reunion and long-term residence policies, few countries impose language or integration tests. Family members mostly receive equal access as their sponsor to access employment and education, whereas long-term residents receive equal access as nationals to employment, social security and healthcare. In Estonia, family members and long-term residents have some of the most favourable rights in the 28 countries surveyed. Latvia receives the same favourable score for the rights that it grants to long-term residents.

Policies for political participation represent a potential area of improvement for all EU member states, including Estonia. Estonia's policies are found to be slightly unfavourable, whilst those in the EU-10 are on average wholly unfavourable.

Significant differences are observed across Europe: five countries grant non-EU nationals the right to vote or stand in local elections while eleven grant no right. Countries diverge on whether to form consultative bodies in order to benefit from the insights of non-EU nationals on the policy issues that most impact their daily lives. Further still, six Central and Eastern European countries restrict the political liberties of non-nationals, such as their right to join a political party or form an association with a political aim. Estonia scores 19th out of 28, due to limitations on political liberties, ad-hoc and non-elected consultations, and a right to vote (but not stand) that is reserved for long-term residents.

As previously stated, the EU member states score best on allowing non-nationals to become long-term residents and worst on allowing them to become national citizens. Most countries, including Estonia, have yet to facilitate naturalisation for first-generation migrants or their children and grandchildren born in the country. A naturalised citizen's nationality can be withdrawn on a number of grounds, without such time limits as would guarantee them the same security as their fellow citizens after a certain number of years. Furthermore, few countries offer full opportunities for migrants or non-nationals to become dual nationals, whereas policies in Estonia are critically unfavourable, which is also observed in only Latvia and Luxembourg.

Anti-discrimination laws in most EU member states protect any resident from ethnic and racial discrimination in most areas of life, although discrimination cases tend to drag on for over one year and states remain relatively inactive in promoting equality in their work. Estonia's anti-discrimination laws are the least favourable for promoting integration in the 28 countries. Non-nationals are vulnerable to ethnic, religious, and nationality discrimination in many areas of life, such as education and access to goods and services like housing or healthcare. Unfavourable equality policies reveal several areas of weakness for the state's role in combating discrimination, for instance by not informing all Estonians of issues of discrimination and their rights as a potential victim or granting the equality body a full and robust mandate.

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The many individuals in Estonia who hold a stake in promoting integration are best equipped to stake out pathways towards policy improvement. MIPEX can assist them in their endeavour by comparing Estonia's areas of weakness identified in MIPEX with the new priorities located in the draft integration strategy. The paper concludes by pointing to three areas of interest as well as instances of best practice across Europe, which could be further investigated in order to enrich media and policy debates in Estonia.

Given the document's focus on the active participation of non-citizens in public life, it is important to highlight that non-citizens have few opportunities to engage in mainstream channels, such as to join established political parties or serve their local community as candidates for municipal elections. The document's priorities could be actualised through the creation of structural, freely elected *consultative bodies*, where best practice examples can be found in the Nordic countries as well as Portugal and Spain.

Discussions of youth and access to nationality in new countries of immigration have raised the very pertinent question of the second and third generations, born and socialised in the country. In Estonia, the more appropriate question could concern non-citizens who were born *after* Estonian inde-

pendence. How could opportunities for automatic citizenship promote integration and the equality of all those born and socialised in an independent Estonia? Comparisons and further investigations could be fruitful with countries like Belgium and Sweden as well as new countries of immigration, which are re-conceiving citizenship in the context of second and third generations, such as Portugal, Italy and Ireland.

No matter how plentiful the opportunities in Estonia's legal framework are for non-citizens to participate in economic, social and civic life, Estonia cannot guarantee equal opportunities without robust and effective anti-discrimination laws. The corrosive impact of discrimination upon attitudes towards integration and the potential emergence of 'second-class citizenship' cannot be underestimated. The draft law on Equal Treatment will certainly offer certain improvements in definitions and fields of application for anti-discrimination law. Yet *equality policies* also stand out as a key area of improvement for Estonia as for many EU member states, which can look to equality bodies and state policies in Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and France for best practices on disseminating information and leading civil and social dialogue.

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# Managing Integration at the Local Level, the CLIP Project

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The CLIP Project - Cities for Local Integration Policies – is situated between the micro (individual) and macro (national) level of integration policies; it primarily regards cities as actors in integration policies. A huge diversity of policies can be found across Europe in different nation states and this diversity is even larger when we look at the regional level. Many policy areas that are relevant for integration policies are often allocated to the regional level but implemented on the local level.

