




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D2.1

Gaps in Migration Research

REVIEW OF MIGRATION THEORIES AND
THE QUALITY AND COMPATIBILITY OF MIGRATION DATA ON
THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

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Abstract

Migration is humming with activity and fuelled by the changing nature of typologies, geographies, drivers and, more importantly, changing societies. At the same time, 'migration' continues to be a key concern of public and policy debates, especially as intersectional issues of labour rights, citizenship, ethnicity and health inequalities. Alongside the traditional migration categories, new typologies have developed that present particular internal dynamics. The complexity of current migration phenomena, the obstacles in data collection and the limitations in theoretical framework pose challenges for migration studies. Valid, reliable, scientifically driven conceptualisations and arguments on migration are a critical need of the hour – not only for researchers and policymakers, but also for the public whose opinion has a significant role in policymaking. It is important to develop theoretical frameworks and statistical resources that capture the dynamism of migration, the various intersections of identity, economics, globalisation and gender accurately. Ongoing efforts for harmonising definitions and new data sources have contributed to the availability and quality of information on migratory flows. Nevertheless, coherence, consistency and comparability in national and international migration statistics may still be the exception rather than the standard. Today in 2020, although a lot of things have drastically changed, the same challenges and gaps about migration statistics continue to persist. These shortcomings constitute a notable obstacle for researchers and authorities to understand global migration patterns better, develop scenarios, design effective policies, monitor the needs of the population, and to identify how these needs change over time. In the last few decades, there have been multiple attempts by national governments, international and regional organisations, and private institutions to collect better data on migration. However, the existing data on international migration suffers from problems (gaps) of inconsistency in definitions and data collection methodology, lack of adequate statistics, ignorance of new data sources and limitations for comparability, among others. On the other hand, it has also been questioned whether existing migration theories and capture contemporary migration patterns, dynamics and status. Recent changes in the dynamics and modalities of migration have not yet been studied beyond predominant theories and their components. Scholars and international institutions have repeatedly highlighted these issues and insisted on the urgent need for comprehensive, accurate and timely data on migration. In spite of efforts, actual improvements have been limited. The ultimate goal of this report is to critically discuss and identify the contemporary gaps in migration data and to map theories and the contemporary migration reality. This elaborate report comprised three sections: a brief overview of major theories of migration, gaps assessment in theories and data and the theories and contemporary migration realities nexus. The discussion of each part is based on detailed and critical reviews. A final analysis of the different perspectives in each section highlights the findings and recommendations. Main conclusions serve as the updated and detailed list of long-lasting shortcomings of the migration theories and data. Although solution suggestions are not part of the specific objectives of this report, the identified gaps will be the starting point for the assessment and validation of alternative data sources and new methodologies to develop better understanding of the migration scenarios. In addition to that, developed recommendations are a considered process of using findings of this report to help policymakers, data collecting institutes and researchers with making decisions on future actions regarding the improvement of the knowledge on the migration scenarios.

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1. Introduction

Migration has been called a complex phenomenon for decades. However, in recent years it has been pronounced even more so and far more often given the dynamic changes and accelerated mobility across the globe. The nuance in contemporary terminology makes this complexity evident, as the transition from ‘migration’ to ‘mobility’ highlights how movement is no longer one-way and permanent/long-term, but rather a multi-agent, fluent and progressive concept. Migration is humming with activity and fuelled by the changing nature of typologies, geographies, drivers and, more importantly, changing societies. At the same time, ‘migration’ continues to be a key concern of public and policy debates, especially as intersectional issues of labour rights, citizenship, ethnicity and health inequalities are exacerbated due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

As migration patterns have changed, the migratory flows have become more complex and less predictable. Alongside the traditional migration categories, new typologies have developed that present particular internal dynamics. Although international migration theories are divided into theoretical approaches that explain the beginning of migration and others that explain its continuation (Massey *et al.*, 1993: 430), to date there is no single comprehensive theory of international migration. Today, the theoretical framework of international migration is made up of a fragmented group of theories that have developed several limitations in their field of study, which makes it more difficult to analyse the phenomena at the multidisciplinary level (Horváth & Anghel, 2009: 29). As a result, the complexity of current migration phenomena, the obstacles in data collection and the limitations in the theoretical framework pose challenges for migration studies.

Valid, reliable, scientifically driven conceptualisations and arguments on migration are a critical need of the hour – not only for researchers and policymakers, but also for the public whose opinion has a significant role in policymaking.

Given the advocacy for evidence-based or data-driven policymaking, what constitutes ‘evidence’ has great importance. It is important to develop theoretical frameworks and statistical resources that capture the dynamism of migration, the various intersections of identity, economics, globalisation and gender accurately. Ongoing efforts for harmonising definitions and new data sources have contributed to the availability and quality of information on migratory flows. Nevertheless, coherence, consistency and comparability in national and international migration statistics may still be the exception rather than the standard. The discrepancies between immigration and emigration flows involving the same pair of countries in an origin/destination matrix of migratory flows were determined in 1975 at the Conference of European Statisticians (CES). More than a decade later, in 1987, Kelly explained the reasons for these gaps in migration statistics as differing definitions of ‘immigrants’ and ‘emigrants’, different statistical coverage, differences in the statistical treatment of temporary migrants, a lack of consistency in classifying migrants by country of origin/destination, and differences between countries in the data sources and methods of collection used. Over 40 years later, today in 2020, although a lot of things have drastically changed, the same challenges and gaps about migration statistics continue to persist.

These shortcomings constitute a notable obstacle for researchers and authorities to understand global migration patterns better, develop scenarios, design effective policies, monitor the needs of the population, and to identify how these needs change over time. In the last few decades, there have been multiple attempts by national governments, international and regional organisations, and private institutions to collect better data on migration. However, the existing data on international migration

suffers from problems (gaps) of inconsistency in definitions and data collection methodology, lack of adequate statistics, ignorance of new data sources and limitations for comparability, among others. On the other hand, it has also been questioned whether existing migration theories can capture contemporary migration patterns, dynamics and status. Recent changes in the dynamics and modalities of migration have not yet been studied beyond predominant theories and their components. Scholars and international institutions have repeatedly highlighted these issues and insisted on the urgent need for comprehensive, accurate and timely data on migration. In spite of efforts, actual improvements have been limited.

The ultimate goal of this report is to critically discuss and identify the contemporary gaps in migration data and to map theories and the contemporary migration reality. Written as part of the HumMingBird project, Work Package 2 presents an overview of migration theories and an analysis of the main sources of migration-related knowledge and data. Information is presented in an accessible manner for a broad section of readers and we hope it will inform policymakers, practitioners and scholars within this consortium as well the researchers who are new to this area of research with a broad understanding of this complex phenomenon.

We begin with a review of general (and widely accepted) migration theories, individual migration decision making, structure, agency and the need for multilevel analysis. Section 3 explores contemporary theories and migration realities. In Section 4, we bring together the gaps that emerge from the theoretical review, case studies and extensive research on migration data sources. This section covers gaps in qualitative approaches to migration studies, international data sources, quantitative data sources on migration policies, and migrants and migration in the EU policy framework surveys. In Section 5, we present our conclusion and some recommendations on how to strengthen migration knowledge sources and study.

2. Reviewing migration theories

Besides giving an overview of better-known migration theories, this section takes a systematic look at the major problems of migration theory building. We ask how theories deal with the question of individual migration decision making (Section 2.1.2); we look at how theories deal with the relation between agency and structure (Section 2.1.3) and the levels of explanation in different theories (Section 2.1.4). In each of these sections, we will present theories that offer promising options to address these problems.

Though we argue in favour of a broad understanding of ‘migration’, we believe that forced violent migration should be treated as a separate project. Migration, in our approach, involves at least some degree of individual decision making which is different from being expelled by force from one’s country of origin. In some cases, there might be, however, only a very thin line between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ actions, so we suggest defining ‘forced’ as the absence of any kind of agency when starting the migration.

2.1 Main migration theories

In this section we present and review ‘general’ theories of migration – theories that study migration as a change of place of residence across international borders, without focussing on specific motives and legal or political conditions (such as family migration or asylum, for instance). It has to be noted, however, that many general theories focus on what happens on the labour market and how related events give momentum to many kinds of special migration patterns.

In a similar view as well-known reviews (Hagen-Zanker, 2008; Haug, 2000; King, 2012; Massey *et al.*, 1993), we review the following theories in our report: neoclassical (micro and macro) theories of migration, new economics of labour migration, behavioural models, dual labour market theory, world systems theory, the theory of migration systems, network theory, and finally the theory of cumulative causation of migration. We will look at the main concepts, research questions and focus of interest (*explanandum*) of these theories. We differentiate between theories that explain the **initiation of migration** and those approaches explaining the **perpetuation of migration**.

2.1.1 Explaining the initiation of migration

Classical migration theories focus on the initiation of migration. Though they all focus on causes that facilitate the start of migration, all theories have distinct concepts and assumptions. Some are conceptualised as micro level, others as macro level theories. Behavioural models as well as the New Economics of Labour Migration are commonly regarded as micro level theories.¹ Dual labour market theory and the world systems theory are seen as macro level theories. Neoclassical migration theory provides explanations at micro and macro level.

2.1.1.1 Neoclassical migration theory

Neoclassical migration theory is among the best-known migration theories. It entails micro as well as macro elements to explain migration. The underlying assumptions of neoclassical migration theory

¹ The literature shows some discrepancies in the categorisation. Hagen-Zanker (2008), for instance, assigns the New Economic of Labour Migration to the meso level.

are rooted in models that were initially developed in the research field of development economics (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954). Migration is assumed to arise due to geographical differences in labour supply and demand and the resulting wage differentials between labour-rich and capital-rich countries. People move from low-wage (labour-surplus) to high-wage (labour-scarce) countries. Consequently, labour supply and demand as well as wages converge across countries. Migration is assumed to stop as soon as the wage differences decrease to the expected costs of migration. In short: initially, the labour market faces a state of disequilibrium mirrored by wage disparities and migration is the mechanism to bring the market back to equilibrium. As soon as the market is in equilibrium, migration stops. There is an underlying assumption that markets other than the labour market do not influence migration movements (Massey *et al.*, 1998).

Neoclassical migration theory is, in contrast to almost all other migration theories, directly linked to a model of individual choice at the micro level (Todaro, 1969; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). The core element of the neoclassical micro migration theory is a ‘rational’ actor who acts according to a cost-benefit-analysis. The migrant weighs costs and benefits of migration to different countries against costs and benefits of staying and chooses the strategy with the highest net returns. Sjaastad (1962) enriched the neoclassical theory by connecting it with the human capital approach considering migration as an ‘investment increasing the productivity of human resources’ (p. 83). Consequently, net returns differ across people depending on their personal skills and other socio-demographic characteristics. Neoclassical migration theory includes different types of costs and benefits, monetary and non-monetary. The first ones entail ‘out-of-pocket expenses’ (Sjaastad, 1962, p. 83), like costs of travelling, costs during the journey and the arrival period and costs for practical issues like language courses. Non-monetary costs include opportunity costs and also (and against popular presentations of the neoclassical model) psychological costs of leaving family, friends and the familiar surroundings. Similar to costs benefits can also be separated into non-monetary (e.g. preferred climate) and monetary returns (wages). Sjaastad (1962) notes that psychological costs of migration are especially hard to measure and calculate.

Analytically, the decision making process can be summarised in the following term – as one of the established conceptualisations (Faist, 2000, p. 36):

$$\sum_{j=1}^N \frac{Y_{dj} - Y_{oj}}{(1+r)^j} - T > 0$$

If the overall sum (summed up for all years in which future returns are expected) of the discounted difference between the earnings in the year j at the destination (Y_{dj}) and the earnings in the year j at the origin (Y_{oj}) less the costs of moving (T) show a positive value (greater than zero), people decide to move. r represents the rate of interest to discount future earnings.

This model is especially useful in explaining the heterogeneity of migrants. Different migrant groups face a higher or lower likelihood of emigration since they expect different rates of return depending on their human capital variables such as age, gender, education, profession, experiences or skills.

2.1.1.2 Behavioural models

Behavioural models extend the idea of migrants as rational cost-benefit-calculators. Value-expectancy models leave behind the basic idea of monetary profit maximisation and promote a more general approach where people choose the action that lets them expect the highest perceived value as an outcome (de Jong & Fawcett, 1981). The strength of the motivation to migrate for each individual result is the product of individual value of the preferred outcomes and the expectancy that migration can actually provide these outcomes. In contrast to the neoclassical theory that focused strongly on

monetary costs, the value-expectancy model is able to include all conceivable variables that might influence people's behaviour. Wealth, status, comfort, stimulation, or autonomy are only some variables that might influence the decision making. The value-expectancy model, however, is still based on the assumption that migrants make rational decisions *ex ante*, preferring that choice where one's own aspirations are most likely to be fulfilled.

In contrast to the models assuming complete rationality, there are more psychologically oriented models that assume the bounded rationality of actors (Faist, 2000). This addresses the fact that individuals are limited in their ability to solve problems and to access and to process information (Simon, 1957). This means that individuals take a simplified model as a basis for their decision making and act rationally according to this model. One representative model is the stress-threshold model (Wolpert, 1965). It considers migration as an adaptation strategy to conditions of the direct environment of a person including economic, social, psychological and other opportunities and costs. Individuals assign different 'place utilities' to different places according to their subjectively perceived utility. Information about action alternatives is incomplete and subjective. If the place utility in a possible alternative destination is expected to be higher than in the present location, individuals decide to move.

2.1.1.3 New economics of labour migration

New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) as a theory has evolved as a reaction to the criticism on the dominating neoclassical paradigm. NELM raises the decision making level from the individual to a group level within families, households or even communities (Stark, 1991). The individual is no longer assumed to decide independently. Instead, one or more family members are selected by the community or household group and sent off in order to improve the wellbeing of the whole group. In this way, an implicit contract has been undertaken: the family mobilises its resources to enable one member to migrate; the migrant, on his or her part, sends remittances back home. NELM is the first theory that includes remittances explicitly into its theoretical framework.

In contrast to former theories, NELM does not consider maximisation of the joint income as a decisive factor for migration. Instead it considers the minimisation of risks and the compensation of constraints related to market failures. Families try to diversify their income portfolio in order to (i) minimise risks like unemployment, loss of income or crop failures, and (ii) to overcome market failures not only in the labour market but also in the credit or insurance market (Stark, 1984; Taylor, 1999). In poor emigration countries, especially, credit and insurance markets are imperfect or even missing. Thus, savings or credits are not appropriate means to insure the household against income risks or to self-finance production (King, 2012; Taylor, 1999). Instead, migration is used to overcome these failures and to diversify sources of income in order to guarantee the family's economic hedge through the strategic allocation of investment and labour.

Another important innovation of the NELM approach is that income is no longer seen in absolute terms but in relative ones. Households want to increase their income not in an absolute value but relative to other households within their society - not between sending and receiving societies. In other terms: they want to diminish their relative deprivation compared to a local reference group (Stark, 1991). This argument is directly linked to remittances which raise the income and investment opportunities of migrant families. Directly confronted by the wealth that is considered to come with migration (such as remittances spent for new houses, vehicles or other consumer durables), non-migrant families become more aware of their own poor living conditions. This causes them to pursue migration as well (Stark & Taylor, 1989). The likelihood of emigration increases.

2.1.1.4 Dual labour market theory

While previously discussed theories have different focal points, theoretical assumptions and units of analysis, they share one commonality: they are all essentially micro level models that emphasise the

role of the decision making entity. In this section, we look at theories that see migration as a consequence of structural conditions like labour market segmentations, concentration of land ownerships or long-term effects of colonisation.

One prototype of these macro level theories is the dual labour market theory (Piore, 1979). The dual - or also called segmented - labour market theory assumes migration to be primarily driven by labour demand from the countries of destination and usually initiated through recruitment programmes for a foreign work force. The underlying assumption is that the labour market of developed countries is divided into two main segments, the high-skilled and well-paid sector and the low-skilled and badly paid sector. To be employed in the first sector is related to high social status and prestige, to be employed in the latter one is connected with low pay and prestige. There are various mechanisms that explain the need for foreign labour (Massey *et al.*, 1998).

First, a rise in wages in the low-skilled sector would provoke a structural inflation throughout the overall labour market since wages have to be adapted upwards for all wage levels. Consequently, it is easier to recruit foreign labour.

Secondly, jobs at the lower end of the hierarchy are often correlated with motivational problems of domestic workers because of low social status and few opportunities for upward social mobility. Foreign workers, however, are still thinking in terms of the hierarchy of their country of origin. Thus, they do not care about social prestige in the destination country at the beginning.

Third, the primary, capital-intensive segment is stable and only sparsely affected by fluctuations. Workers must have expertise to handle the technology-intensive processes. Employers must invest in the education of their workers and promote their constant further trainings. Employees are considered capital for the company. The secondary segment is subject to strong fluctuations in the economic cycle and is characterised by unstable and insecure jobs. Since the jobs do not require higher knowledge, workers are normally suspended when the economy declines. Therefore, it is very difficult to motivate native workers for jobs in the secondary segment.

Fourth, immigration will foster ethnic enclaves and networks that have reciprocal effects on further immigration.

Additionally, in former times, jobs in the secondary sectors have been occupied by women, teenagers, and rural-to-urban migrants. However, due to demographic changes in industrialised societies, such as the emancipation of women or the decline in birth rates, these cohorts of employees are not available anymore. The demand has to be covered with alternative labour and foreign migrants are one solution.

2.1.1.5 World systems theory

In a critical response to those theories that are based on the underlying assumption of a market equilibrium tendency (with neoclassical migration theory as a prototype) historical-structural approaches concerned with global inequalities arose in the 1950s and gained more and more importance during the 1960s and 1970s. The underlying paradigm of historical-structural theories is that the expansion of capitalism throughout the world maintains and even increases global inequalities. The world economy is assumed to be divided into core areas represented by the main capitalist powers and peripheral areas that provide raw material, labour, and new consumption markets. Poor countries are kept in their disadvantaged positions and (geo)political structures remain unbalanced. World systems theory is a prominent example of historical-structural theories (Wallerstein, 1974).

World systems theory assumes migration to be a reaction to capitalist penetration into less developed regions (see Massey *et al.*, 1993). Companies expand worldwide and enter less developed countries looking for land, labour, raw materials, and new consumer markets in search of higher profits. Initially created by colonialism, exploitive structures are maintained in present times by neo-colonial governments, multinational firms and national elites who sell a country's resources below value.

Capitalism changes structures in the less developed parts of the world through various mechanisms: Mechanisation and industrialisation of agriculture from outside destroy traditional ways of land use

and land use rights and force small farmers out of local markets. Concurrently, foreign companies take over the raw material market creating a demand for paid labour. This new form of employment leads to a change in traditional values. Collectivistic thinking is replaced by individualism and private gains become more important.

In addition, foreign-owned companies penetrate local markets of less developed countries. In this way, they ruin not only local production and consumption markets through cheaper prices. They also demonstrate a way of living that can never be achieved by the local population in the local markets. This enhances the desire for migration of the local population.

The inflow of capital into less developed countries improves transportation and communication infrastructure. Ideological links between countries - often established through former colonial links - the spread of western lifestyles, living standards and consumption patterns through modern media together with the improvement of transportation and communication infrastructure increases the desire for as well as the realisation opportunities of migration to the core western countries.

Demand for foreign labour by the low-skilled sector develops especially in global cities like New York, London or Tokyo where a high density of wealth and high-skilled workforce demands services from the low-skilled sectors like hotels or domestic service.

2.1.2 The perpetuation of migration

While classical approaches primarily try to explain the causes of migration, more recent theories focus on the perpetuation of migration. These are concerned with factors that sustain migration. They look for explanations as to why migration movements go on even when the initial incentives, such as higher wages or lower unemployment rates, cease to exist. Unlike classical theories, they do not focus solely on micro or macro level explanatory variables but work mainly either at an in-between (meso) level of analysis or at the integration of different levels. Migrants are no longer considered as either decision makers who act rationally on their wishes and preferences or as passive agents whose actions are determined by social forces. Instead, migration itself is seen as a social construct (Boyd, 1989) within these theories which attempt to establish concepts of linkages to societies as fundamental elements to understand migration flows, their direction, size and persistence. The meso level of analysis including networks, organisations and institutions gains attention. In this context, analysis moves away from focusing *either* on the hosting *or* on the sending region. Instead, it investigates movements and social spaces *between* or *above* the hosting or sending communities and embed migration into a broader social framework (Pries, 2013).

2.1.2.1 Network theory

Social network theory is a modern approach to theorising migration. In the context of migration, personal migrant networks have to be distinguished from smuggling networks. Social (migrant) networks are supposed to be a decisive driver of ongoing migration. Migrant networks are 'a set of interpersonal relations that link migrants or returned migrants with relatives, friends or fellow countrymen at home, (...) convey information, provide financial assistance, facilitate employment and accommodation, and give support in various forms' (Arango, 2000, p. 291). Migrant networks are considered social capital that facilitates migration (Coleman, 1990). Migrant networks decrease the costs and the risk of migration and, thus, raise the probability of further movement. Networks provide knowledge on the migration destination and give support for labour market and social integration. Particularly when migrating internationally, networks are often essential prerequisites for the realisation of migration plans. They can provide insider knowledge on local life, local employment opportunities or the current legal situation in the destination place.

These services might not only be offered by personal networks but also by diaspora networks. Diaspora communities are characterised by a strong ethnic group consciousness as well as solidarity

and empathy with people belonging to the same ethnicity or religion (de Haas, 2014). Diaspora networks can be spread worldwide and guarantee support to co-ethnic migrants what obviously simplifies the realisation of migration (e.g. the international networks of the mourides of Senegal) (see Ebin, 1995).

For irregular migrants, especially, networks provide a useful resource during the journey, in the country of destination as well as a connection to the country of origin. Networks can provide contacts to people who can help with transportation, before, during or after crossing a border. In addition, networks are a good resource in the country of destination. Network members can provide a place to stay for the first days after arrival or even longer, they can give information about the labour market and the right of residence and even help to find employment (Crisp, 1999). This reduces costs accrued in daily expenses for accommodation and alimentation while waiting for employment.

Additionally, networks do not only reduce monetary costs, they also lower psychosocial costs (Parnreiter, 2000). Networks, especially those formed by countrymen, provide a kind of home in the foreign country. Migration is assumed to stop if the exploitation of the network is saturated.

While researchers emphasise the positive sides of migrant networks, they have also been seen to divide societies in countries of origin in a socio-economic way – into groups with access to international migration networks and those without. The social capital associated with a network, the advantages that are linked to successful migration and the remittances sent back often remain within certain lineages while other families or people of other religious or ethnic belonging are excluded (Toma, 2012). On the other hand, studies also found if support through networks is asked for excessively, migrants tend to block network assistance and are not willing to support potential future migrants anymore (Böcker, 1994; Collyer, 2005).

Apart from personal networks of migrants and potential migrants, illegal or smugglers' networks, institutions as well as organisations play an important role in the perpetuation of migration.² The main reason for their development is the discrepancy between the high demand for international migration (to capital-rich countries) and the limited legal opportunities - restricted by visa limitations - to enter those countries. As a consequence, an underground market arises promoting migration for profit and offering a broad variety of structures that help people to cross borders illegally. These structures include services offering smuggling, clandestine transport, labour contracting, counterfeit documents and visas, arranged marriages or support for lodging or credit. Concurrently, humanitarian groups are forming that provide counselling services, social services, protection or even support to obtain legal documents. These structures constitute a form of social capital supporting the migration process especially for irregular migrants and thus, over time, come to be well-known among migrants and foster the perpetuation of migration by their activities.

2.1.2.2 Cumulative causation of migration

Cumulative causation emphasises the perpetuation of migration. Migration, once it is initiated, changes the economic and social composition of the emigration country as well as its values and moral concepts. The more people have migrated from a certain place the stronger the effects. Once migration has started, the theory of cumulative causation assumes migration to 'sustain itself in ways that make additional movement progressively more likely' (Massey *et al.*, 1999). Besides perpetuation, it also attempts to explain the increase in international migration under contemporary conditions. The concept of cumulative causation can be traced back to Myrdal (1957) and has been rediscovered by Massey (1990) in recent years.

Cumulative causation brings together six feedback mechanisms that generate the accumulative character of migration³ (Massey *et al.*, 1993). As already described in NELM, migration changes the income distribution of countries of origin. In its initial phase, migration produces income inequalities in sending communities, leaving non-migrant families feeling relatively deprived and causing more

² Massey *et al.* (1993) treat the formation of institutions and organisations systematically under the name 'Institutional Theory'.

³ Obviously, there might be more relevant variables, however, only these have been treated systematically.

migration aspirations. Second, migrants have greater financial resources that they often spend to purchase land in their country of origin. This reduces the area for agrarian production and the demand for agricultural workers and, thus, enhances the pressure for migration. Third, higher financial resources enable migrant families to use modern machinery in agriculture which increases the output per labour unit. This, indirectly, raises the migration pressure on non-migrant families. Fourth, a 'culture of migration' arises within countries of origin. Fifth, the international distribution of human capital changes to the benefit of countries of destination. Since relatively well-educated people migrate expecting higher returns abroad, countries of origin lose human capital while economies of countries of destination grow even faster. With better education in rural areas in countries of origin, these effects intensify as future returns of potential migrants increase. Lastly, the labour market in countries of destination generates a class of jobs – mostly low-skilled jobs – that are stigmatised as 'immigrant jobs' (Massey *et al.*, 1993). Since natives are not willing to occupy these jobs anymore, the demand for foreign labour forces will continue and generate constantly more migration.

The formation of a migration culture is a very fruitful insight into societal changes caused by migration. Massey *et al.* (1998) conceptualise the 'culture of migration'⁴ by emphasising four components: first, the material component. Migrants demonstrate a lifestyle that is highly admired and aspired to be imitated. Thereby, migrants do not only promote the demand for goods per se, but also establish a materialistic thinking within the sending communities promoting consumerism. The second and probably even more decisive component is a normative one. Migration and especially labour in a foreign country get established in the values and expectations of a society. For young people in the labour market entering age, working in a foreign country becomes the dominant strategy for their life, the 'normal course of events'. Third, the more popular migration becomes, the higher is the expectation from young people to migrate. Migration becomes a strategy for them to demonstrate their worthiness, manhood and ambition. Fourth, gender relations might change through migration. People immigrating to a country where gender equity is respected might bring this thinking back to their home countries and stimulate others to fight for it. In summary, Massey *et al.* (1998) describe a fundamental change in the sending society, its values, expectations, and dreams that arise because of the broadened horizon that is due to the influence of migration.

2.1.2.3 Migration systems

Another approach that was initially developed to explain rural-to-urban migration in Africa is the migration systems approach⁵ (Mabogunje, 1970). Mabogunje tries to explain why certain migratory patterns and stable migration flows between certain places and countries emerge and how these generate further migration flows. He emphasises the dynamic spatial process of migration describing migration as a 'circular, interdependent, progressively complex, and self-modifying system' (p. 39). Important elements of the theory are a starting pool of migrants whose decisions to migrate are affected by different stimuli, the rural control sub-system controlling outflows, the urban control sub-system controlling inflows as well as a series of positive and negative feedback channels and adjustment mechanisms. Control sub-systems oversee the general system and determines the migration flows within the system (e.g. family, community or cultural instances and norms, city administrations, employment agencies). These sub-systems as well as the environment (e.g. economic conditions, technology, transportation, governmental policies, etc.) are constantly changing, thus forming a dynamic system of migration.

Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) extended the migration systems approach to international migration highlighting the interdependencies, reciprocities and adjustments of the actors involved in the migratory process (individuals, institutions, organisations, states). The central argument of the migration systems theory is that as soon as any kind of exchange between countries has been stimulated (for

4 The terminology 'Culture of migration' is not homogeneously used (see e.g. the use of Jeffrey Harris Cohen (2004) who only focuses on the intrinsic value of economic success). In the present paper, we will follow the concept of Massey *et al.* (1998).

5 Mabogunje referred to it as 'General Systems Theory'

instance, the exchange of goods) other kinds of exchange (for instance, the exchange of people) are likely to follow (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). Often, the migration systems approach is not considered as a separate theory but rather a generalisation of the world systems theory, network theory, institutional theory, and the theory of cumulative causation (Massey *et al.*, 1993).

In the previous section main migration theories were introduced including their main concepts and research questions. It sticks out that migration theories are very diverse offering a broad range of conceptual tools to explain migration. They differ, for instance, in explananda (initiation vs. perpetuation of migration), underlying paradigms (equilibrium vs. historical-structural perspective) or levels of analysis (micro, meso, macro). To complement the review of main migration theories, Sections 2.2 to 2.4 will introduce three important analytical perspectives on migration: (1) the individual migration decision making perspective; (2) the debate on structure and agency; and (3) The multilevel perspective. Each section will introduce theories that are explicitly dealing with one of these perspectives. These theories serve as valuable examples of how different conceptual tools can be efficiently integrated.

2.2 Explaining individual migration decision making

The overview of migration theories has shown that one group of theories focuses on the individual and the factors shaping the individual's decision making, while another group sees migration flows primarily as a result of economic, political and social structures that either initiate or perpetuate the process. Dual labour market theory, for instance, stresses labour market structures of the destination country to be the main driver of migration. People in countries with a surplus of labour are not seen as acting but more or less automatically reacting to these structural conditions; no attention is given to the mechanisms of the individual decision making process that finally results in the act of migration.

Theories explaining the perpetuation of migration face the same problem. They are interested in feedback effects of migration at the group and community levels that are obviously influencing migration aspirations (such as the culture of migration), but they cannot explain why one individual migrates and another - living under similar conditions - does not. Since migration is a social phenomenon that deals with human beings, their actions and their decision making it is necessary to analyse the subjective side of migration decision making processes and to explain the heterogeneity of decisions among migrants. That is the focus of this section.

As described in Section 2.1.1.1, neoclassical migration theory assumes that people act according to a cost-benefit analysis. Even if non-monetary costs are included, they are assumed to be converted into a monetary value. In further elaborations of the model, political restrictions, structural constraints or historical ties are at best included as cost increasing or decreasing factors. This reduction does not only raise the problem of how to transfer non-monetary factors into calculable values, it seems also inadequate to reflect the individuality and subjectivity of migrants.

In an attempt to overcome the monetary focus of neoclassical migration theory, various other behavioural models have been developed. The value-expectancy model of de Jong and Fawcett (1981) is a good example of one such individual decision making model.

The basic idea of the value-expectancy model is a person whose migration intentions depend on his values and the expectancy that these values can be achieved in a certain place. Values are formed by various kinds of motivations. In the original model - based on a broad review of empirical studies and theoretical literature - de Jong and Fawcett (1981) identify seven categories of migration motivations: wealth, status, comfort, stimulation, autonomy, affiliation, and morality. Wealth includes economic items like income, living costs, or labour market stability. It can be perceived as an end in itself or as a means to achieve other goals. Status encompasses factors related to social standing and prestige. This might include a raise in social status gained through migration itself or through better

occupational and educational conditions abroad. Comfort describes physical and psychological comfort, entailing easier work, a healthier environment or improved living conditions. Stimulation implies valued activities like entertainment or recreation and the escape from boredom. Autonomy refers to all aspects related to personal freedom and self-determination, including political freedom and the absence of family obligations. Affiliation addresses the motivation to join family or friends through or during migration. Finally, morality relates to the value and belief systems of people, their perceptions of good and bad ways of living.

For each of these seven clusters, indicators have been defined. Indicators for the cluster ‘autonomy’ are, for example, ‘being economically independent’, ‘being free to say and do what you want’, ‘having privacy’, and ‘being on your own’. A weight has to be assigned to each indicator (the ‘value’ of the indicator) and the corresponding expectancy be defined that a certain behaviour will lead to an outcome. The strength of people’s intentions to move can, thus, be formalised in the following way:


$$MI = \sum_i V_i * E_i$$

V describes the value of a certain outcome i (indicator), E the expectancy to achieve that outcome i and MI the strength of the intentions for migration. People choose that destination where the strength of the intentions for migration is highest.

Besides these seven categories of individual motivations for migration de Jong and Fawcett (1981) also consider demographic, sociocultural, personal, and economic determinants as decisive components that influence people’s values and thus their migration intentions. These include individual and household characteristics like family structures or past migration history, societal and cultural norms like marriage-related norms or expectations concerning remittances, personal traits like risk taking, efficacy, and adaptability to change, as well as opportunity differentials between destinations, for example economic or marriage opportunities. These categories are assumed to have an impact on migration behaviour indirectly through influencing people’s values and expectancies. For instance, opportunity structures differentials between countries of origin and countries of destination constitute a major factor in forming expectations regarding the attainment of goals, societal and cultural norms like the expectancy that migrants send remittances back home are supposed to influence the people’s values.

In summary, whether someone migrates is determined by (1) the strength of migration intentions MI , given the migration motivations and expectations; (2) the indirect impacts of individual and environmental factors, and (3) changing effects of constraints and facilitators that stick out during the decision making process. The last point concerns unexpected intervening factors (uncertainty) that might shape the final decision independently of the initial value-expectancy considerations. Figure 1 shows a graphic illustration of the value-expectancy model.

Figure 1. A value-expectancy-based model of migration decision making behaviour



Source Own representation based on de Jong and Fawcett, 1981, p. 54

The model rests on some general assumptions. First, people are assumed to make decisions, which means that there must be at least one alternative to migration. The assumption further requires that people are physically capable of moving or staying and are aware that they have a choice. This excludes typically forced migration as well as forced immobility since in both cases people have no actual freedom of choice. Secondly, migration is seen as a means to an end. People migrate in order to achieve a valued goal; the instrumental value of migration is emphasised. It is thus implied that individuals make a conscious decision and that the decision making is considered to be a process during which they weigh the costs and benefits of migration. If migrants take into account costs and benefits of migration and weigh the consequences of moving against those of staying, the decision making process is assumed to be 'rational'.