If we look at the social realities of integration processes, firstly, what really happens is that integration always takes place through a local social context. Many European studies show that migrants usually integrate well, but they integrate into their specific local social context. Secondly, because they often have a large share of migrants, local communities (especially cities) are directly affected by failed integration. That has led to a situation in which many cities all over Europe have

developed integration policy practices that usually manifest themselves as social policy measures for the general population. These policies do not mention migrants or minorities as a target group but in practice still affect them to a large degree. Therefore many cities, especially metropolitan areas, have long-standing experience in implementing integration policies and measures on the local level, so it can even be said that in some EU countries cities are also policy makers.

The CLIP Project traces back to an initiative by the mayor of Stuttgart in Germany. He was very active within the Council of Europe on municipal issues and started a series of conferences in Stuttgart, inviting representatives from various European cities to attend in order to discuss local integration issues. The basic idea behind the CLIP Project is that research has been done on migration and integration issues in Europe for several decades and the theoretical discussions are quite well developed.

On the other hand, there are a lot of cooperation networks set up between cities covering a large number of areas which are relevant for local authority policy. But there is still a clear need for going beyond conceptual discussions. Concepts and principles are important, but it is also crucial to look into the practice of integration policy – how it is implemented, what measures are taken, why these measures work, and more importantly, why they do not.

The CLIP network was started up about a year and a half ago and the general idea behind the network is to assemble a critical mass of European cities over several years for a joint learning process through a structured sharing of experience which contributes to the improvement of local integration policies. This network has two levels. The most important one is that of participating cities – cities which actively participate in the research process and by their input shape the development of the research course. The network of participating cities is in turn facilitated by a network of researchers with long-standing experience in research on integration policies. The research institutions participating in the CLIP Project are: Compas (the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society) at Oxford University with Steven Vertovec; IMES (the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies) in Amsterdam with Rinus Penninx; CEDEM (the Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies) at the University of Liege with Marco Martinello; the Austrian Academy of Sciences with Heinz Fassmann; and the European Forum for Migration Studies, which is the project coordinator.

The project is organised in modules which are chosen in a consultation process with the Council of Europe and the cities involved. The four modules are housing, diversity policy, intercultural dialogue and ethnic entrepreneurship. The first module – housing – started in April 2006 and focuses on segregation, access, quality and the affordability of housing for migrants and minorities. It targets those residents of the local city who have a background that involves migration but it also includes nationals – for example Latin-Americans in Spain or ethnic Germans in Germany – migrants who might already bear the nationality of the

state in which they reside but who also have a migratory background.

The second module – diversity policy – started in the summer of 2007 and focuses on two areas: a) personnel policy within city administrations, access to employment, career development and wages, and b) the delivery of services to migrants and minorities.

The next module will start in 2008 and will concern intercultural dialogue with specific focus on inter-religious relations especially with Islam in Europe. The fourth will be on ethnic entrepreneurship and local economy – the importance of migrants to the economy and entrepreneurship for developing the economic success of a city or region.

The network of cities has been built up with support from the European Foundation, the CLRAE (the Council of Local and Regional Administrators of Municipalities and Regions at the Council of Europe), the Congress of European Municipalities and Regions at Brussels, and some mayors from the CLIP Steering Committee. The contribution from the cities is in delivering data, assigning local staff to data collection, and participation in the conferences.

Each module follows a specific work cycle starting with a *concept paper* – a state of the art analysis and conceptualisation on the module's issue by the CLIP European Research Group (CLIP-ERG). The concept paper is then discussed with the city experts at one of the conferences so there is adequate feedback from the practitioner's level as well. Empirical work is very important in order to have a clear common picture about how this area is conceptualised: what language is used, what the terms being used mean, and how we should approach that field. Based on that concept paper, the research group develops a *common reporting scheme* such as a checklist or questionnaire for data provision by the cities.

The next step is *case studies*. In order to make case studies comparable, a set of guidelines are developed and distributed amongst scientific partners. Three days of local field work are carried out by the researchers in the city during these case stud-

ies and expert interviews are conducted amongst the city's administrative staff, experts at the local level, NGOs and social partners. Based on this data and the consultation process, the partners write a 30 to 50 page case study on the cities, which contains very condensed material about those cities. These case studies are then discussed with the city's administrative staff and experts at the local level who deliver feedback about whether everything has been understood correctly, making it a joint endeavour by the experts at the city level and the European research group.

After this, the case studies face an analysis on policies and measures. So if we look at the first module – housing – there's the development of a typology and the revision of the concept paper in order to discover whether there is something which needs to be changed or improved. Single measures which are implemented by the cities are identified – there were about 160 measures identified by the twenty cities which participated in the housing module. The concept, policies, local discourse and the different visions of integration policies at the local level are also represented in the case studies.