The advantage of such an individual decision making model is obviously its ability to explain the diversity of migration. People have individual values and different expectations about their fulfilment. It is of particular interest to note that de Jong and Fawcett (1981) see structural factors not as pure 'push' or 'pull' factors but as elements that shape people's values and expectancies. Haug (2000) sees the advantage of the value-expectancy model in its ability to include various dimensions of values and thus to highlight the subjectivity of migration decisions. One can conclude that de Jong and Fawcett (1981) are, in principle, attempting to explain the huge heterogeneity among migrants and the subjectivity when it comes to migration decision making.

The underlying concept of most decision making models is 'motivations', even if these are given different names and pairings, such as cost-benefit ratios, stress and satisfaction, value and expectancies. Through the extension of the concept of motivations the explanatory power is no longer focusing on labour migration alone. It can be extended to all possible forms of (voluntary) migration including, for instance, religiously or politically motivated migration as well as migration motivated by arts or sports.

The integration of 'expectancy' as a determinant of migration intentions is another merit of this theory. Expectations do not only include the subjective decision making of migrants according to their background factors; they also relate to the importance of information. Information provided by

friends or family networks, smugglers, public institutions or social media influence not only the perceived attraction of different destination countries, they also determine the sample of destinations. Migrants may include in their choice only those countries that they have information about. This also means that a migrant's expectations might be led by misinformation that promises better perspectives than actually exist.

Individual decision making models are often criticised for the underlying assumption of the rational actor. Decision making theory assumes that people can and do make rational decisions *ex ante* and act according to their preferences and values. Conversely this means that the decision making framework represents an adequate research approach only if the decision making process can be considered as rational (de Jong & Fawcett, 1981). The consideration of migrants to make rational decisions *ex ante*, however, has been frequently questioned (e.g. Faist, 2000; Tabor, 2014). Faist goes one step further and questions the empirical meaningfulness of such a decision making model. He stresses that people, instead of acting in accordance with 'rational' considerations, tend to be guided by 'insecurity and dissatisfaction' (p. 37). After having migrated, however, when they are asked for their reasons of migration, they are likely to 'rationalise' their answers.

Another point of criticism is that the focus of decision making models lies - as their title already states - on the individual's decision making but not on the realisation of the intent. It is very useful to explain the determinants affecting the intention to migrate as well as the importance of background variables in this process; the model, however, is very vague when it comes to the realisation of migration. In the foreword to their volume on individual migration decision making, de Jong and Gardner (1981, p. 2) write: 'The concept of decision making is used in its most general form to refer to the formation of an intention or disposition that results in a migration behaviour'. They implicitly assume that migration intentions result in the act of migration. Even if de Jong and Fawcett (1981) are aware of 'unanticipated constraints and facilitators' as crucial interventions regarding the realisation of migration, they mention these only briefly. The importance of financial, social and human resources is frequently stressed as a decisive component for the realisation of migration intentions; the lack of these in micro models of decision making is often criticised (Arango, 2000; de Haas, 2014).

Other decision making models respond to this criticism. Gardner (1981) emphasises that the decision making process must be analysed at different stages: 'a desire to move is not the same thing as an intention/decision to move (perceived constraints intervene), and an intention/decision to move is not the same thing as actual migration behaviour (real constraints intervene)' (p. 65). Kalter (2008) offers another alternative with the development of the subjective expected utility (SEU) model and its phases. He divides the migration process into the phases of consideration, planning and realisation while emphasising the integration of micro and macro levels. These concepts and behavioural models in general have not been integrated into migration studies by today's researchers (Carling & Schewel, 2018) and are often disregarded or only mentioned briefly in reviews on migration theory (e.g. Arango, 2000; de Haas *et al.*, 2020; Massey *et al.*, 1998).

In conclusion, it can be said that individual decision making models show great flexibility in integrating decision making determinants of different levels of analysis and in being refined by further elaborations of the basic model. They are able to account for the huge diversity among migrants and their motivations. However, individual decision making models convey a one-sided picture of migration. Their assumption that migrants move voluntarily based on some rational considerations creates a sense that migrants are able to foresee any occurrences. This is a very delicate matter, especially given how migration is politicised. Besides legal consequences, this narrative also influences public and political debate around migrants and whether certain groups were forced to move or did so voluntarily. In this context, it must be questioned if the individual can really be seen as an independently deciding entity. People are not only constrained by political conditions and economic resources. They are also often involved in a family or community-based decision making process that limits the autonomy of individuals.

2.3 Structure and agency in migration theories

The structure-agency-debate has a long tradition in the social sciences, especially in sociology. Structure and agency are different ways of looking at the same reality, but with a different focus. Both are concepts that are frequently used in migration research but often without a common understanding about what is actually meant by it. One way to understand the concept of agency is an atomistic view, referring to agency as ‘a synonym for action, emphasising implicitly the undetermined nature of human action’ (Scott & Marshall, 2009). This emphasises the capacity of people to act independently and make free choices unconstrained by external conditions. There are other scholars, however, emphasising a more relational approach to agency: ‘To be an agent means to be capable of exerting some degrees of control over the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform those social relations to some degree.’ (Sewell, 1992, p. 20) This definition emphasises the reciprocal effects between relations and agency, highlighting the ability of persons to alter relations through the exercise of agency. This relational property is frequently stressed by scholars dealing with the structure-agency divide in migration theories (e.g. de Haas, 2014; Bakewell, 2010).

Structure can be understood as ‘the social relationships which provide the social context or conditions under which people act’ (Layder, 2006, pp. 4-5) In migration research, structure implies, for instance, political and economic institutions and organisations of sending and destination countries, the distribution of social resources such as networks as well as the cultural context of migrants.

The relationship between structure and agency is a recurrent challenge in theory building. Is structure something that is made and can be altered by human agency or is it something rigid and beyond the influence of human actions? If structures were independent of human agency, how can they change over time? And the other way around, how far is human agency guided and altered by structure? The purpose of adequate theory building should thus be to recognise the significance of social structures for social actions and at the same time provide enough space for agency and its relevance for social change (Bakewell, 2010).

An integrative approach to the relations between structure and agency has been demanded by experts for a long time. In their review on migration theories, Massey *et al.* (1993) criticised both ‘atomistic theories that deny the importance of structural constraints on individual decisions, and of structural theories that deny agency to individuals and families’ (p. 455). They explicitly require integrating both concepts in theory-building. The aspiration-capabilities approach of de Haas (2014) can be regarded as a promising theory to the structure-agency relation in an integrative manner.⁶

De Haas argues that a well integrative migration model must consist of the following five components: (1) multidisciplinary empirical insights of many years of migration research; (2) a basic and parsimonious way of theorising to fulfil its generalising ambitions; (3) determination of the basic assumptions about factors that affect people’s migration decision; (4) incorporation of a sense of agency; (5) incorporation of a sense of structure since migration behaviour is restricted by structurally determined limitations of resources and information (de Haas, 2011).

In Section 2.1.2 it has been shown that there are a range of individual decision making models that, however, miss one elementary aspect with regard to migrants’ agency: they do not take into account systematically whether people are actually capable of realising their migration intentions. When people lack the necessary resources to migrate they are obviously limited in their exertion of agency. For an adequate modelling of agency, de Haas demands the following aspects to be taken into account: (1) people need access to social, human and economic resources in order to realise migration intentions; (2) the perception of a valuable life differ across individuals and social and cultural contexts; (3) migration has an intrinsic value; (4) structural conditions might be changed through migration (de Haas, 2014).

⁶ As preliminary work to that approach work by Carling (2002); (2001) and de Haas (2009; 2003) has to be mentioned. Further underlying concepts have been developed by Sen(1999) and Berlin(1969).


The core argument of de Haas' theory is that 'the fragmented insights from different disciplinary theories can be integrated to a considerable extent through conceptualising virtually all forms of migration as a function of migration *capabilities* and migration *aspirations*' (de Haas, 2014, p. 23). Migration aspirations are defined as a function of people's general life aspirations and their perceived spatial opportunity structures. De Haas emphasises the subjectivity of life preferences and perceptions about life elsewhere. He assumes aspirations to be influenced by culture, education, personal disposition, identification, information, and images. Migration capabilities describe people's capability to choose where to live. They are conditioned upon positive and negative liberties that represent the 'freedom to' and the 'freedom from'. Negative liberties constitute the absence or presence, respectively, of external obstacles, barriers or constraints and positive liberties refer to the capacity to control one's life and to achieve one's personal objectives (Berlin, 1969). The latter might include financial resources, personal characteristics, and social support. Positive liberties mainly affect people's capabilities in their access to economic, social or human resources. Increased capabilities are assumed to increase migration aspirations and migration must be perceived as being accessible (de Haas, 2014).

Agency as a function of aspirations and capabilities refers to the 'limited but real ability of human beings (or social groups) to make independent choices and to impose these on the world and, hence, to alter the structures that shape people's opportunities or freedoms.' (de Haas, 2014, p. 21) Structure is manifested in positive and negative liberties and seen as 'patterns of relations, beliefs and behaviour.' (ibid.) Patterns refer 'to regularity or routine, which leads people to repeat the same behaviour without constantly making conscious, rational choices' (ibid.). People's perceived opportunities are limited by institutions or factors like religion, gender, networks or markets.

Figure 2 shows the aspirations-capabilities framework as presented by de Haas (2014). People are only likely to migrate when they have aspirations as well as capabilities to do so. Negative freedoms affect people's aspirations as well as their capabilities. Positive freedoms mainly influence people's capabilities while capabilities again influence the aspirations of people. What is important here is to understand the reciprocal effects between structure and agency. De Haas emphasises that structures are not only restrictions that prevent migration. Instead, structures have a more organising element, constraining migration of one group while facilitating migration of others. Policies, for instance, affect not as much the number of migrants but the selection of migrants in terms of skills, age or national origin. The reciprocal effects behind this framework are quite complex:

The ensemble of structural conditions in origin and imagined migration destinations therefore creates complex opportunity structures, endowing different individuals and social groups with different sets of negative and positive freedoms, which, depending on how these structural conditions simultaneously affect their capabilities and aspirations, and how people perceive these conditions through their social, cultural and personal lenses, may or may not lead them to decide to migrate. In its turn, such migratory agency will reciprocally affect these initial conditions through feedback effects. (de Haas, 2014, p. 29)

Figure 2. Expanded aspirations-capabilities framework for conceptualising migratory agency



Source de Haas, 2014, p. 28

The aspiration-capabilities framework has various advantages. First, with the integration of people’s aspirations and capabilities as central concepts of agency he is able to integrate different mobility types in one single framework including movement and non-movement as well as voluntary and involuntary migration (see Table 1). It has to be added that de Haas emphasises not only the instrumental dimension of migration defining migration as a means to achieve a certain goal but also its intrinsic dimension. He stresses on people’s freedom to choose where to live as being a value in itself. Not the actual movement but the pure capability of a free choice is seen as a freedom in its own right (de Haas, 2014). As a consequence, he considers mobility and not migration as the central concept of interest. Different degrees of aspirations and capabilities define whether people should be considered ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’ migrants. Table 1 presents the different mobility types as evolved by de Haas.

Table 1. Aspirations-capabilities derived individual mobility types

		Migration capabilities	
		Low	High
Migration aspirations (instinsic and/or instrumental)	High	Involuntary immobility (feeling ‘trapped’)	Voluntary mobility (most forms of migration)
	Low	Acquiescent immobility	Voluntary immobility and Involuntary mobility (e.g. refugees, ‘soft deportation’)

Source de Haas, 2014, p. 32; with own adjustments

‘Voluntary mobility’ as well as ‘voluntary immobility’ include all people who are capable of migrating or staying, and whose decisions are mainly driven by their migration aspirations. Only if people have

a real choice to stay would it be adequate to talk about ‘voluntariness’ and only those who have aspirations as well as capabilities can be seen as ‘voluntarily mobile’. If people could move but do not want to, they are ‘voluntarily immobile’. People facing low migration capabilities are made immobile either involuntarily if they have high aspirations or in an acquiescent way, if their aspirations are low.⁷ This category includes, for instance, people who aspire to flee conflict or environmental disasters but do not have the resources to do so. Whenever people migrate against their intrinsic desire, they can be called ‘involuntarily mobile’ (de Haas, 2014). These categories are an interesting starting point for formulating hypotheses that can be tested in empirical research since they can be operationalised easily. On the basis of empirical research, better knowledge might be generated, for instance, on the discourse about sedentary and migratory behaviour and the conditions under which people indeed are able to decide and, finally, do decide for the one or other strategy.

Furthermore, the concept of negative and positive freedoms allows a systematic integration of the role of states as well as of policies (de Haas, 2011). States influence people’s freedoms twofold. Migration policies directly affect negative freedoms of people through either restrictive (visa requirements) or encouraging policies (labour recruitment programmes). In addition, states impact people’s positive freedoms through non-migration policies. Providing free education, for example, might raise the awareness concerning living opportunities elsewhere enhancing the capabilities of migrants. Finally, states may directly influence migrant aspirations, for example when oppressing human rights. De Haas (2014) points out that states are often reduced to a set of constraints, thereby denying the shaping function they have on migration processes.

We have presented the theory of de Haas as a fruitful and integrating approach to the structure-agency debate in migration theory building and research. In the next section, we take up another basic general problem in theory building in migration research, the multilevel explanation of social phenomena.

2.4 Multilevel analysis in migration theory

While individuals and their relations with different structures were the main units under research in the preceding two sections, this section focusses on theories that strive to integrate micro, meso and macro levels of analysis. It demonstrates the importance of differentiating structural elements into macro and meso level and shows the strong influence of networks, institutions and organisations in the context of migration.

In literature, the relation between the debate on micro and macro level and structure and agency is not always clearly indicated. Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 have shown, however, that there are fundamental conceptual differences. Micro level models do not necessarily contain a comprehensive conceptualisation of agency. Concurrently, agency is not limited to the micro level. Meso level theories like network theory, cumulative causation as well as migration systems theory stress the relational component of agency. Also ‘structure’ is not necessarily limited to the macro level of analysis. Continual but locally limited conditions can be considered as structures at the micro level. Ritzer (1990, p. 363) summarises the debate in the following way: ‘Agency is usually micro but may be macro. Structure is usually macro but may be micro. Micro usually indicates agency but may include mindless behaviour.’

The micro-macro pairing originally stems from economics. Macroeconomics dealt with the economic processes on the national level while microeconomics focalised in the choices of smaller units such as companies, households or consumers. These concepts were then adopted by sociologists and enlarged by introducing the meso level. All in all, the micro-macro pairing - with the subsequent complementation of the meso level represents an analytical distinction. In general, micro deals with the individual as well as with interconnections between individuals, small groups, relations, inter-

⁷ For a further discussion on this category see de Haas (2014, p. 33).

actions, and situations. The meso level refers to a broader system of people such as networks, institutions and organisations. The macro level finally deals with social classes, nations, societies, and states.

For a theory, it is essential to overcome the divide between micro and macro level. The mere introduction of an intermediate unit as new unit under study, however, seems to be insufficient for being a useful solution for an adequate integration of micro and macro. NELM, for example, raises the decision making unit to the household level (Stark, 1991). No longer the individual but the household or even the community is assumed to make the final migration decision. Regarding the micro-macro relation, this approach seems to only shift the discussion. NELM denies, for instance, the autonomy of individuals assuming them to be determined by family or community decisions (de Haas, 2010). On the other side, it ignores commitments that exceed the household and refer to the whole kinship systems. Explanations for the mechanisms between the household (meso) and the individual (micro) as well as between the household and the broader society are missing.

More fruitful approaches in the context of the micro-macro relation seem to be those focussing on the mechanisms between the levels of analysis while concurrently including the meso level of analysis. Massey (1990) sees theoretical progress not in 'better methods, better data, or different theories' (p. 19) but in the analysis of 'interrelationships between levels' (p. 18). In his paper on the cumulative causation of migration he highlights the feedback mechanisms between 'individual behaviour, household strategies, community structures, and national political economies' (p. 3) as well as their 'inter-temporal dependencies' (ibid.).

Migrant networks as a unit of analysis on the meso level, for instance, lower the costs for migrants through the provision of information or through practical support (e.g. providing accommodation or job search assistance); they contribute to an increase in out-migration because networks directly influence the decision making process of individuals. Concurrently, once a certain level of out-migration has been reached, communities are confronted with labour shortages and thus facing an increase in local wages (Massey, 1990). Consequently, people's job opportunities increase, migration pressure decreases, and out-migration is assumed to stagnate.

Apart from these reciprocal effects with the individual, there are further feedback mechanisms at the meso level changing the initial conditions in the home community and thus raising or lowering the migration pressure. The investment of migrants in farmland and agricultural production often goes ahead with an increase in land prices and a modernisation of production methods. Traditional methods of cultivation become unprofitable and opportunities for employment in the agricultural sector decrease due to mechanisation. Migration pressure increases.

In addition to these effects on individual and community level, Massey stresses the importance of macro level forces acting through (inter)national institutions and markets predominantly on the labour market (Massey, 1990). The increase in migration - once it has been initiated through recruitment programmes - is said to 'generate additional employment, which generates additional migration, which creates additional employment, and so on' (Massey, 1990, p. 18). Self-sustaining and cumulative mechanisms are established.