So as mentioned above there are several areas that are relevant for the integration of migrants and minorities in the housing sector – segregation, access, affordability, and the quality of housing. As a result we came out with a set of recommendations for local policy makers developed ex-post from good experiences gained from the cities:

- » Local housing policies and the migrant integration nexus: the need for partnership in cross-departmental cooperation. It is very important to have regular internal working groups which are composed cross-departmentally, usually by committed staff members who are interested in the given issue. Outside the administrative level it is important to have regular roundtables with external experts and NGOs at the local level since NGOs play a very important role for the integration of migrants. The city should take a long-term approach with an integrated and holistic concept with focus not only on the quality of housing but also on all the other related areas which are directly connected with housing and the quality of housing of migrants and minorities.
- » Sufficient information and intelligence. It is important to have sufficient information and statistics on residents with a migratory background – indicators on migrants' access to housing and the provisions for monitoring this success; monitoring spatial distribution across cities, segregation, and especially the dynamics of such segregation.
- » Social housing as a prime means for local authorities. Social housing provides steering possibilities for local authorities and thus is very important. If there is no social housing and everything is carried out at the private level, it becomes very difficult to implement any measures which are related to the integration of migrants and minorities. So this means that when checking access regulations for discriminatory rulings, such as if access to social housing is bound to the duration of a migrant's stay in the city, migrants are strongly disadvantaged.
- » Information provision is also very important and it is vital that social housing is not concentrated in a specific area of the city. There should be a policy which disperses social housing in general and mixes existing concentrations of social housing.
- » Cities and the private rental market. Cities can act as mediators by renting private housing and sub-letting it to vulnerable groups. Another possibility is the provision of local authority housing land which is below the market price in exchange for guarantees of housing creation for vulnerable groups.
- » Supporting home ownership in migrants. Supporting access to mortgages at reduced rates (loan security guarantees, cooperation with local banks) and providing subsidies and tax cuts for low income families should also be considered.
- » Ensuring personal security in the neighbourhood. Cooperation among schools, social services and the police in preventing crime is of great importance.

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- » Soft urban renewal. Residents should be involved in the planning and implementation of a neighbourhood's reconstruction work and any largescale demolition should be replaced with re-conversion and upgrading. Opening public institution offices in disadvantaged neighbourhoods should help to integrate them into the city as a whole.
  - » Anti-segregation policy. Social housing should be spread across the city instead of being concentrated in specific neighbourhoods. Positive measures should be considered in order to influence the concentration of migrants instead of formal or informal quotas. It is also important to increase the attractiveness of these segregated neighbourhoods for middle class families by means of urban renewal programs.

As far as national and EU policy areas are concerned, the first suggestions would be to offer an integration policy that in turn offers perspectives,

because uncertain situations (such as those involving national permits, or long term residence) lead to divided investment, harming the resources of immigrants. Subsidy systems should not give privileges to minorities because that immediately triggers counterproductive effects; instead, they should be general and targeted at vulnerable groups.

To sum up the experiences of the first year and a half of the duration of the project, there have been many positive experiences gained with the measures mentioned in the case studies. Several very innovative approaches were found and since there was a large variation in the background of the CLIP cities, there is the possibility of some transferability in the sense that the cities can learn a lot from each other. On the other hand, it is very important to keep in mind that there is no one size fits all solution, so it always has to be adapted to the specific local situation, and placed in the national and regional context.

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# Equitable and Undivided Education System: the Way Out of the Cultural Conflict Factory



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Schools play a central role in maintaining peace and inclusion in a multi-cultural society, but their ability to act as arenas within which meaningful inter-cultural interactions take place depends on the degree to which students from various cultural backgrounds meet there. If schools reflect a greater degree of ethnic segregation than the residential areas they serve, even as a result of parental choice to preserve identity, the society can expect a lack of opportunities for meaningful cultural exchanges. As a leading article in the Guardian pointed out two years ago, describing the situation in Britain, 'communities which do not overlap or have meaningful cultural interchanges, breed fear, distrust and division'. (*The Guardian*, 21 January 2005, p29)

This paper will look at a situation in the national education system which is peculiar to Estonia and Latvia, while other countries in the EU experience it to a lesser degree (eg. Lithuania, Romania) or not at all. The situation referred to is that of an inherit-

ed system of separate schooling of students from major ethnic or linguistic groups in the country.

Some researchers have gone so far as to call this system 'segregation'. Whatever the term we apply, it is important to ensure that the wish to avoid uncomfortable terms does not lead us to disregard the actual similarities of this model to other historical or existing models of separate schooling, which have bred division and even discrimination in some societies. Therefore we have to examine this model critically, keeping in mind its effect on the two basic principles that are recognised by policy-makers throughout Europe and reflected in the Estonian draft integration strategy: equity and participatory citizenship.

Educational policy should proceed from some general principles such as equity in access to high quality education, and it should prepare young citizens to make responsible, informed and independent choices in their lives. The Estonian draft integration strategy also stresses these principles,

defined as 'Equal opportunities' and 'Participatory democracy'. From these principles, it is obvious that education policy should not pre-programme some groups of young citizens to achieve less than other groups. It is also obvious that it should not pre-programme future generations of citizens to lead segregated lives, constrained by the arbitrarily defined boundaries of ethnic communities. That much is clear, but from this point onward, the real dilemmas begin.