Massey's work is an example of the integration of different levels of analysis as well as of focusing on the mechanisms interlinking micro, meso and macro levels of analysis. He is, thus, able to depict and explain an empirically validated broad picture of causes and consequences of migration.

Müller-Schneider (2000) has developed a theory of migration that proceeds by analysing the different levels of analysis and their interrelations in a very explicit and methodologically driven way based on Esser's theory of sociological explanation. He is particularly interested in explaining why migration has increased in present day Western societies. A major element of his theory, the global convergence and integration of values, has been derived from research by Hoffmann-Nowotny (1993). Hoffmann-Nowotny argues that the objective worldwide inequalities between countries do not suffice to explain why people migrate and why more people migrate than in former times.

The very notion of ‘development’ would be senseless if there were no common ideas in the world as one society, such as of prosperity, wellbeing, social justice and human rights. Apparently, these ideas of what a good life is have spread and have been universally accepted and internalised. In other words, the second major driver of migration is the homogenisation of values and the cultural integration of the world. For this reason, individuals become aware of the stratification of the world society and feel its inequality and injustice. (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1993, quoted and translated from Müller-Schneider 2000, p. 57)

Müller-Schneider develops his explanation of increasing migration to the Western countries by discerning between the micro, meso and macro level (Figure 3). The ‘lower’ micro level represents the migrating individuals, the meso level stands for organisations and networks and the upper level for societal structures and processes.

Figure 3. The explanation of the new migration



Source Müller-Schneider, 2000, p. 289

Increasing migration dynamics are eventually explained at the macro level: they are a result of modernisation and globalisation. To be a complete explanation, however, meso and micro level have to be included.

The dynamics of the recent international mobility processes are reinforced by an upward mobility spiral mechanism: migration leads to more migration. This proposition, however, is meaningful and represents an improvement of Hoffmann-Nowotny's theory only when it is ‘deepened’ and completed at the meso and micro levels. That is why the arrow at the macro level (...) representing a causal influence is interrupted. (Müller-Schneider, 2003, p. 75)

The more complete explanation proposes that a direct macro level influence is affecting the individuals: modern communication has created common values, common expectations and common concepts of what a good life is, what leads to migration motivations in the lesser developed countries. In Figure 3 this is represented by the uninterrupted path from the macro directly to the micro level.

The second, interrupted path from the macro level leads to the meso level and then directly affects the micro level: networks and organisations including smugglers' organisations create new migration wishes and create new possibilities to realise the migration motives and opportunities to actually migrate, what is represented in the model by the uninterrupted arrow between meso and micro levels. This migration creates new networks, new migration motives and new migration possibilities, which leads to a self-reinforcing upward spiral: migration creates more migration.

It is the meso level structures and processes that make migration happen. Migrant networks are a social capital, enabling potential migrants to receive financial help from the immigration country to pay travel costs, agencies and/or smugglers. Information for the preparation and implementation of the migration is provided as well via the networks. One of the main reasons why networks and particularly smuggling networks play such an important role is that due to the globalisation of values migration aspirations in the less developed countries by far exceed the readiness and perceived ability of Western societies to take in migrants. Therefore, migration policies of various kinds have been developed and institutions created to control migration. Müller-Schneider has empirically studied these migration policies and institutions in the area of human smuggling, asylum, international marriage agencies and family migration. He has given proper weight to the analysis of the political dimension in explaining present migration.

Both Massey and Müller-Schneider highlight the crucial role of the meso level of analysis. Networks are providing information and support during the planning period, the journey as well as after arrival. Networks are likely to compensate for a lack of financial resources and thus create the necessary capabilities for migration. They are, in addition, an important intertemporal component that connect the decision of today's migrants with that of possible future migrants.

Networks representing the meso level cannot only be supporting in realising migration aspirations but in other cases could also direct the migrants to destinations that were originally not intended. Research shows that migrants not necessarily arrive in the actual aspired country of destination (van Liempt & Doomernik, 2006). Smugglers networks were the crucial factor determining the migrants' destination by choosing the easiest way to continue the journey. It will be one task of HumMingBird to gather more information about networks and the functioning of migration hubs especially in the context of irregular migration.

2.5 Discussion

In Section 2, we presented a brief overview of the major theories of migration and discussed them from a general analytical perspective. We considered how theories can explain the initiation or the perpetuation of migration; how theories explain an individual's decision making process to migrate and what room there is for 'autonomous' decisions (agency); the discussion of relations between structures and agency and finally, we looked at theories that are implicitly or explicitly built on a multilevel mode of analysis.

The strength of the individual decision making theories is the provision of an analytical framework for the conceptualisation of subjective and social determinants of the decision to migrate. It is a useful approach for contexts with few structural restrictions, like a common labour market and freedom of movement between countries as within the European Union. The paradigm is also useful to account for the great variety of individual migration motives that are hidden, when migrants are seen primarily in the legal categories of the receiving country's migration policy, for example as asylum seekers, labour migrants or family migrants.

Legitimate criticism against individual decision making theories has often been brought forth for the assumption of the rational actor; critics point instead to the concept of bounded rationality and that respondents when interviewed may often rationalise their motives and decisions and not give a true account of the process. The implicit equation of decision making and actually executing the decision is another problem of the approach.

Theories that focus on agency and structures aim at finding out about the relative autonomy of migration decisions against the compelling force of restrictive or supportive economic, political, social and cultural structures. Approaches that integrate agency and structures and see it as a relationship are most promising. They imply that the less restrictive structures are the more agency is possible. But primarily they try to explain why under similar conditions some people decide to stay, and others decide to go. Particularly when there is a 'culture of migration' in an emigration country as conformity

pressure and as an orientation pattern, great practical and political relevance must be attributed to knowing about under what conditions agency is possible and more or less likely. It is such knowledge which can explain as well why migrants usually come from a somewhat educated and resourceful background and not from the poor.

In terms of levels of analysis previously discussed theories are conceived of at either the macro or micro levels or on both. Multilevel approaches that we have discussed include the meso level as well and give it a strong role in the realisation of migration aspirations. Under conditions of globalisation and the communication revolution migration aspirations by far exceed the readiness of developed countries to legally allow migrants in. Migrant networks and smugglers' organisations - all on the meso level of analysis - are important structures and mechanisms which offer services to overcome the barriers set up by developed states' migration policy. The multilevel approach is one of the few that gives migration policy its proper relevance for explaining migration processes. Another strength of the multilevel theories that is of high interest for policymakers is their ability to explain why migration tends to create more migration or migration pressure.

The general background and major general cause of most migration processes that a large majority of theories just presupposes that migration is caused by the huge inequality between countries in a global perspective. The world systems theory has made the explanation of this global inequality the centre of its attention. Dual labour market theory describes and explains labour market mechanisms that are a direct consequence of the global inequality and affect the markets of countries and firms in both countries of origin and destination. Neoclassical theories, finally, assume unemployment and wage rate disparities between countries to be the causes of migration that, however and in contrast to dual labour market and world systems theory, return to equilibrium through migration.

This section illustrated the variety and comprehensiveness of migration theories. Arising from different backgrounds they are able to explain diverse observed migration phenomena. Even if they are especially useful in explaining migration behaviour *ex post* instead of predicting people's behaviour *ex ante*, theories are advantageous in providing compact and systemised explanations. As we will see in the following sections, besides 'grand' theories a broad range of frameworks and models exists explaining certain types of migration such as environmental or gender-driven migration. These are indispensable to gain deeper and more profound insights into particular migration topics. Concurrently, it is necessary to interlink insights from different research areas. The review has shown that a return to general questions and relationships in theory building such as the relation of structure and agency and the multilevel analysis is very fruitful to pool the diversity of knowledge systematically. Many empirical findings can be integrated and common discussions in migration research overcome. Unfortunately, the advancement in unifying theory building has stagnant for many years while literature reviews commonly refer to the same well-known theories. Even if one all-encompassing theory seems very unlikely to be developed considering the multifaceted nature of migration, returning to a metatheoretical way of theorising seems one promising way forward.

3. Theories and migration reality

In recent decades, migration studies have undergone intense development as an area of study, which is clearly reflected in the growing number of publications and in the increasing volume of research on migration (Massey *et al.*, 1998; Bommers & Morawska, 2005). Migration studies encompass research on various aspects of migratory phenomena, from the analysis of internal flows, typologies of migration and migrants, diversity related to migration and its management (Pisarevskaya *et al.*, 2019). As mentioned in the previous section, migratory studies, despite their buoyant development, face numerous obstacles that sometimes undermine their explanatory and interpretative capacity. In this report, we also explore how the scope of generalisations and the comparability of results is limited by theoretical and practical approaches to migration. One of the challenges most frequently encountered by researchers of migratory phenomena is the divergence between the explanatory capacities of the theories and the complexity of the questions and phenomenon they intend to address (de Haas *et al.*, 2014; King, 2012). In other words, the challenge for migration scholars is not only how to develop internally coherent theoretical approaches, comprehensive and accurate terminology, and access to data sources that provide valid and reliable statistical information, but also to have on hand explanatory frameworks with sufficient explanatory power to provide interpretations for the phenomena which are extremely complex and volatile. In this sense, in order to establish a new research programme as proposed by several authors (de Haas, 2010; Czaika, 2015; Vella, 2013), it is essential to identify those aspects and dimensions that the conceptual and explanatory tools are not able to cover, given their complex and changing nature. Moving away from grand theories to ground realities, the purpose of this section is to describe past and current trends in migrations, discussing the principal interpretative frameworks used to describe and explain specific dimensions of migrations as the European one.

3.1.1 Migrations in the 20th century

3.1.1.1 The first economic globalisation (1900-1929)

During the first era of globalisation (1900-1929), European emigrants settled in former colonies which were in the midst of rapid industrialisation and development. The United States alone absorbed around 60% of Europe's total outflow, while 25% of the emigrants headed to other countries, such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Massey, 1988). With the outbreak of World War I, large-scale emigration from Europe was stopped (Massey & Zenteno, 1999) and the demographic situation in most European countries was alarming because of the shortage of working-age population. Faced with this situation, many countries signed agreements to promote economic immigration. The end of the conflict led to a political reconstruction of the territorial borders of states and a long period of forced migration. In fascist Italy, many opponents of the regime were forced to leave the country; the same happened in Germany when Hitler seized power in 1933. Nevertheless, the onset of the Great Depression stopped all international movement except for a small amount of return migration flows.

World War II (1940) increased the number of refugees and displaced people and led to restrictions in the US economy from receiving migrant workers. Nevertheless, that situation led to the 'bracero program' (1942-1964), a series of labour laws and diplomatic agreements between the United States

and Mexico. During the development of this program, more than 10 million Mexican workers were mobilised to the United States (Durand & Massey, 2003). World War II caused millions of deaths and forced people to escape from the racial and political persecution of the totalitarian regimes. With the collapse of the Nazi regime, Western Europe opted for a policy of openness, while the East fell prey to authoritarian regimes. This ideological division between democracy and socialism was the main factor of the Cold War.

3.1.1.2 The post-industrial migration

According to Massey (2003), the period that starts between the second half of 1960s represents post-industrial migration. The migration flows changed dramatically: on the one hand, there was a decrease in European emigration to the United States, Canada and Australia; on the other, the number of emigrants to those countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America increased (Massey, *ibid.*). In addition to the traditional receiving countries, Western Europe, especially Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands, also started to attract a significant number of immigrants. Europe was transformed into a major global migration destination, representing a declining share of immigrants in the traditional immigration countries and an increase of the South-North migration, an alternative to transoceanic migration (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014). With rapid economic growth, tight labour markets and a demand for workers that was impossible to fill, European governments started to recruit guest workers from other countries, especially from the South, including Turkey (Karras & Chiswick, 1999; Akgündüz, 2012). Europe became a multi-ethnic and multiracial society (Castles & Miller, 2003).

In 1973, the Oil Crisis provoked a major turning point in global migration patterns. The crisis and the associated economic recession accelerated the decline of labour-intensive industries in Europe and North America. As a result, guest workers were encouraged to return to their countries of origin (Abella, 1995; Massey, 2003). However, quite on the contrary, the crisis marked the beginning of massive labour recruitment in the oil-rich countries located around the Persian Gulf.

In this period, a significant change in the composition of flows to North America and Australia has been observed. The share of Europeans decreased and that of Latin Americans and Asians increased (Sánchez-Alonso, 2000a). The number of Mexican and Asian seasonal workers in the United States and Canada continued to grow notably. After the 1970s, the strong presence of military regimes and the sub-regionalisation of the flows contributed to converting Latin America and the Caribbean into emigration countries (Durand, 2009). In Australia, from 1976 to 1985, migratory inflows began to increase due to the abolition of existing restrictions on the entry of 'non-white people' and the arrival of Vietnamese and Lebanese refugees and workers from southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent (Jakubowicz, 2016).

3.1.2 The second economic globalisation (1980-present)

Between 1980 and 1995, international migration spread in Asia, especially to the newly industrialised countries of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand (Massey, 2003; Hugo, 1995). Although the Japanese financial crisis of 1997 put a brake on flows and reduced the number of residents, Japan was an exception among the most developed countries. From the post-war period onwards, it encouraged emigration but prevented immigration on the grounds of the country's overpopulation and the importance of preserving homogeneity. In the mid-1980s there was a labour shortage which the government tried to solve by exporting jobs with investments abroad. The fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) modified the geopolitical picture of Europe. On one hand, Central and Eastern European countries emerged as new origin regions of migrants for Western and Southern Europe; and on the other, southern countries became important recipients of labour flows from Eastern Europe (Stanek, 2010).

The beginning of the 2000s brought important changes for Latin America and Caribbean migration to Europe, especially due to the economic crises in South American countries, high levels of inequality and greater restrictions on migrations to the United States (Pellegrino, 2004). At the end of the 20th century, the conflict in the Balkans brought the flow of refugees in Europe back to levels similar to those of World War II (Fassmann & Münz, 1994). The 21st century started with new legislative immigration reforms characterised by increased restriction on movements.

3.1.2.1 Dynamics of recent migration flows: patterns, main figures and identification of gaps between migration theories and current migratory phenomena

After the fall of the totalitarian regimes, the Soviet collapse and the construction of new socio-cultural paradigms, the 21st century began with large migrations resulting from the process of economic integration and political changes (Arango, 2007). Geopolitics have been restructured following the fragmentation of national states and the creation of large economic areas.

In addition to the traditional migration corridors from the South to the advanced economies of the North, that reveal the spatial arrangement of power structures, in the 21st century the whole planet has been involved in the migration phenomenon. Most of Central and Eastern Europe have become transit countries for many flows from Africa or Asia trying to reach Western Europe. A recent trend is South-South migration, an alternative to the South-North axis, that can strengthen relations in other regions (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007). The situation in the last decades of the 20th century and the first decades of the 21st century has changed a great deal compared to earlier stages. Globalisation has contributed to making international mobility more complex, particularly in relation to transport, which has minimised distances, or advances in communication and information technologies.

According to Castles, de Haas and Miller (2014), contemporary migration is characterised by several general trends:

- globalisation of the migratory phenomenon: most countries perform multiple functions at once, such as senders, receivers or transit areas. Every state is directly or indirectly involved in the secondary effects of international migration and the free movement of people, producing increasingly complex migratory processes (Arango, 2007; Held *et al.*, 1999, p. 2);
- changes in the configuration of the flows: after World War II, Europe became a major global migration destination, changing the traditional outward emigration flows of Europeans;
- long-distance migrations have become less common, while short-distance moves take place frequently;
- type of migration: the composition of migration flows has become more diverse. In most countries there is not just one type of migration but a wide range of them. Because of this, the implementation of national policies has become quite complex;
- the role of women in migration dynamics has always been quite complex and often forgotten. Since the 1960s, women have been migrating as guest workers (especially among the Turks and Spanish) however they also play a major role in family reunification;
- politicisation: migration policies require global governance and cooperation between receiving, transit and sending countries;
- migration transit: the traditional distinction between origin and destination countries seems to be vanishing as many receiving countries have become transit areas (Delgado-Wise & Guarnizo, 2007). Poland, Spain, Mexico, Morocco, the Dominican Republic, Turkey and South Korea are experiencing different phases of this transition migration;
- contemporary migration dynamic: due to multiple flows, diverse flow compositions and country policies, there is a lack of reliable migration statistics and data; on the other, there is no theoretical framework for understanding the complexities of such rapid changes in migration patterns, and finally, the theoretical frameworks used often cannot explain a particular type of migration phenomenon (Castles & Miller, 2009).

The combination of all these trends suggest that global migration patterns have become more complex and diverse compared to the past patterns of migration which were characterised by a more orderly structure with a clearer division between countries of immigration and those of emigration. In recent years, migratory movements did not take place under favourable circumstances, several factors such as economic and financial crisis, civil and transnational conflicts, persecution, situations of environmental degradation, insecurity and stricter migration control policies have changed not only the demographics of migration, but also the condition of human displacement. Many issues remain unresolved in this century.

Mapping a geography of current migration flows

In this section we will describe the main international migration flows. Given the change in the configuration of flows, we will proceed with an individual analysis of the continent and its corresponding flows, divided into short-term and long-term flows.

At the beginning of the 21st century migrations with different forms of circularity reached unusual levels of intensity and volume. According to the International Migration Report (2015), published by United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), between 2000 and 2005, among the large geographical areas, North America was in the top position in terms of percentage of migration growth (4.2), followed by Oceania (3) and Europe (1.5). The highest negative values regarding migration corresponded to Latin America and the Caribbean (-1.5), followed by Africa (-0.5) and Asia (-0.3). This confirms that immigration to developed countries was high and growing. Between 2007 and 2008, the intensity of migration flows started to decrease significantly due to the global economic crisis in many countries from the United States to Europe. Within this landscape, new migration patterns and processes across transnational, transoceanic, intraregional and internal lines changed and made migration flows increasingly complex (Feldmann *et al.*, 2018). From 2010 to 2015, the total number of international immigrants increased by 2.4% per year: according to the United Nations, in 2017 there were 258 million international migrants worldwide, approximately 3.4% of the world's population. Evidently, the scenario changed again. The greatest number of immigrants went to Asia and Europe. North America was in the third position followed by Latin America and the Caribbean and, finally, Africa (UN DESA, 2016).

According to the comparative study on migratory flows elaborated by Abel and Sander (2014), the global migration system is characterised by three characteristics. First, the flow of migrants from sub Saharan Africa has moved predominantly within the African continent among the West African Economic and Monetary Union; in contrast, the flows from Western Africa have moved to Western Europe. Second, migration flows from Asia are more spatially focused in Western Asia and North America; while migrants from Latin America move considerably toward North America and Southern Europe. Third, the trend of migration in Europe is different and almost characterised by a diverse set of flows (Abel & Sander, 2014).

3.1.2.2 Asia

During the 20th and 21st centuries, migration in Asia was at an unprecedented scale. Between 2000 and 2010, Asia accounted for the largest number of departures was third in arrivals, mostly concentrated in the Gulf countries. After 2005 and 2010 these countries became the third largest receivers of migration flows after Europe and North of America. In 2015, Asia originated more than 40% of the world's international migrants. Especially India and China, Bangladesh and Pakistan have the highest absolute numbers of migrants abroad (IOM, 2018). In the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the number of migrants over the total national population is quite high. For instance, in 2015, migrants represented 88% of the population in the United Arab Emirates; about 74% in Kuwait; 76% in Qatar; and 51% in Bahrain. Flows from Africa, South Asia and South-East Asia were mostly for labour migration.

Different regions in Asia are highly different in their geography, history, societies and political structures. As a result, there is a great deal of diversity in migration and incorporation patterns depending on the region (de Guchteneire *et al.*, 2007). In the Pacific region there are 20 main migration corridors that represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time. These provide an overview of how migration patterns, in particular in destination countries, have given rise to large populations of foreigners.

In Asia, the incoming and outgoing flows are generally driven by specific internal factors. Within the regions it is possible to trace several complex, mixed migration flows: on the one hand, temporary and circular migration, many times internal to the continent; on the other, permanent and forced migration going to North America, Europe and Oceania (Demaio & Nanni, 2013; Hugo, 2006).

The flows include asylum seekers, stateless persons, people displaced by conflicts, natural disasters and/or environmental changes where immigrants are predominantly semi and low-skilled workers in informal sectors looking for work (IOM, 2018).

By the end of 2016, refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic and Afghanistan accounted for more than one third of the world's refugee population. In 2016, most refugees from Asia were living in neighbouring countries. Refugees from Syria were mainly hosted in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, while refugees from Afghanistan were hosted in Pakistan and Iran (IOM, 2018).

- Temporary and circular migration flows: In recent years there has been an increase in both the number of international students wishing to study in Asia and the number of Asian students choosing to study abroad. The other feature is labour migration, especially in East Asia. Japan and the Republic of Korea, with very low fertility rates and rapidly ageing populations, led the promotion of new migration policies. This has incremented the seasonal and labour immigration of foreign workers (Park, 2017; Moon, 2015). A large number of these immigrant workers are unskilled and linked to jobs in sectors which require larger workforces, for example workers from Bangladesh and Nepal who work in India. In addition, in the regions of South Asia or Central Asia, internal migration flows are predominant and mainly related to temporary and seasonal migration from rural to urban areas (Srivastava & Pandey, 2017). The flows from South Asia are directed to oil-rich Persian Gulf countries, which since the 1970s have been the main destination of many temporary workers (Oommen, 2015). Meanwhile, in Central Asia migration flows toward Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan attract skilled workers from various countries, generating remittances that over time have contributed to reducing the national poverty rate in the countries of origin (UN DESA, 2015a).
- Long-term migration flows are characterised by movements abroad related to specific migration projects. One of the main characteristics of the long-term migration, as well as of the short-term migration, is the sending of remittances, which permit a financial vector for most of Asiatic countries, especially for China. (UN DESA, 2015a). Over time, long-term migration has been characterised by different factors such as: the feminisation of migration flows due to increased demand for female workers in the service sector (Huang *et al.*, 2000); the increase of family reunification, which indicates a stabilisation of the migratory project towards final settlement; the emergence of a significant proportion of skilled and highly qualified workers. Other aspects of skilled migration have now become significant factors as well. For instance, brain drain, which is particularly affecting India, as skilled workers in medicine or engineering are leaving the country (Demaio & Nanni, 2013).

3.1.2.3 Africa

The phenomenon of migration in Africa is not recent, since the populations of these countries have always moved periodically to cope with different situations. In fact, as a result, migration flows represent an important demographic response to several factors: unequal regional development, poverty and hunger in certain regions, environmental changes, conflict and violence related to political unrest,

community and ethnic tensions, a rapid population growth that led to increased agricultural strain, deforestation and overgrazing (Hummel *et al.*, 2012).

In Africa, the number of movements of refugees and asylum seekers is very high. In 2016, Southern Sudan and Somalia were the country with the largest number of refugees in the region. Among the main drivers of displacement were conflict, violence and food insecurity (IOM, 2018). Also the colonialism had a profound impact in all regions of the continent and the direct intervention of European powers to control African labour through slavery, the expropriation of land and the contract labour systems forced and encouraged new migration dynamics (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007).

The distinction between international and national movements has created several problems in Africa, where until recently short moves of nomads played an important role (Adepoju, 2003). The existence of a large number of African countries and the relatively small size of some of them influence data collection (IOM, 2018). Since 2000, international migration in Africa has increased, particularly in relation to migration flows from Africa to other regions. In 2015, the main migration flows from Africa were directed to Europe (9 million), Asia (4 million) and North America (2 million); while the number of immigrants to Africa (2, 3 million), mostly from Asia and Europe, was less striking (IOM, 2018). In 2015, the country with the most citizens living abroad was Egypt, followed by Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Algeria. While South Africa represents the most important destination country in Africa where most international migrants reside:

- Temporary and circular migration flows: these flows, more internal to the continent, are characterised by rural-urban mobility, rural-rural mobility, urban-rural mobility, and urban-urban mobility depending on several factors (Adepoju, 2000; Baker & Aida, 1997). Since the end of colonialism, East Africa and the Horn of Africa have been scarred by conflicts leading to massive movements of refugees. In South, West and Central Africa, migration flows are driven by labour mobility. The flows are composed by internal temporary workers from Africa, especially from Niger and Mali (Devillard *et al.*, 2016), and foreign flows from Asia (Cook *et al.*, 2016). In Central Africa, unlike in West Africa, where economic factors are major drivers of intraregional migration, conflict and instability have played a more important role in the movement to neighbouring countries. Despite free movement agreements, irregular migration continues to predominate in West and Central Africa.

In recent years, West Africa has been described as the most mobile region of Africa, characterised by intra-regional, seasonal or circular, movements that reflect pre-colonial patterns, although many migrants eventually settled (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007). Many scholars agree that since 1990 in Africa there are two migratory poles at the northern and southern extremes of the continent, in which South Africa has become an immigration focus for the rest of the continent.

- Long-term migration flows: people involved in more permanent migration tend more to have higher skills as a result of the greater economic return to education in industrial countries. The brain drain has been regarded as a problem since the Second World War, for the economic activities of country of origin, particularly in the South of Africa (Ellerman, 2003, p. 30). Long term flows are based on income disparities between origin and destination countries in terms of unemployment and on brain-drain mobility especially from people from North Africa, both toward Persian Gulf countries and Europe (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016). In East Africa, especially in Uganda or Ethiopia, the brain-drain effect has been the major driver of migration for many years. Usually, young people from these regions migrate to study abroad but never return. In terms of intra-African emigration, political instability in Somalia and the Sudan, as well as conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have been important drivers of emigration.

3.1.2.4 The Americas

In the beginning of the 21st century there were many changes in migration flows in the Americas: flows from Europe to North America began to decline, while flows from Latin America to North

America increased; meanwhile emigration from Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia) to Europe increased. Also, intraregional flows multiplied particularly toward Costa Rica, Ecuador, Chile, Panamá, Belize, Brazil and Argentina (Feldmann *et al.*, 2018). Of course, although the two Americas have a particular migration dynamic, it links the two considerably.

In North America migration trends have been characterised by a high level of immigration, mainly from Latin America, Asia and Europe which have increased considerably over time. The largest group of migrants living in the United States of America was from Mexico and secondly from Asian countries such as China, India and the Philippines or from Viet Nam, the Republic of Korea and Cuba (IOM, 2018). The North America also has hosted a large number of refugees and asylum seekers from a variety of countries, especially from China, Haiti, El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, Egypt and Ethiopia. However, the number of North American migrants living within the region or outside was relatively low compared to the foreign-born population residing in the country.

On the other hand, South America's migration dynamics reflect both internal and external migration. Most of the migrants living in Latin America and the Caribbean were from Europe and North America. In 2015, Mexico was the main emigration country in Latin America and the Caribbean. Many other Central American countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras also have significant migrant populations in the United States of America, as do South American countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil and Peru. There are also numerous migrant populations from South America living in other regions of the South.

- Temporary and circular migration flows: although in the United States, the admission of temporary workers and their families has increased in recent years (Martin, 2003), South America accounts for the majority of the temporary and circular migration flows, especially at intra-regional level due to economic and labour disparities between countries (IOM, 2017c). The economic restructuring of South America has favoured a greater presence of women in intra-regional movements, especially in the service and care sectors (Cerruti, 2009). Countries such as Chile, Argentina and Brazil attract migrant workers from the Andean countries and Paraguay. For a long time, Venezuela had a large number of intra-regional migrants from Colombia and Ecuador (UN DESA, 2015a), but today the situation has changed due to its internal crisis.
- Long-term migration flows: the United States and Canada have always been destination countries for Europeans and recently for Asians. These flows have promoted economic growth and stability in North America. Although the incoming flows are more or less stable, the intensification of the conflict on the southern border shared with Mexico has changed migration patterns. People from South America started to emigrate toward Europe, especially to Spain and Italy, rather than North America (Feldmann *et al.*, 2018; IOM, 2017c).

Another recent trend in migration is that North-South migration has increased among immigrants from developed countries who migrate to southern countries. These kinds of flows are made up mostly of retirees and investors that are migrating to Costa Rica, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Mexico taking advantage of their mobility and economic power (IOM, 2015b; Oliver, 2011).

3.1.2.5 Oceania

Since the end of World War II, Oceania and in particular way countries as Australia and New Zealand have experienced years of intense immigration. During this period, internal policies have been implemented in relation to both migration and settlement (Castles & Vasta, 2004). The political and economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s led to the arrival of new flows from the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and South Africa. Australia and New Zealand have been converted into a traditional immigrant receiving countries that are still growing and changing due to high levels of migration (ABS, 2017b).

The foreign-born migrant population was mainly composed of two large groups from Asia and Europe, but over the past 25 years, while the Asian migrant group has increased, the European group has remained stable. However, the development challenges and the disproportionate growth of the youth population in the Pacific Islands have led to significant employment shortages. This has resulted in a high level of labour migration to different countries, especially to New Zealand and Australia (IOM, 2018). In addition, Australia on one hand, has the third largest refugee reception programme in the world, especially for people displaced by the conflicts in Syria and Iraq (UNHCR, 2016); on the other, in collaboration with New Zealand, also resettles refugees who have been living in neighbouring countries transferring people who arrive irregularly as asylum seekers to offshore processing centres (IOM, 2018)

- Temporary and circular migration flows: in recent years, migrants from Oceania have been more likely to migrate within their region than to other regions. In fact, intra-regional migration in Oceania is a notable and continuing trend, especially between New Zealand and Australia, driven by the existence of mobility agreements between the two countries; on the other hand, most of the incoming flows are temporal and seasonal especially composed of skilled workers and international students (Iredale, 2006; Castles & Miller, 2009). Also in all sub-regions of Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia there was an increase in their migrant population (UN DESA, 2005). Between 2015 and 2016, in both Australia and New Zealand, 200,000 temporary migrant workers from India and the United Kingdom placed a work visa; while, a large number of international students, especially from China, India and Japan were attracted from the two countries (IOM, 2018).

- Long-term migration flows: the main characteristic of long-term migration flow is related to the time of granting visas. This means that in the long-term, the major determinant of net migration is the number of permanent visas granted, with an annual limit. During 2002 and 2003, the rate of permanent emigration was high, as a results many people left Australia, New Zealand and the all sub-regions with most going to the UK, the USA and Asia (UN DESA, 2005).

Nowadays, Oceania has gained in terms of inflows. For example, in the case of Australia, permanent migration is a result of the Australian Government, which each year allocate quotas or places for people who want to migrate permanently to Australia. The Australian Government has prioritised skilled migration, family reunification and refugee migration according to the Humanitarian Programme for refugees and those in refugee-like situations. (Phillips & Simon-Davies, 2016). Until recently, the UK has been the primary source country for permanent migration to Oceania, especially towards Australia; however, in 2010-2011, China and India have surpassed UK.

3.2 From migration to mobility: the case of European Union

In an increasingly globalised world, the nature and scope of human displacement have changed, as well as its conceptual frameworks. The productive process has generated new population movements that are more heterogeneous and different in terms of composition: from specialised and highly qualified human resources, to retirees or lifestyle migrants (Castels & Miller, 2009).

In this new context it has been observed that the concept of migration as one-way movement has lost the ability to accurately describe an increasingly complex reality. An increasing number of studies choose to describe movements across border in terms of spatial mobility, understood as a set of movements in space of individuals regardless of duration and physical distance. In particular, according to the complex of migration trajectories, qualitative studies suggest that multiple international moves have become a common 'mobility strategy' especially adopted in times of economic crisis (Toma & Castagnone, 2015). According to Salazar (2017) current phenomena should be explained by more systematic and comparative studies focused on the features of migration and mobility. Mobility studies have been developed to explain different modalities of population movements in the world. In a macro sense, the era of mobility is governed by globalisation forces, as 'a set of spatial-temporal processes of change that underpin a transformation of human affairs, through the growth

of their relationships and the expansion of human activities across continents and regions' (Held *et al.*, 1999). On a micro level, the management of mobility is done through strategies that individuals use to adapt their structural situation to the changing circumstances in which they live (Holling, 2001). Other mechanisms, such as household size and the accumulation of educational capital coexist with coping strategies in relation to mobility (Folke, 2006).

The conceptual change from migration to mobility is particularly relevant when analysing population flows within the European Union. Since the Treaty of Rome (1958), the flow of workers, together with the free movement of services, goods and capital, has been the cornerstone of the European integration project. As a result, the legislative effort of several decades has made it possible to create an area of freely flowing labour in which any EU citizen who wishes to do so has the right to move to any country of his or her choice, establish his or her residence there, and carry out economic activity as an employee or self-employed person on an equal footing with native workers in that country. It is a *sui generis* regime that technically still takes the form of international migration but does so under the conditions typical of internal migration. To mark this change semantically, EU documents increasingly refer to intra-EU movements as 'mobility', rather than 'migration', the latter term being restricted to movements of persons from third countries. In everyday terms, 'mobility' means migration without the inconvenience of border controls or the risks that characterise the travel and settlement of traditional migrants (Favell, 2018). Similarly, freedom of movement gives EU citizens full rights to enter the labour market and protects them from any institutional discrimination and inequality in terms of recruitment opportunities and employment and working conditions.

The freedom of movement has created highly complex area of mobility in terms of types and patterns of both displacement and insertion in the host societies. Firstly, the ease of moving from one country to another and settling in places according to one's preferences and needs has encouraged both permanent residence and temporary and circular migration, changing traditional migration patterns. Second, destinations have become more diversified, migration projects are much more individualised, and decisions to move to another European country are now driven by a wide range of reasons and motives (King & Okólski, 2018a). Finally, while work remains a major motivation for leaving the country of origin, non-work-related reasons for migration (family, relationships, education, retirement or change of lifestyle) have also become an important aspect of migration motives (Verwiebe, Wiesböck & Teitzer, 2014a).