- » What if the students or their parents consistently opt for separate education (eg. with the purpose of preserving difference, defined as 'cultural identity')?
- » What if some groups, owing to the immediate geographic/ social environment where they are educated, are predisposed to aspire less and to achieve less in education?
- » What is the ethically permissible extent of 'social engineering' through the national education system: eg. imposing a programme of de-segregation, creating quota, introducing compensatory measures?

I propose to identify the ways in which the concept of diversity mainstreaming answers these questions.

The Estonian draft integration strategy proposes two goals related to integration through education:

- » Estonian language proficiency for all members of society, and
- » general recognition that cultural diversity is a resource, not a drawback.

Both goals are duly optimistic, taking into account the Estonian society's capacity for developing and adapting to the challenges posed by change. The data provided in the draft integration strategy shows that there is still much work to be done before either of these goals is achieved. To quote but a few numbers, the document mentions that 62% of the people in Narva are not able to communicate in Estonian, and about 60% of young ethnic Estonians feel disturbed by the Russians' different behaviour and way of life. It appears on the whole that the draft strategy document takes heed of these problems and offers ways to tackle them.

The measures which are proposed, especially in the areas of teacher training and teaching materials, are important in tackling both the problems of insufficient Estonian language proficiency and of cultural closure, and proposed indicators imply that the aspect of equity is addressed (thus, dropout rates among Russian-speaking students and their rate of enrolment in higher education shall be measured).

The proposed measurements are already a step ahead compared to the Latvian education system, where bilingual instruction was introduced years ago, yet still no comparative system of indicators of educational performance is in place to compare the academic achievements of those who were subjected to changes and those who were not. Nevertheless, there is a similarity between the education-related component of the Estonian strategy document and of the Latvian education policy as I know it: neither is proposing to address directly the central challenge to integration through education – the predominantly separate schooling of ethnic majority and ethnic minority students in an inherited system of divided schools.

To be sure, neither in Estonia, nor in Latvia is the system completely divided any longer. According to the Estonian data, about 5,000 students whose mother tongue is not Estonian are studying in schools where Estonian is the language of instruction. In Latvia, recent research has revealed that about 19% of students in the secondary school years (from the age of 15) in schools with Latvian language of instruction come from a different or mixed linguistic background.

Nevertheless, the predominant tendency remains for Russian-speaking parents to send their children to so-called Russian schools. These schools, even when offering bilingual instruction, as in the Latvian case, often remain based on the historic model of a 'Russian' school as developed in the previous decades and, in view of perceived inequalities in the external environment (in the case of Narva, these would be real structural inequalities), may adopt a defensive stance centred on the preservation of what is seen as a national identity in danger. There is nothing new in this model: it has been, at earlier times, pursued by many Latvian and Estonian schools that perceived their mission in preserving Estonian or Latvian national identity. Com-

petitions of patriotic essays and interviews with literature and history teachers in Latvian schools today still reveal that some schools have a tendency to cultural closure and rejection of diversity as a threat to Latvian identity. A study PROVIDUS conducted in Latvia reveals that about 14% of teachers in schools with Latvian language of instruction see the Russian-speaking students' families and culture as obstacles to their integration at school. About 33% of teachers in the same study see the Russian-speaking students' language and attitude as a primary barrier to integration<sup>1</sup>. We can conclude from this that the attitude towards minority students in mainstream (majority) schools is not uniformly open and unprejudiced.

Another study, also conducted by PROVIDUS, indicates that about 30% of teachers in Latvia tend to agree that the ethnic out-group (either non-Latvians or Latvians, depending on the teacher's own group) is behaving badly towards their in-group<sup>2</sup>.

The concept of diversity mainstreaming offers a viable solution for the equilibrium between equity, participation and identity, but diversity mainstreaming cannot be fully implemented in a partially segregated education system. It is therefore important to make sure that the barriers between mainstream (majority) schools and minority schools are not insurmountable, and that mainstream schools at all times remain open to minority students, even if it means investing extra resources in language training and teacher training. In fact, the earlier such investment is made, the better.

It may be useful to look at the needs of de-segregating the general education systems of both Latvia and Estonia using one of the existing theoretical models of desegregation. One of the basic preconditions for applying mainstreaming principles to a national school system in a multi-ethnic or multi-religious society is the system's movement towards overcoming all traces of a previously existing segregation of schools.