In relation to the concept of freedom of movement, a brief mention must be made on English Brexit and its impact on the European mobility. As explained by Portes (2016b), even before Brexit there were some fall in net migration from the EU. The Brexit and Immigration report is related to the degree of preference for migrants: 'will citizens of the European Economic Area (EEA), and third country nationals even if not in full freedom of movement, all be treated in the same way?' (Portes, 2016b). However, according to the first results of Brexit, the UK government will attempt to replace the rights-based EU free movement with a permission-based regime (Denninson & Geddes, 2018). The Brexit cannot change the immigrant labour market developed over the last 30 years but for sure, according to EU referendum result that seems highly likely to lead to a decline in 'Europeanised' migration to the UK (*ibid.*).

In the face of this growing complexity of patterns and destinations, authors such as Engbersen and Snel (2013) suggest that mobility within the EU should be described in terms of 'liquid migration'. The notion of liquidity, strongly inspired by the work of Zygmunt Bauman (2000; 2003), corresponds with the idea that stable social institutions (class, family, work, community and nation-state) are fading away and being replaced by more flexible institutions. The transformation of these institutions, together with advanced communication technologies and the disappearance of borders, has made migration less predictable. Today, migrants respond and adapt quickly to the changing conditions of the different labour markets in which they operate (Drinkwater, Eade & Garapich, 2009). As a result, mobility patterns are less stable and more dependent on the decisions of individual migrants. Liquid migration can be established within the changes of intra-European mobility, due to the unpredictable

and dynamic nature of the flows (Engbersen, 2018). The increased number of labour migrants is producing specific social problems for urban regions regarding renting a house, education and language acquisition, access to health care and claims on social assistance and other public provisions (Reeger, 2018). Homelessness might be an inevitable consequence of temporary labour and temporary accommodation, as losing one's job means losing one's housing (Engbersen, 2018).

3.2.1 The intra-European mobility from the 'liquid' migration perspective

The freedom of movement within the EU produced a new migration system characterised by several aspects such as temporariness, labour migration, legal residential status, unpredictability, individualisation and a 'migrant habitus' of open options and intentional unpredictability (Engbersen, 2012). In this sense, liquid migration is particularly valuable for describing the legal and regulatory contexts of contemporary intra-European migration where legal constraints and the need for planning is less necessary than in many other contexts (Bygnes & Erdal, 2017). Nevertheless, the liquid migration perspective also has some limitations. The main weakness is the lack of data and theories to refer to. Data on liquid migration flows are difficult to collect, especially in relation to non-visible and under-represented groups of immigrants. Moreover, the lack of a theories makes us think that given its 'non-presence or liquidity', migratory theories are simply not able to explain it.

From a general point of view, liquid migration cannot be considered a form of migration and although it does not have a particular theory of reference, behind the term 'liquid' there are some concepts that might help explain the phenomenon. More specifically, the constant change cited by Bauman (2000) represents the notion of youth and young-adulthood as a continuous process of becoming; on the other, changes due to fragility and vulnerability defined by Bauman are highlighted in the term of rupture (Hörschelmann, 2011). According to Lulle *et al.* (2018), the notions of 'rupture' and 'becoming', combined with the concept of liquid migration, constitute a useful conceptual framework for understanding the mobility of EU citizens, especially the youngest.

As stated earlier, the limitations of traditional migration theories make it impossible for them to interpret this contemporary phenomenon.

Beyond the characteristics of liquid migration (Engbersen, 2012), one of the elements that could be analysed through a theoretical framework is the decision to migrate, which is always taken in the context of uncertainty and risk, where information about the future is incomplete and everything is unpredictable. Czaika (2015) pointed out that migration decisions can be influenced by future prospects related to the general economic situation and unemployment, in both the home country and the potential destination country. For this reason, a migration prospect theory based on reference-dependent expectations of immigrants implies that short-term migration flows are driven by changes in future prospects about the economic situation in both the origin and destination country (Czaika, 2015).

Czaika's study (2015), which applied behavioural economic insights on reference-dependent expectations to the individual decision making process of potential migrants for intra-European migration flows, could be used to specify liquid migration in order to identify some empirical evidence.

Case in point – 1: Polish migration to the UK in the 'New European Union'

The first enlargement of the European Union in 2004 gave rise to new migratory dynamics based on greater flexibility of movement and greater openness of labour markets. The free movement of workers helped to alleviate the level of unregistered employment among migrant workers in the EU 8 (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2008). Thanks to the enlargement, millions of people from Eastern European countries started to emigrate to Western and Central Europe, including Poles to the United Kingdom. After 1989, the permanent emigration flow from Poland to UK had been replaced with various forms of short-term mobility, which created networks and contacts among new migrants and those who returned home. The increasing mobility was linked to increasing of short-term labour migration.

In 2004, after Poland joined the European Union, migration flows within Europe increased considerably: over half a million migrants have since registered to work in the UK, constituting one of the largest migration movements in contemporary Europe and one of the most studied flows in the period of post-accession population mobility (Okólski & Salt, 2014).

The presence of Polish migrants in several countries of Europe has raised a number of questions about the length of their stay, policies relating to temporal work and settlement in specific neighbourhoods. Over time, new migrants have become more and more visible for the institutions they create and renew, for life in society, for the migration network and the benefits they have given to the labour market (Engbersen, Snel & de Boom, 2010).

As confirmed by Okólski and Salt (2014) the UK benefitted from this mass migration from Poland, especially in the labour market. A direct consequence of these flows is that on the one hand they have started to represent an economic advantage for European countries; on the other hand they have given rise to the displacement of illegal workers from other European states (Engbersen, Snel & de Boom, 2010).

From the beginning, empirical data showed that the flow of Poles towards the UK took diverse forms. One of the ways to address this new reality was to propose typologies that seek to identify migrant mobility strategies. These typologies take into consideration both geographical mobility strategies, as well as patterns of incorporation to the labour market, and finally aspirations, life expectations and family situations. The best known typology, devised by Garapich (Eade, Drinkwater & Garapich, 2007), divided Poles into 'hamsters' or target earners or one-off visits; 'storks', or circular migrants; 'stayers', intending to remain for the long term, though perhaps retiring to Poland; and, the largest category, 'searchers', or those with flexible plans. In the same vein, Luthra *et al.* (2014) differentiated six types of migrants from the new member countries: 'traditional circular', 'short-term accumulators', 'committed expats', 'followers', 'living and learning' and 'adventurers'. The first two types represent classic forms of circular and temporary labour migration in which strong connections to the country of origin are maintained, while short stays in Western Europe are undertaken. Within the strategies of 'committed expatriates' work is also the main motivation, although non-economic motivations such as family or educational enhancement are also indicated. In the remaining three categories work is a marginal reason for undertaking mobility.

In particular, the migration of Poles does not result from a single cause, such as wage differentials, labour recruitment, household strategies or migration networks; it cannot even be explained by push and pull factors (Okólski & Salt, 2014). This new and unique mass migration flow cannot be analysed through traditional migration theories. Therefore, the concept of liquid migration and its characteristics can fully represent the migratory flows within the European Union.

3.3 Discussion

Human migration represents a dynamic phenomenon that has evolved over time. If the first migratory flows were directed towards traditional destination countries, such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in the second half of the 20th century Europe was transformed into the major global migration destination, with an increase in 'South-North' migration. Contemporary migrations are driven by globalisation and characterised by a differentiation in the compositions of migratory flows, which are more dynamic and faster, with changing volumes and temporariness, as well as by the inclusion of the gender perspective and politicisation.

We have seen how at the beginning of the 21st century the migration dynamic towards developed countries was quite high, how it decreased between 2007 and 2008 during the economic and financial crisis, and finally how it changed the landscape and the migration patterns during the crisis of refugee and asylum-seekers between 2010 and 2015.

The main migratory flows that characterise the globalisation scenario are internal to the continents, mainly of short duration and circular type and external, with a long-term duration. The outside migration flows are from West Africa towards Europe, from Asia to North America, those from Latin America to North America and South of Europe and in the end, the European migration flows which represent a specific case study. These flows have specific characteristics starting from the fact that they do not have fixed destination and are open to more options. As a result, given the particularity of the European scenario, the term mobility is used instead of migration.

Migration often fails to explain the dynamics of intra-European migration flows which are directed towards several destinations without involving a change of residence. These new changes in migration patterns make interpreting the migration phenomena more difficult. In conclusion, with the lack of reliable migration statistics and with the fragmentation of traditional migration theories with a strong individualistic line, describing global migration dynamics has become limited and complex.

In Section 4, we see how these shortcomings impact the migration, policy and data nexus, creating critical knowledge gaps.

4. Gaps assessment

Migration is a human experience with layered, contextual and unpredictable vagaries. As the previous sections have shown, there is a need for migration knowledge to be multidisciplinary and multifocal in the perspectives and contexts they address. Building on the theoretical analysis and the link between the theories and migration reality presented in the previous section, in Section 4, we analyse qualitative and quantitative data collection methodologies. The aim of this section is to understand whether contemporary dynamics of migration find resonance in the academic and policy nexus that facilitates it. The ‘gaps’ under scrutiny here refer to those aspects of lived reality that go unaddressed or unnoticed in data sources, data collection, theoretical examination and administrative coverage. The knowledge base for migration studies has three pillars: theoretical knowledge, migration data and surveys. These pillars form a feedback loop, shaping and influencing each other - thus, gaps, biases or blind spots in any one can often have a ripple effect creating misinformed policies or limited academic insights. We explore these limitations and their potential ramifications in this section, with a detailed analysis of the gaps in each category. First, we look at qualitative approaches to migration, then we present in-depth analysis and case studies for recent migratory phenomena. Following this we look at existing approaches to policies, gender and geography and how migration challenges the theoretical underpinnings of sociology. Then we analyse the different sources of international data on migration and assess the shortcomings that make it difficult to base generalisations or forecasting studies on this data. A similar critical assessment is conducted in the third subsection, where we look at international surveys and their limitations.

4.1 Gaps and challenges in qualitative approaches to migration

In Sections 2 and 3, we discussed grand theories and theoretical approaches to migration. In this section we take a look at qualitative, empirical studies on migration; analyse the inherent gaps and biases and illustrate the gap analyses through a selection of case studies. Massey *et al.* (1993) caution: ‘Theories developed to understand contemporary processes of international migration posit causal mechanisms that operate at widely divergent levels of analysis. Although the propositions, assumptions, and hypotheses derived from each perspective are not inherently contradictory, they nonetheless carry very different implication for policy formulation.’

4.1.1 Definitions, types and drivers in migration theories

In this section we look at definitions and typologies associated with migration: from terminologies in policy and public discourse, to how migration and migrants are categorised. While governments and academia need categories to make decisions and conduct analyses, it is critical to reflect on these categories, especially the moral and political biases embedded within them. ‘The deliberate or uncritical use of particular categories by politicians and the media can have a distorting effect on perceptions of migration phenomena. Often, such categories are embedded in discourses that give misleading representation of the magnitude, nature and causes of migration processes.’ (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020, p. 36). Furthermore, categorisations can conflate divergent strands and render some others invisible. We explore some of these in the three sections below: De Jure and De Facto definitions of a migrant, and migration drivers and typologies of migration.

4.1.1.1 Definitions: de Facto vs. de Jure

The term migrant is defined as ‘foreign-born, foreign-nationals, or people who have moved to [a country different from the one of origin] for a year or more’ (Anderson & Blinder, 2011, p. 1). However, no universally accepted definition for ‘migrant’ exists at an international level. Most data collection institutes develop their own definitions in line with their purposes. These definitions then become the main source of reference for policymakers. To start with the existing official definitions of who is an (international) migrant, we can refer to global and European perspectives. In the global context:

- the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) defines an ‘international migrant’ as ‘any person who changes his or her country of usual residence’. The OECD follows the United Nations recommendations and categorises migrants into four groups: long-term immigrants (or emigrants); short-term immigrants (or emigrants); residents returning after (or leaving for) a period working abroad, i.e. short-term emigrants returning (or leaving); and nomads;
- the UN Migration Agency (IOM) defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students;
- the EU defines a ‘migrant’ as a person who is outside the territory of the State of which they are nationals or citizens and who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate. In the EU/EFTA context, ‘migrant’ is defined by the EU as a person who either: establishes their usual residence in the territory of an EU/EFTA Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another EU/EFTA Member State or a third country; or having previously been a resident in the territory of the EU/EFTA Member State ceases to have their usual residence in the EU/EFTA Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.

In both definitions, ‘mobility over border’ and the ‘time frame’ are crucial to identify migrants. Nevertheless, political and public rhetoric differs in terms of the coverage of the definition in particular in relation to the time frame. Empirical studies using international data sources adopt the official definitions of the data collection institutes, which are usually measured through nationality or country of birth. When the concern is the public attitudes and perception about migrants, they hold on the assumption that the term ‘migrant’ is understood in the same way in public and social context. Nevertheless, de jure definitions are dominated by the ‘migrant image’ in people’s minds which yield de jure definitions where migrant can be a recent immigrant, refugee, people with migrant background (a second-or third generation) or can be country dependent in terms of country of origin. To illustrate, at the first instance ‘migrants’ in Belgium are assumed to be Turkish and Moroccan in daily conversations, although the main migrant group in Belgium is the Dutch citizens. Migrants are often conflated with ethnic or religious minorities and with asylum seekers (Saggar & Drean, 2001; Crawley, 2009; Beutin *et al.*, 2006; Baker *et al.*, 2008). Political rhetoric and media discourses commonly use such terms interchangeably, which constitutes a notable problem for consistency in public debate concerning the number or impact of migrants, as the same discussion might simultaneously employ two different definitions unwittingly or to conform the speaker’s or author’s intentions. The confusion in public debate over the definition of ‘migrant’ poses challenges for government and international policies.

4.1.1.2 Drivers: Contextualising migration in official registers

Understanding what conditions perpetuate certain forms of migration has been a key area of research, with theories of push-pull, brain drain/gain and labour migration dominating the field. In recent years, scholars have moved away from terms such as ‘determinants’ or ‘causes’, opting for more open-ended concepts such as ‘drivers’, that make room for multiple conjunctures of structure and agency - from individual aspiration and ability, infrastructural availability, social and political discourse, migration policies, labour market opportunities, and so on (Black *et al.*, 2018; Carling & Collins, 2018; Van Hear *et al.*, 2018). Even though contemporary research challenges the idea of one singular motive or cause for migration, a recent analysis of first residence permits issued in EU countries states that first residence permits reflect a migrant’s ‘actual motive’ for coming to the EU (Migali & Natale, 2017). In keeping with the analytical framework of this report, we problematise this assumption and look at research on drivers in specific categories of mobility that are recognised in international datasets: labour migration, family reunification, education and humanitarian migration.

Remunerated activities and entrepreneurs

Historically, labour migration has been one of the most significant migration flows. From seasonal movements of population to the more organised transnational/multinational work force today, a large part of migration discourse and policies have evolved out of economic migration. This matrix of migration includes paid highly skilled migrants, seasonal migrants, and even undocumented migrant workers in precarious jobs. Labour migration directly links two key aspects of governance, and Ruhs (2013) points out that it is especially critical for nation-states as it is one aspect of the labour market they can directly control. Thus, there is a continual ‘trade off’ in policies, which prioritise one type of migration or group over another, keeping their economic viability in mind (Ruhs, 2013; Freitas & Levationo, 2012). In traditional push-pull models, labour migration is traditionally understood to be from a poor or disadvantaged socio-economic situation to one with better promise, however recent scholarship shows that there is a matrix of ‘plus’ factors that impact labour migration (Van Hear, Bakewell & Long, 2018). South-South migration, intra-Europe migration and globalised flows of skilled migrants further challenge these assumptions. Several strands of research show that migration entails a loss of capital - social, cultural and professional - as these are not readily transferable across contexts (Borjas, 2006; Chiswick & Miller, 2009). Skilled migrants are often under-employed, particularly in the domestic work sector which sees a number of highly educated female migrants (Vouyioukis & Liapi, 2014), especially from within EU countries. Labour migration is also influenced by the policies available in host countries, such as tax benefits for highly skilled migrants, fast-tracked citizenship opportunities, better industrial infrastructure and growth opportunities. In line with research on brain drain/brain gain models, studies on skilled migration show that despite popular rhetoric that migrants want to move, it is evident that countries want [certain kinds of] migrants just as much (Hawthorne, 2014). International trade relations also drive labour migration, for instance, intra-EU labour migration (Allen, 1998; Piekut, 2020). Free movement, however, can create precarious conditions for low-skilled and seasonal labourers. Globalisation and transnational work culture also have a significant impact on migration, with a growing number of posted workers world over. Studies also show that ‘historical experiences of diversity and colonialism’ also influence patterns of labour migration (Cornelius, Martin & Hollifield, 2004, cited in Biene *et al.*, 2016; de Haas *et al.*, 2020). We also see that certain professions create and are impacted by a network effect (Borjas, 1992) - such as the presence of women in the ‘global care chain’ (Sassen, 2002) and female migrant medical professionals (King & Raghuram, 2013), ethnic groups (Chiswick, 2009) - so there is an overrepresentation of certain ethnicities within them. When considering labour migration as a reason for migration, multiple causalities such as these should be accounted for.

Education for migration/migration for education

The drivers of education migration are rooted just as much in global flows and social context as in the case of any mobility. Tracing the history of international education, Robertson (2013) sees links between international policy and education. In the 1920s, when the West (primarily the US) began to open up to international students as part of diplomatic outreach, the focus was on courses such as development and social theory, public policy and theory and building competencies for development. In the 1970s, as education world over began to be privatised or incentive based, international students and international capital *vis-a-vis* them became more attractive. At the same time, education in the 'West' came to be seen as socially attractive and professionally promising (Robertson, 2013; Miller, 2011). Recent research explores this 'education-migration nexus' (Robertson, 2013, p. 12) and the 'neoliberal nexus of education' (Kwak, 2013); within which education migration is a socially and politically driven aspect of/pathway to labour migration. Education migration has two distinct pathways: immigration for education and education for immigration. For a number of education migrants, the 'driver' or end-goal is the possibility of long-term migration rather than the education itself (Robertson, 2013). It is the aspiration of prospective students and ambition of receiving countries that drive education flows. Countries such as Australia and Canada have points systems that give added points to students with local degrees. Hawthorne (2010, 2011) explores how OECD specially target international students as potential skilled workers, and how the possibility of lucrative jobs and long-term residence makes a particular destination more attractive for students. There is also a flow of education migration of younger, school-going children - in order to ensure better job opportunities for children in the home country or future migration opportunities. To this end, countries such as Singapore have even introduced 'Study-Mother Visas' for accompanying mothers. Dustmann and Glitz (2011) note that education is an economically driven consideration, since education impacts income. Furthermore, they argue that education abroad can change the skill set in the local country and maybe even investments etc., thus sending countries also promote foreign education. This 'global knowledge industry' runs concurrently alongside neoliberalism, the hunt for global talent and the internationalisation of education (Tlatlik, 2016). In Europe as well, the internationalisation of education is visible in the proliferation of English language courses and growing numbers of international students. Kell and Vogel (2008) analysed how overall migration and education migration can have separate flows. Following the recession, migration itself was not favourable, however universities increasingly relied on international students for money, thus favouring education migration (*ibid.*). In 2016 and 2017, education migrants comprised over 20% of the new migrants in OECD countries. Beine and Salomone (2013) also see gender and education as key in the network effects of migration. In the absence of a broader perspective at a policy level, data on migration either overlooks education migrants as migrants, or fails to consider the complete picture of their aspirations, study their contributions to the labour market (or potential to do so) and offer pathways in that regard. Without disaggregated data on education migration, we also fail to ascertain what fields of education (and thus what line of work) is coveted and how the existing talent pool can be optimised.

Family unification

In recent years, family reunification has become one of the primary reasons for migration into Europe. The right to family life is recognised as a basic right by most countries, however, there are administrative processes that limit the right to a certain section of migrants - from age limits, processing fees, DNA tests (in case of missing records), language tests, and a fairly high minimum income. In 2015, 52% of all first residence permits issued were to family migrants. In 2016, of the 16,067 family migrants joining non-EU citizens, 12,393 were children and 3,635 were spouses/partners, while just 40 were other family members. The United Nations recognises the right to family life as a basic human right that should be accorded to all migrants. However, countries regulate the flow of migration through family reunification visas, which, in most countries are only applicable for 'direct' family members - spouse and dependent children. For a long time, family reunification has

been conceptualised as the objective of long-term migrants after a period of transnational living arrangements, which was connected to the characteristics of members left behind and to the economic and social conditions in the host country. This concept has been questioned to create the basis for a new approach about family migration taking into account how the country of origin's gender, cultural, and family norms affect family migration (Fresnoza-Flot & Shinozaki, 2017; Baizán *et al.*, 2014; Hoang, 2011).

Family settlement, defined as a key concept for understanding the integration process of migrants in the host society, has constituted one of the main legal routes of entry in a specific country, after the halt of labour migration (Ambrosini *et al.*, 2014; Baizán *et al.*, 2014). From a general perspective, the literature on social science includes a plethora of studies related to family and migration, including migration of children, parents, wife/husband long after marriage, cross-border marriages and transnational family life (Baldassar *et al.*, 2014), or quantitative studies on marriage patterns and/or labour market participation among family migrants (Elrick & Lightman, 2016). In a more specific analysis, the lack of adequate datasets that contain information about the relatives of immigrants and the inconsistent theoretical framework related to family reunification have severely hampered empirical research on the reunification process.

Assuming that the migration experience is a socialised experience, from the decision to migrate to the decision of family reunification, the current theoretical framework does not allow for an effective interpretation of the last phase of the process. First of all, traditional migratory theories, where the family has always been put in the background and considered an obstacle to individual migration, should be rejected. Recent scholarship highlights that family unification is not as straightforward in terms of drivers – some families opt to stay apart in order to pursue dual careers (Belgiojoso & Terzera, 2018), education opportunities for children (Robertson, 2013), or secure monetary streams by diversifying income (Chen, 2003; de Haas *et al.*, 2020). Massey *et al.*, (1998) in their discussion on contemporary theories, highlighted how migratory movement through networks becomes independent of the specific, individual and structural factors generally linked to immigration. For this reason, push and pull factors are also insufficient.

In the context of family reunification, the responsibilities of the individual with respect to the family increase along with bureaucratic difficulties in obtaining the necessary documents in both the country of origin and reception, and costs associated with moving family from one country to another, etc. Scholars have also studied how the Western notion of the migrant family (Hagelund, 2008; Grillo, 2008) shapes policies around family reunification, with women assumed to be slotted into traditional gender roles and denied pathways to labour integration - through lack of work permits, such as in the US, or lack of orientation (Timmerman *et al.*, 2015). However, several researchers show that for women marriage can also be a strategy for professional growth and several women reskill or retrain in order to enter the labour market in host countries (Vouyioukas & Liapi, 2013). Nevertheless, owing to a lack of data on migration trajectories of family migrants, this is hard to quantify.

In different countries the relation between inflows of labour migrants and inflows of accompanying family has increased. The role of family reunification is also a matter of debate in the context of refugees. The importance of family reunification for the well-being of the family members has been demonstrated, while family separation can compound the effects of an existing trauma (Rousseau *et al.*, 2001). Since the '50s, the UN recognises that immigrants, including refugees, have the right to reunite with their families. Nonetheless, states have the sovereignty to decide who enters their territory (Lambert, 2014). A study by Walther *et al.* (2019) reported that, especially in the case of refugees who had already reunited with part of their family, they were more likely to focus on integrating than those who had not yet been reunited. Some studies have focused on the reunification of particular family members, for example a spouse (Baizán *et al.*, 2014) or children (Ambrosini *et al.*, 2014). Others have found different effects of education for men and women in explaining the likelihood and length

of spouses' separation due to international migration (Gupta, 2002; González-Ferrer, 2007). However, it is important to study how education correlates with permanent settlement and family reunification and whether the decision to settle on a permanent basis impacts family migration.

In a recent UN brief, family reunion was seen as a driver for child smuggling/trafficking as legal obstacles, delays and difficulties in family tracing and unification increases the likelihood that families try irregular pathways, which make children more vulnerable to exploitation.⁸ Although some studies have examined family migration decisions, they are mostly restricted to the experience of internal migrants and focused on family separation. However, according to the Neoclassical Economic theory, the person who emigrates may incur non-monetary costs that include not only opportunity costs but also the psychological costs of leaving family, friends and the familiar surroundings (Sandell, 1977; Mincer, 1978; Courgeau, 1990; Mulder & Wagner, 1993; Stark, 1988)

As described in Section 2.1.1.3, the predominance of Neoclassical Economic theory in the analysis of migration has favoured a strong individualist perspective (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1976), which in turn has contributed to obscuring the family dimension in the migration process. Of course, with the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) the individual is no left totally alone and deciding the process independently. The wellbeing is improved by more family members, the household group or the whole community. In this way, on the one hand family represents a decisive factor behind the decision making process (Mincer, 1978); on the other hand, family can affect the evolution of the migration project in terms of integration or work in destination country. Moreover, the presence of migrant families is a phenomenon that transforms the impact and the significance of migration, transforming an economic issue into a political one (Zanfrini, 2012).

Humanitarian migration

According to the IOM, in 2018, there were 25.9 million refugees globally, with another 3.5 applicants waiting for the paperwork. Humanitarian admission is temporary or permanent residence permit granted to people in need of protection, such as refugees, migrants in vulnerable positions, people with urgent protection needs, among others. 'The global data also show that displacement caused by conflict, generalised violence and other factors remains at a record high. Intractable, unresolved and recurring conflicts and violence have led to an upsurge in the number of refugees around the world in recent years, with women and children comprising a substantial portion of the total' (McAuliffe & Khadria, 2020, p. 51). While there is an assumption that humanitarian migration is only one way, in 2018, 63,316 migrants (refugees) returned from 128 host countries to 169 countries or territories of origin (IOM, 2020). De Haas *et al.* (2020) point out that that the line between 'forced' movement and 'voluntary' movement is blurred in some cases. Crawley & Skleparis (2017) say there is a complex interplay between political, social and economic drivers and 'categorical fetishism' fails to capture this adequately. It is important to bear in mind, however, 'that those at the lowest end of the migration agency spectrum may have little or no possibility of migrating and have the potential to become *trapped* populations' (McLeman, Schade & Faist, 2016, p. 13).

4.1.1.3 Typologies

Classification of migration into different 'types' is important from a governance and a research point of view. However, it is important to be critical of classificatory systems as 'neither language nor categories are neutral and therefore deserve to be assessed critically' (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020, p. 21). Classificatory systems of migration abound – from analytical categories used by academics and policymakers, to administrative and discursive categories (*ibid.*). Theorists have also called for typologies based on development, i.e., from less developed for Southern countries to countries of the North (Logan, 1992; Gould, 1998). In this section, we consider broad mobilities that involve a change of

8 https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/unicef_ts5.pdf.

residence undertaken across state borders. In doing so, we also see how broad brushstroke categories fail to take into account complexities of lived experience.

Internal, international and transnational

International migration entails moving beyond administrative borders of nation-states, while internal migration is the movement of people within a country. This is not only a methodological acceptance of the nation-state (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003), but involves administrative processes and a ‘coalescence of factors that condition people’s lives’ (Vertovec, 2007, p. 1024). Even though internal migration is treated as categorically distinct, it involves a number of the same drivers as international movement (de Haas *et al.*, 2020). Furthermore, several researchers argue that in order to understand mobilities or movement better, it is important to be cognisant of the overlaps between these categories. Borders are fluid and subject to bilateral treaties (for e.g., between Turkey and Belgium), transnational agreements (e.g. EU Free Movers) and other shifts, so movement across international borders might be administratively similar to internal movement and yet have hurdles faced by international migrants (Gal, 2012; Madanipour *et al.*, 2008). Given rapid urbanisation, common sub-cultures, and ‘modernity’, the change incurred in international movement can be less profound than internal movement (Appadurai, 2000). Another aspect is that one form of migration often precedes the other. Thus, it is important to think of them as ‘functionally interrelated’ (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020; Skeldon, 2017; Salt & Koser, 1997). Another significant category of research in this regard is that of transnational mobilities (Sheller & Urry, 2006). To move beyond the idea of settlement and territoriality to a more nuanced idea of urban mobilities (Collins, 2011). ‘Movement and settlement across borders but in which individuals build multiple networks of connection to their country of origin, while at the same time, settling in a new country’ (Fouron & Glick-Schiller, 2001, p. 60).

Temporary and permanent

As per international norms, a person has to spend a certain amount of time in another country before being classified as a migrant, typically between three to 12 months.⁹ A temporary migrant spends less than a year in a country, while a permanent migrant stays on for more than a year. Temporary migration includes seasonal workers, transit migrants as well as posted workers. Research on temporary migration considers issues such as precarity, policy and lack of citizenship/ rights. Ruhs (2013) notes that immigration programs that target low skilled migrants restrict more rights. Though permanent migration implies a stable state, long-term migration is also precarious, and rights are accorded officially but not always socially (Madanipour *et al.*, 1998). Studies also show that temporary migration often leads to long-term residence in a country and this interplay should be studied. To do so alerts us to how and why temporary migrants, seasonal labourers and guest workers are seen as undeserving of citizenship and granted limited rights, versus the more ‘wanted’ highly skilled permanent migrants (Ruhs, 2013; Robertson, 2013). Such discourse often hides the policies and administrative hurdles faced by both parties. This categorisation is compounded by groups such as international students and employees of international firms posted for longer than a year and ‘guest workers’ who are bonded to one employer by contract. Koser and Salt (1997, p. 299) propose looking at labour migration and skill as part of a broader ‘geography of the movement of expertise’.

Voluntary and involuntary/forced migration

This typology, perhaps more than any other, has given rise to a semantic debate; are those who move due to extreme circumstances ‘forced’ or do they have a certain element of agency (Bartram, 2015)? This category of migration includes: refugees (‘persons who are outside their country ...[for fear of] persecution, conflict, generalised violence, or other circumstances’ - UN) (*ibid.*); asylum seekers

⁹ <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions>.

(someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed – UNHCR);¹⁰ those with a protected status (those with temporary protection/stay agreements)¹¹ and, a more recent category of internally displaced people (displaced within national borders for reasons of armed conflict, generalised violence or human rights violence). There has also been a growing call for those who are displaced due to environmental factors to be considered ‘refugees’. Development-induced displacement is the largest single form of forced migration, leading to the internal displacement of an estimated 10-15 million people per year (de Haas *et al.*, 2020). This displacement mainly affects disempowered groups such as indigenous peoples, other ethnic minorities and slum dwellers (Cernaia & McDowell, 2000 *cited in* de Haas *et al.*). Another strand of argument against the idea of forced/involuntary migration is the lack of agency attributed to those who move, as the most vulnerable populations are often unable to flee in exigent circumstances. Researchers warn against labelling migrations in neat categories. ‘Involuntary or forced movements of people are always only one aspect of much larger constellations of socio-political and cultural processes and practices’ (Malkki, 1995) and not taking this into consideration hampers research. Castles (2003) argues that economic migration and forced migration are closely linked, with the latter an ‘expression of global inequalities and social crises’ in a bipolar world order (2003, p. 17).

Regular (migration with papers) and irregular (undocumented migration)

Drawing on the idea of ‘migration project’ (Timmerman *et al.*, 2015), we consider certain types of voluntary migration as projects that are shaped as much by aspiration as by external factors (Collins & Carling, 2018). These include, labour migration, education, family migration and entrepreneurial migration – these are administrative categories as well (discussed later). Despite the seemingly straightforward administrative and legal processes, several underlying assumptions have been challenged by researchers. Labour migration is not always an economic choice but is based on several factors (such as rights and social opportunities) in the host countries. Education for migration (Robertson, 2013; Hawthorne, 2010) is another area where one form of migration is often tied into another. Seasonal labour and temporary migrants are often on bonded contracts with limited rights (Ruhs, 2015), blurring the lines between forced and aspirational migration. ‘In reality, Northern governments in Japan, the USA, Italy and elsewhere tacitly use asylum and undocumented migration as a way of meeting labour needs without publicly admitting the need for unskilled migration’ writes Castles (2003, p. 16). Madanipour *et al.* (2008) note that for EU migrants from Eastern Europe, while the migration is legal and by choice, social acceptance and professional trajectories are marred by discrimination and precarity. These routes of migration are shaped just as much by broader global processes as individual and meso level factors, for instance, skills that contribute to the global market are prioritised in international mobility (Freitas & Levotino, 2012). Following the economic crisis of 2008, family migration and education migration increased while the number of labour migrants reduced. Some countries also grant large investors ‘golden visas’, so they count in citizen registers but don’t actually stay in the country (Lanzieri/Eurostat, 2018) - creating a small but theoretically significant gap as money and citizenship are directly equated together. Sassen (1991) locates the international division of labour within the broader context of global economic restructuring, Koser & Salt (1997) call for research to think of ‘a new international spatial division of labour’. Kofman (2000) analyses how the intersection of skill and gender renders highly skilled female migrants invisible. Despite seeming clarity in migration categories, labour, family and education migrants are often interlinked, with their choices and outcomes shaped and determined by a vortex of factors.

Migrants without papers are commonly referred to as ‘illegal’ migrants, including refugees without paperwork, undocumented migrants, and other migrants who do not have the legal right to residence in the country they reside in. In some countries they are also referred to as *sans papiers*. Kubal (2013) notes that according to human jurisprudence no one can be ‘illegal’ (cited in De Haas *et al.*, 2020,

¹⁰ <https://www.unhcr.org/asylum-seekers.html>.

¹¹ <https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/44937/migrant-definition>.

p. 33). A large strand of research around the legality of the terminology and related rights (in some countries they can work and even pay taxes even though their stay is unauthorised), also examines the moral implications of such labelling - treating vulnerable populations as illicit or criminal. De Genoa (2002) argues that the socio-political processes that create this category of 'illegal' itself should be examined. Demographic studies indicate that sometimes gaps in paperwork and visa overstay create categories of 'illegal' migrants who might otherwise be legal in other categories (i.e., as labour migrants or family migrants, etc.). Labour market studies have shown that such migrants are forced into precarious jobs with low pay and negligent work conditions (Castles, 2003).