The term 'desegregation' emerged in the US during the Civil Rights Movement, and was initially applied to measures taken to overcome the racial segregation of schools.<sup>3</sup>

In Israel since the 1970s, the same term was applied to measures taken to overcome the ethnic segregation of Arab and Jewish schools.<sup>4</sup> While in each case the power relations between racial or ethnic groups in respective societies were different, as were the social and political transformations they were going through, it can be argued that some variables are essential to understanding the perspectives of school desegregation in any society. These are structural variables, variables of role behaviour, affective variables, and variables relating to goals and values.<sup>5</sup>

It seems (on the basis of the data provided in the draft integration strategy), that in Estonia, links between language and social status and the variables related to goals and values – future projections and perceptions of citizenship and nation – may be the problematic parts of the desegregation formula. Working with these issues both inside the educa-

Structural variables	Variables of role behaviour	Affective variables	Variables related to goals and values
» Legal status	» Teacher-student relations model	» Attitude towards existing segregation	» Future projections
» Funding	» Links between language and social status	» Attitude towards prospects of desegregation	» Perceptions of citizenship and nation
» Public perception			

<sup>1</sup> I Austers, M Golubeva, M Kovalenko, I Strobe. *Diversity Enters Latvian Schools*. PROVIDUS, 2007 (in Latvian: Dažādība ienāk latviešu skolās; in Russian: Mnogoobrazije vhodit v latyshskie shkoly).

<sup>2</sup> I Austers, M Golubeva, I Strobe, *The Barometer of Teachers' Tolerance*. PROVIDUS, 2007 (in Latvian: Skolotāju tolerances barometrs).

<sup>3</sup> Stave, S A, *Achieving Racial balance. Case Studies of Contemporary School Desegregation, Contributions to the Study of Education*, Number 65, 1995.

<sup>4</sup> Amir, Y and Sharan S (eds). *School De-segregation: Cross-cultural Perspectives*, Lawrence Erlbaum: Hillsdale, 1984.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. Chapter 6.

tion system and in society at large is therefore of paramount importance.

The option proposed is not a forced desegregation but incentives for the two types of schools to merge into a multilingual, varied, free-choice-based system of schools.

The outcome would be a movement away from a model of minority education that is characterised by three Ps: protectionism, paternalism and parallel cultural spaces (limited contact and mingling with other ethnic/ linguistic groups) to a model of minority *and* majority education characterised by another three Ps: pluralism, participation and personalisation of cultural interaction.

Obviously, this shift in the paradigm of education cannot be achieved without a serious commitment to the values of a pluralist, participation-oriented society, where the contribution of all individuals is valued. Here, we come to a certain problem presented by the way in which the third principle of the Estonian draft integration strategy is formulated:

***“Confidence as the basis of integration***

The use of equal opportunities, participation in social affairs and the rise of tolerance regarding ethnic and cultural differences is dependent on people feeling both confident and secure. For Estonians that means confidence in the preservation and development of Estonian identity. For non-Estonians it means confidence that the Estonian state’s policies do not aim to exclude or forcefully assimilate them, but instead promote linguistic and cultural diversity alongside the Estonian-language public sector.”

***The problem presented by this statement of position of the Estonian policy-makers is twofold:***

1. The very division into two hypothetical groups, defined as ‘Estonians’ and ‘non-Estonians’ is unhelpful. If indeed the purpose is to build society around core common values and to avoid exclusion, one needs to start with avoiding the practice of labelling Estonian citizens of minority ethnic backgrounds as non-Estonians. This, of course, will change what being ‘an Estonian’ means – which nevertheless fits into the concept of ‘development’ of Estonian identity if viewed inclusively.

2. The premise on which the principle of confidence is built – that Estonians and whoever is defined as ‘non-Estonian’ need different things from the integration policy – is both right and wrong. It is right in so far as experience shows that the activists of the Russian-speaking linguistic minority in the Baltic States, including Estonia, have expressed frequent concerns about the fear of assimilation, of Russian-speaking children losing linguistic and cultural competence in their mother tongue, etc. It is wrong in so far as it assumes that the two hypothetical groups are entirely distinct and will remain so in the future, moreover, that they will aspire to different articulated goals in the development of Estonian society and that these goals have to be addressed separately. This kind of assumption, by ignoring the potential of blurring and blending of boundaries between the linguistic majority and minority groups, preserves the division of society that the strategy is trying to address. Instances of blending and voluntary assimilation, of hybrid cultural practices developing under the influence of European and global trends, are to be seen as legitimate parts of social and cultural processes that may provide a way out of the divided society.

***The fundamental question is, then, the following:***

When the draft integration strategy says “one of the objectives of Estonian statehood is the preservation and development of an integral Estonian cultural space”, how is this integral Estonian space defined? Does it include those who come from a background different to that of Estonian high culture, but who wish to be equal players in the field of Estonian culture? (Eg. young artists of Russian origin, or ethnic Estonian teenagers developing street culture such as graffiti artists?) Is this integral space going to be open towards hybrid forms and fresh influences? The success of this cultural space depends on its ability to integrate new phenomena. Will this integral Estonian cultural space be an equitable, participatory space, or will it be an exclusive playground for the custodians of Estonian high culture, where others are not allowed to take part? The ultimate question is – Will it be a work-in-progress cultural space where the contributions of individuals, independently of their background, are valued and welcome?

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# Immigrant Education in Finland

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**Leena Nissilä**

*The Finnish National Board of Education*

European countries are in very different situations concerning their topical integration issues. Finland, for example, has rather few immigrants – foreign citizens account for 2.2% of our population – but if taking into account immigrants with Finnish citizenship, then the number is bigger – around 4%. The concentration of non-Finnish population can largely vary in different cities. There are schools where 70% of children have an immigrant background and there are schools with only Finnish speaking children and that is why the school system and national curriculum should be highly flexible in order to be adaptable in various situations.

A characteristic of a *multicultural* school and a multicultural society is that these cultures keep themselves separate and are not involved in very much communication with each other. When talking about multicultural schools, we might come across the notion 'tolerance' – are we tolerant towards each other, or not? One step ahead is already the *intercultural* stage which involves inter-

cultural dialogue and intercultural education. At this stage the representatives of different cultures already communicate with each other and there is no need to raise the subject of tolerance, since it is self-evident. However, discussions are held on good ethnical and international relationships.

And if we move further on, we reach the *intra-cultural* stage. In Finland there are actually schools in each of the aforementioned stages and for this reason the national curriculum should be very flexible.

In the case of Finland the majority of immigrants arrive from neighbouring countries. The largest groups are the Russian, Estonian and Swedish-speaking immigrant groups. In Finland the influx of immigrants was actually very slow; other Nordic countries and Central Europe had large numbers of immigrants before us. Our immigrant population only started to grow in the early 1990s. This was the point when we introduced the Finnish language as the second language into the national curriculum, while also teaching the mother

tongue to immigrants. We realised that we could not throw immigrant children into the deep end so we created a system which contained preparatory education as one part of its curriculum, both preparatory education for basic school and preparatory education for occupational schools.

In all of this we have the principle of functional bilingualism at every school level. This means that we do not only teach the official language and the majority language, but we also provide the opportunity to learn and use one's own mother tongue. I noticed in the Estonian draft integration strategy document that Estonia also provides an opportunity to use one's mother tongue, which made me very happy. This is naturally something that requires financing and high levels of organisation in order to become more than just a sentence in the strategy.

In addition to teaching the official language there is the need for a lot of supporting education both in the majority language and in one's mother tongue. Research has shown that good results are achieved with supporting education in the native language, which is especially vital in the beginning when an immigrant has only just arrived in a new country. The teaching of one's mother tongue and teaching in the native language has a very positive effect on study results. The task of the school is not to make children forget what they are already capable of. We know that when small children immigrate and have no opportunities to use their mother tongue, their mother tongue skills deteriorate. This again is a loss from the government's point of view as well, since any language skill will be highly important in the future and it is a big asset to have people in the country whose mother tongue is a non-official language. Teaching a majority language-speaking child any other second language requires a lot of resources and for this reason such resources should be used for those who have such a second language as their mother tongue, and their language skills should be developed further.

Some thoughts about preparatory education. In Finland preparatory education is intended both for pre-school and compulsory school age, either for half a year or a whole year according to the need –

what level has the pupil reached in the Finnish language, as well as in other subjects. Preparatory education is financed by the state, which means that after the child or adolescent has integrated into a school, the local government authority will receive higher levels of state aid for teaching foreign language-speaking children than when they teach majority language children. This will enable the school or local authority to arrange Finnish language or second language education and religious education.

The state also provides separate financing to support the education of immigrants for the period of four years after immigration. We recommend delivering it in the mother tongue as much as possible during the first year, after that provide support education in the child's mother tongue for two and a half hours per week. Currently about fifty languages are taught to various immigrant groups as their mother tongue. These two and a half hours also include education to Romanians in the Romany language and to Samis living outside the Sami territory.

Finland adheres to the principle that bilingualism is not a problem, but a great opportunity. Such a language skill should be taken advantage of by means of active use and the further learning of the language. For example, if an immigrant spends two years learning a language, then the learning of their mother tongue will be interrupted and their knowledge will have large gaps, with the result that their language skills will not develop.

Research shows that a healthy child is able to acquire more than one language and since language is a means of thinking, the skill of one's mother tongue is extremely important in respect of study results. Results have proven to be good namely in the case of enriching bilingualism, which means that the second language will supplement the mother tongue so that the first will function in the role of a mother tongue and will substitute it. In any case, achieving the language skill necessary for studies is time-consuming. Depending on the mother tongue and culture, this may take approximately five to seven years, which is why learning the majority language should be given a lot of

time and funding by the state. Should this be left only up to the schools themselves, it will quickly be seen that they have neither the necessary skills nor finances to organise it. In Finland, the majority language is taught under the subject mother tongue and literature and it is taught to foreign language speakers. It should also be stressed that it should be taught separately from Finnish as a second language.

An important aspect is that the majority language is both a subject and a means of study. It is learnt while learning all other subjects in this language. This is extremely important as the teachers of all subjects are to some degree the teachers of Finnish as a second language. They must teach the terminology and concepts of their subject in the majority language. An important way of teaching here is exemplification. In Finland, research revealed that if a teacher puts great stress on exemplification in the class when teaching another subject, then the study results of both immigrants and majority language speakers will improve. Teaching minority language students requires a lot of exemplification, using step by step transition, calm language and plain language. In Finland, study groups are formed not according to one's form, but according to skill levels in the Finnish language. Here it should be emphasised that we are talking about teaching the second language, not a foreign language, because a second language is learnt in the environment of that language, which again contributes to the development of the language skill. If we look at immigrant children and adults in Finland who go to Finnish-language schools and who have Finnish-speaking friends, then in two or three years we can see that they are actually very fluent in the spoken language.

Finland has developed a multitude of different educational materials. Besides such educational materials, training of teachers and other employees of the school is very important. We have done a lot of work for this purpose, issuing literature on didactics for teachers in which they can find information on teaching methods, how to exemplify, and how to teach Finnish as a second language in general. Teacher training here bears a prominent role and not only additional training, but training new

teachers in universities who should learn about interculturality and the methods of teaching foreign language children in school. The authenticity of educational materials is also vital. Textbooks should contain materials and information that are in wider use in society, in order to comply with the phrases and dialogues used in society.

A few more words about didactics. Learners have two different levels of knowledge in language: there is the so-called descriptive knowledge in which they can explain how something is termed in the language; then there is procedural knowledge, which enables them to use the language correctly, but in which case they are unable to explain why something is as it is. When teaching a second language, the teacher must make a didactical choice as to which one of the two to deliver: language knowledge or language skill. In teaching a second language this may be crucial. Traditional language education largely applies a method in which it is first explained how things go and only after that does language practice and use start. Research has shown that this knowledge will never turn into skill. At the beginning it should be the other way around – get students to start using the language immediately from the first lesson and only later provide them with explanations about how and why the language works. The order of teaching should proceed from a constant use of the language. Different phrases are used, and thereby constant dialogue is the key to such use. Only at a much later point should forms and cases be introduced and provided with primary analysis. Much later, when a student is at an advanced learner's level, more in-depth analysis on meaning is needed.

In teaching the majority language the setting of objectives is very important. For this purpose Finland has applied the European framework of reference for languages, which was initially drawn up for teaching foreign languages, but was later adapted to second language teaching. This document can be applied in stating the objectives, but it can also be applied in assessment and self-analysis. It distinguishes between six levels, but while compiling the national curriculum in Finland it became apparent that six levels are not

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enough. These would suffice with language tests, but when we teach the language all the time and the language develops step by step during the process of education, there should be more levels with a higher density. In Finland this resulted in a document with ten levels and these all are applied in second language teaching to immigrants. This system enables to indicate which level should immigrant students reach in basic school, vocational education schools, in adult education and so on. This provides us with the national standard that is being followed in different parts of the country and that gives us a common system and common objectives. A uniform system guarantees continuity, so that when an immigrant changes schools, the new teacher will know his or her level. Grading also proceeds from targets which are established by a uniform system which enables us to compare the school reports of students from different parts of Finland.

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To conclude, a few words about the major challenges in immigrant education. I can tell from my personal experience that language skill is very important. Language is the key to society, and when learning a majority language, many other problems become settled along the way. This requires a lot of cooperation, both between teachers and with families. Much depends on various cultural and religious views prevailing in different immigrant groups, and it is essential for the teacher and school to value the role of the family as the teacher of the child. There should definitely be no interference between the child and parents. The school should value the views of the family, even if these may seem strange from the Finnish point of view. It is also important to recognise foreign language speaking pupils as a matter of everyone at school, and not only the person who teaches them Finnish as a second language, their mother tongue or religion. Each teacher whose class such a student attends, whether mathematics or geology, should think of how they can ensure the best possible study results for the child.



# Conclusions of the Conference



## **Raivo Vetik**

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For me one of the most important messages of the integration conference was the thesis presented by John Berry, known under the name of the Multiculturalist Hypothesis. The hypothesis holds that security in one's own group identity is the basis for accepting other groups and maintaining tolerance towards other cultures, and that this process is a mutual one, meaning that one cannot strengthen one's own group security at the expense of the other side. This message is very important at this particular point in time in Estonia after the crisis in April 2007.

When talking about the integration policy in Estonia, there is always the question of how to define integration. In what we have heard in the presentations of this conference, there is, I think, a certain tension between different approaches. My understanding is that the Estonian approach states that, figuratively speaking, integration is not about making people happy. Such an understanding was also present in Matti Similä's paper when he was talking about theoretical tensions between nation-state discourse and discourse on multiculturalism. However, Matti's point was that we still need to keep both concepts and work towards a

kind of compromise between them. On the other hand, it was very interesting to listen to our Latvian colleagues and their experiences. According to Nils Muižnieks, the working definition of integration includes three basic elements: participation, equality and inter-cultural competence. The same type of approach was also represented by Thomas Huddleston in his paper.

I would say that what we have here are two theoretically different approaches to integration – one is descriptive and the other is analytical. My understanding is that in the final analysis we need both of them. The descriptive approach, from my point of view, means listing a certain number of positive things such as participation in society, equality, etc, and to be able to say that the achievement of these aims constitutes integration. My problem with the descriptive approach is that, for example, in the case of participation, we do not presume that all ethnic Estonians or ethnic Latvians are fully participating in society. There are people in all societies who simply do not care about participation and this is their right. The same holds to the notion of equality – we do not presume, for example, that within the communities of ethnic Estonians or Latvians there exists an absolute equality of opportunities. Even in democratic societies there are people who are more equal than others due to social, economic and other reasons. We are not living in a perfect world.

So, there is a problem that if we define integration only in a descriptive manner as participation or equality in society, then we actually ask something of minorities or immigrants which does not even exist within the majority group and cannot be achieved in principle. For me this represents a kind of conceptual problem and this is the reason why I said at the beginning that, from my point of view, integration is not about making people happy and listing all positive things one can think

of regarding minority issues. It is about managing social differences and conflicts in multicultural societies. However, I agree that in the final analysis we also need a descriptive notion of integration, but it should be complementary to the analytical one, which highlights the underlying conflicts of multicultural societies.

We also had an interesting discussion in the conference about how much multiculturalism should be reflected in the public sphere, and whether it should be reflected at all. We heard different views represented in this regard, from Elena Jurado and Eric Kaufmann. Elena said that, from her point of view, it would be very important that multiculturalism is expressed in the Estonian public sphere and that the lack of it is currently one of our main problems. Eric, on the other hand, said that he is not sure whether it is a good idea, because this would create new problems which are not easy to tackle. I would say that this is one of the core questions of integration and my own recommendation would be that the best we could do is to try to find an ideal middle ground.

Further on we discussed about whether integration policies matter at all in real life. This is related to a broader discussion in literature about generic and specific integration policies. There are authors arguing that what really matters is generic policies alone, not specific integration policies. Such a statement is based on empirical data from a number of countries. This issue in turn leads to the discussion about mainstreaming which has also started in Estonia. From my point of view, one of the biggest problems in the previous stage of integration in Estonia has been that the policies were based only on the efforts of the Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs and the Integration Foundation. Both are very small institutions, but the issues of integration in Estonia are big and complicated. So, my recommendation would be to switch over to the mainstreaming approach in the integration programme for 2008-2013 in Estonia.

A very important point was made in the conference by Eric Kaufmann about the increase of security processes in relation to integration, which it-


self creates additional difficulties. He said that the integration processes are influenced by a number of factors such as political struggle between parties, foreign interests, etc, which make integration issues particularly problematic. Such a warning is very strongly confirmed by the example of the April crisis in Estonia, which was very much the result of political manipulation.

Further, Tove Malloy gave a very interesting presentation at the conference about how ethnic features and integration issues are made much more important in society. I found her paper excellent and very useful. I would like to add that this phenomenon can be found not only in society, but also in academia. If we look at academic writings on integration we very often find that they are based on an essentialist understanding of the phenomena. For example, if I recall my own research of the nineties on the inter-ethnic issue in Estonia I would have to admit that it was basically an essentialist approach. I would say I represented the position which in literature is called 'methodological nationalism'. In this regard I would like to mention a new trend in literature formulated by Eric Kaufmann and his colleagues under the name of 'dominant ethnicity approach' which represents a very important step forward in overcoming essentialism in academic research.

My final point is that if we would like to achieve any real improvement in integration, we should operate on two levels – one is on the level of society and the other is on an academic level. Theoretical debates can have a lot of impact on integration processes and I feel that this conference has greatly contributed to the better understanding of the core issues faced in this field. I would like to thank all eleven speakers particularly because we are not exactly going through the best of times in Estonia after the April crisis, and in this context it was very important to have such prominent people in the field here to share ideas and experience with.







Rahvastikuministri Büroo



Integratsiooni  
Sihtasutus



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