4.1.2 Going beyond the registered drivers and typologies: an analysis of the differentiation of migration

In this section, we move away from established migration categories to more recently emerging modalities such as lifestyle migrants, return migration, forced migration and environmental migration. While these categories include aspects of mobilities that have long been in existence, they have hitherto been obfuscated by discussions on larger flows. It is essential to analyse these patterns, motivations and modalities of migration that, according to Van Hear (2010), are encapsulated in the concepts of 'mixed migration' or 'super diversity' by Vertovec (2007, p. 1025). This approach emphasises the dynamics among the increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, trans-nationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified migrants. Most destination countries today see the simultaneous arrival of many different kinds of migrants, identified as permanent or temporary workers, students, wealthy investors, lifestyle migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and families among others (Betts, 2013; Bhabha & Schmidt, 2008). It is necessary to clearly define these categories and labels used to explain the composition of migration flows (Huete *et al.*, 2013). Some categories reflect the background of the authors, a theoretical approach, a methodological specialism (O'Reilly, 2012) or describe the direction of a migration flow, such as in the case of North-South migration (Van der Geest, 2011). Others, such as refugees, asylum seekers, displaced persons, or climatic refugees are a direct interpretation of policies and legal definitions (Marfleet, 2006; Castles, 2003). Scholars also use nationality to define a type of migration flow, as in the case of Mexican migration (Hellman, 2008) or specific terms, like labour and economic migration for a particular trend.

With this in mind, in the next section we take an in-depth look at some of these new types of migration: first we offer a detailed description, then we analyse existing theories, and finally present a case study.

4.1.2.1 Refugees and asylum-seekers

Typically driven by the economic and political situation, these flows are usually limited to specific countries suffering from long-term civil conflicts, political instability, violence, repression and the proliferation of terrorism and other sources of population displacement. Refugee status is obtained through the legal process of applying for asylum. If the asylum application is refused, the person will be placed in a category usually called economic immigrant, by decision and definition of the state where asylum application was submitted. Asylum, which at the beginning of the 1990s began to take on larger migratory flows, is one of the main features of the third post-war migration phase (1990-2002). According to the Declaration of Human Rights (1948), every person has the right to seek protection outside his or her country of origin if they are fleeing conflict or life-threatening persecution. The reasons may be religious, race, gender, sexual orientation, social group, nationality or political opinion. As asylum-seekers cannot return to their country of origin for fear of persecution, they can apply for asylum in the country where they are. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) refer to individuals or, at times, communities moving within a country due to conflict or natural disaster. If they cross international borders, they can become asylum seekers, and if asylum is granted under the

UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), they become known as refugees. Over the last decade, forced migration flows grew substantially, reaching a record high. Most of this increase occurred between 2012 and 2015, mainly due to the Syrian conflict, but also due to other conflicts in different areas of the world or due to environmental disasters. The Syrian conflict has displaced more than half of the country's population and, by the end of 2016 had generated 5.5 million refugees, 6.3 million internally displaced persons and more than 184,000 asylum-seekers (IOM, 2016a). The other side of the 2015 refugee crisis was its impact on European states. The main flows came from Syria and Afghanistan came through the 'Balkan route' where they were often victims of rejections and violence; other flows, mostly women and unaccompanied minors, used the 'Central Mediterranean route' to reach Italy and applied for asylum (European Commission, 2017b; IOM, 2016d). Several refugees also used the 'Western Mediterranean route' to reach Spain (UNHCR, 2017d).

In Africa, forced migration flows are related to internal conflicts such as the Somali Civil War, the conflict in the Republic of Congo and other situations that have caused destabilisation, forcing millions of people to move to other countries (UNHCR, 2017a). The main forced migration flows in the Americas are Mexican asylum seekers on the US-Mexico border in El Paso and Venezuelans fleeing the ongoing crisis in their country. Despite years of intervention to combat drug trafficking, violence in Mexico remains at a humanitarian crisis level. Mexican people have fled the country and sought protection especially in the United States and Canada (Cabot, 2014). The crisis started in 2008 and Venezuela became the second most violent country of South of America due to political polarisation, institutional deterioration, the continuous rise in inflation and high levels of insecurity (Briceño-León, 2008). The flows from Venezuela are directed to Canada, the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, among others (IOM, 2018).

Looking for a unified theory explaining forced/humanitarian migration

In academic literature, refugee migration represents a historical phenomenon as individuals have been moving to avoid dangerous situations for a long time. This type of mobility tends to be seen as the result of a structural, social, political or economic anomaly under the umbrella of migration phenomena and represents a theoretical challenge for scholars, because of the lack of consistency among theories (Black, 1991). Given the peculiarity of the context in which the migratory action develops, the refugee label is often confused at the legal and social science level (Hamlin, 2017). From an analytical point of view, the construction of categories helps to know the reasons for movements, if there are opportunities or barriers to integration in the destination country and if there are circular movements along the way (Fitzgerlad, 2014). The categorisation of this mobility, especially at the legal level, is relevant for refugee and asylum seekers in order to be admitted to the new territory but, it may be unfavourable when the identity is stigmatised and impedes belonging (Fitzgerlad, 2014).

Most of time, the criterion used to distinguish refugees and asylum seekers from migrants revolve around political and economic terms because of the context. The line between political and economic repression can become blurred, as many refugees are classified as economic migrants. In addition, environmental change can be the cause of mass migrations, a variation of migration usually ignored by contemporary definitions. Assuming that individuals are dynamic, and that their goals change over time (Crawley *et al.*, 2016), the use of economic and political factors as the main vectors of the migration process limits the understanding of other factors that can explain mobility and its constraints.

At the theoretical level, given the complex nature of contemporary migratory processes, a theory of migration should not focus on a single element of analysis, but incorporate a variety of perspectives and assumptions (Taylor *et al.* 1993: 432). Wood (1994: 608) pointed out that a comprehensive refugee theory is difficult to formulate because forced migrations involve complex decision making processes at the household level and reflect multi-level causal factors.

The pioneering theories analysing refugee mobility were the macro theories that underscore structural conditions and emphasise push and pull factors of migration. Push factors include conditions

such as unemployment, low wages or low per capita income compared to the country of destination, migration legislation and the labour market situation in the receiving countries (Boswell, 2002). The economic factor has also been analysed related to violence, as well as how individual interactions affect out-migration over time. Violence, in its most extreme form and at the macro level, can affect the decision to leave one's place of origin in search of a better future elsewhere (Alvarado & Massey, 2010; Bohra-Mishra & Massey, 2011).

According to Stark (1991), refugee mobility is a hard case for NELM to study, because this approach is based on the idea that households allocate labour to different markets, manage risks of unemployment and other economic problems. The applicability of NELM to refugee migration is a question that requires more research (Fitzgerlad, 2014; Alvarado & Massey, 2010), and the management of risk by households represents a great perspective for future analysis. Davenport *et al.* (2003), with a study on a global database from 1964 to 1989 suggested that economic factors do not predict refugee migration or according to Moore and Shellman (2006) and Neumayer (2005) income and GDP per capita in the country of origin are negatively associated with refugee flows. The limit of macro-theories stems from the fact that they are not able to explain the persistence of voluntary migration despite changes in economic conditions or legislation in the host countries and they are also not able to explain why migration is taking place in certain places (Faist, 2001). The neo-classical theories of migration and the push and pull models have always been focused on the demands of the receiving countries, considering migrants as passive pawns. They fail to account for factors from the country of origin which trigger migration or the decision making process of immigrants (Vella, 2013). The mesotheories do not pay attention to push and pull factors and analyse the concepts of migration flows and states in terms of systems and networks (Bilsborrow & Zlotnik, 1994). Finally, the micro theories focused on factors that can influence individual decisions to migrate according to the analysis of costs and benefits. In this case, the costs could include the financial and psychological resources invested in moving and integrating in the country of destination, while benefits include improved living conditions in the destination country.

According to Vella (2013), the missing link to explain this type of mobility is characterised by the error in attributing migration to mobility for economic purposes and by not recognising that migrants are not passive subjects of migration but are actors who act according to their context and needs. The lack of a clear cut delineation between voluntary and forced migration has also been observed by Crawley, Castles, and Loughna, (2003) who stated that, 'Even among those who are fleeing violence or persecution and are therefore in need of protection, there is evidence that some, although not all, asylum seekers have a degree of control over where they go and how they travel' (Castles *et al.*, 2003: 29). Furthermore, the theory of forced migration must integrate economic and non-economic theories, as well as provide the link between micro and macro theories, and naturally, integrate agency and culture into migration theory (de Haas, 2014). Vella (2013) pointed out a unifying theory of forced migration based on the theory of 'rational choice' and the 'push-pull model'. On one hand, the rational choice theory, used in combination with the concept of migration, explains the consequence of human mobility resulting from the expression of the choice of the migrant to decide where to live (de Haas, 2014). On the other, the push-pull model will be valid if utilised to explain the relation between positive and negative freedom (Vella, 2013). According to Berlin (2013), negative freedom coincides with the push factor, the constraint to freedom of action. Another aspect that should be considered in the analysis of the phenomenon is the condition of 'immobility' as an adaptation to the new situation. In violent contexts not all people use migration as a solution, some have no resources to migrate, so they are forced to stay in the context of origin (Fitzgerlad, 2014). According to Lubkemann (2008: 454), the implicit conflation of migration with displacement, not only renders invisible people who suffer a form of 'displacement in place' through involuntary immobilisation, but also distorts the analysis of migration experience. Immobility should exist taking a 'type' of migration, in which a particular relationship between migration and displacement is already implicitly presumed and imagined in particular ways (Lubkemann, 2008).

Case in point - 2: The refugee migration and asylum seekers crisis in Europe

In recent years, phenomena such as civil war, conflicts, terrorism, deterioration of internal security and the increase of poverty has triggered massive population departures in many countries. In 2015 and 2016 Europe experienced the largest inflow of refugees since World War II, where more than 1.2 million asylum-seekers submitted asylum claims (Eurostat, 2017a) compared to 625,000 in 2014 (Eurostat, 2015, p. 4). The migration crisis affected Europe and especially southern destination countries, revealing the most critical aspects of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Many refugees seeking protection status in Europe came from Africa, mainly from Libya, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia, but the largest group was from war-torn countries, such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Eurostat 2017b). In Europe the signs of a looming crisis were already visible in the years before 2015, as the situation in Syria and neighbouring areas had been deteriorating since 2013, and the conflict and violence persisted in Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen, and Nigeria (Triandafyllidou, 2018). In 2013, Italy strengthened the Mare Nostrum search and rescue operation that in 2014 was replaced by the European operation Triton. In 2015, to deal with this flow of unprecedented magnitude the 'European Migration Agenda' was drawn up (Porras Ramírez, 2017). Among the different reform measures introduced were the hotspots or critical points. These comprised specialists from different Member States, as well as staff from the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex and Europol to assist border states (COM., 2015, 673). The Commission identified other priorities that could make European asylum policy more effective (COM., 2016, 197). Another key aspect of European foreign policy was the negotiations with Turkey to limit the refugee flows (Triandafyllidou, 2018).

As mentioned above, in the case of forced migration, often only the economic and political dimensions are analysed. This was seen during the Mediterranean migration crisis: we have been aware since 2011 of certain events that could have led to the crisis, but a multidisciplinary approach has not been taken into account. In relation to the forced migration generated by the migration crisis that broke out in 2015, the lack of a unified approach left other elements uncovered, since strategies and measures were used just to 'manage' the humanitarian emergency, not to understand it. The attention of scholars has been focused on crisis management at different levels: stopping the migration emergency, identifying asylum seekers and political refugees and distributing quotas of immigrants among the European states. People who have been forced to emigrate to Europe to seek asylum and protection have been considered victims and passive actors of the migration crisis. In this case, it was taken for granted that the political and economic elements were at the basis of the migration crisis, without thinking about a multidimensional and multilevel approach to the phenomenon, in which factors such as agency, culture and the individual's decision making process are also taken into account.

4.1.2.2 Return migration

In the context of international migration, the return represents the power of the ties migrants have with the places of origin and destination, encouraging the construction of social spaces that cross borders, not only geographically but also culturally, socially, politically and religiously (de Haas *et al.*, 2019). The return to the origin country is a consequence of exogenous factors such as wars, political reasons, changes in economic development, changes in economic and social conditions in the host country, the lack of integration into the host society, the availability of services or products, personal circumstances such as illness and death in the family (Palo & Longino, 2001). Furthermore, motivation for return can be explained in terms of the lack of motivation to stay in the host country, the sense of failure to achieve the expected outcome of a successful migration project (Cassarino, 2004). It is a strategy to move temporarily, accumulate and acquire new skills and knowledge to use in the home country (Dustmann & Glitz, 2011). Even if spontaneous return migration is a resource for origin countries, there is a decrease in terms of return migration flows that probably can be explained by two factors. The first is linked to the relative deterioration of the socioeconomic and political climate in host countries; the second concerns relative change in the destination country and the development of new migration strategies (Flahaux, 2015).

Currently, the transnational approach has changed the concept of return in terms of the migration being temporary and circular. In this sense, return does not only mean 'permanent return', but can represent a transitory phase underlying the concept of continuity and the link between countries of origin and destination. For this reason, the study of return migration and its impact should also appraise the social, human and economic capital accumulated by the migrant in the country of destination once back home, as well as the channelling of productive remittances.

Return and reintegration are perceived differently depending on the countries of origin and destination. In the destination country the return is mostly understood in terms of controlling migration and preventing irregular migration; while in the countries of origin, the return receives low priority, in particular involuntary return, or return due to failed migration or integration elsewhere.

Generally, people who have returned and are highly educated can benefit more from the skills they acquired abroad, than the unskilled (Wahba, 2015). The rates of spontaneous return migration are high among skilled and educated migrants, especially for students who return after their studies abroad or workers who have accumulated human capital and have acquired skills. For example, in the case of Moroccans or Egyptians who return, the level of education is definitely higher than that of the population of origin (Wahba, 2007; 2015). Wages are also different among return migrants and people who have not migrated, because of the accumulation of human capital abroad (Reinhold & Thom, 2013); in West Africa, for example, the wage is different only for migrants returning from OECD countries.

Return migration is also common among retirees and involves a complex relation of structural, social and individual factors (Cassarino, 2004). One of the main reasons for returning after retirement migration is a decline in health, an emergency or a disability problem (Palo & Longino, 2001).

Return migration and conceptual difficulties

Return migration is part of the complexity of human displacement. The myth of return reflects a demographic pattern: most international migrants move with an intention to return to their country of origin, but actual return typically occurs at a much lower rate (Carling, 2015). The first limit of the theoretical approach towards return migration is its definition, since the migratory movements that could fit under this generic denomination are highly varied. According to Bovenkerk (2012), the concept of return migration should only be used when people return to their country, or region, of origin for the first time. When they move to a second destination, the term that should be used is transit; when they migrate back to the same destination, after having returned for the first time, it is re-emigration; when people migrate to a new destination after having returned, it is a new form of migration, so emigration is appropriate. Finally, movements back and forth between two places, with more than one return, represent circular migration (Bovenkerk, 2012).

There is no general theory of return migration because, on the one hand, it is considered a special case of migration with opposing interpretations about it (Constant & Massey, 2002; Fokkema & de Haas, 2011); and on the other, migration theories ignore the concept of return completely, or consider it a failure or success of the migration process (Cassarino, 2004).

Constant and Massey (2002) observed that the relationship between the presence of family in the country of origin and an immigrant's decision to return to their homeland depends on the initial reasons for migration. According to Neoclassical theory, if people migrate on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis in order to maximise their income, expecting the highest returns on their human capital investments, they are expected to be more willing to endure relatively long separations, until proper arrangements can be made for family reunification (de Haas *et al.*, 2014; Todaro, 1976). If migrants fail to find a job and to improve their lives through migration, they are more likely to return (de Haas *et al.*, 2014). Return is seen as the consequence or the result of failure abroad to find a place in receiving societies and reflects the inability to benefit from the migration process (Cassarino, 2004; Constant & Massey, 2002). On the other hand, according to the New Economics of Labour Migration (Stark, 1991), if migrants set an objective of saving a certain amount of money before returning home, having family members at home encourages them to work longer abroad. In the event of a decision on family reunification, bringing the spouse and children of working age to the immigration country might increase the chances of reaching savings target more quickly and, thus, of shortening the stay abroad (González Ferrer, 2007; Battistella, 2018).

Nevertheless, as suggested by de Haas and Fokkema (2011), neither of these theories takes into account the initial motivation and the strategies of migrants that may change during their time abroad.

Generally, the interest in managing this part of migration will depend on the place of origin or destination. Where the flow began, a massive return can be a problem that strains the economic capacity of a given geographical area to reintegrate former migrants; in the place of destination it is considered a solution, which alleviates part of their economic problems by lowering the demand on the labour market (Jáuregui & Recaño, 2014). Return migration is often presented as the reverse of family reunification: immigrants who decide to stay permanently are the ones who end up bringing their relatives to the host country (González-Ferrer, 2007). According to González-Ferrer (2007) establishing a symmetrical relationship between return migration and family reunification means that migration is a one shot move where immigrants stay or return, but nothing else happens in between.

Finally, a common misunderstanding in policy debates and policy planning is to think of return migration as a homogeneous phenomenon. Many analyses often ignore that just as there are different types of migration and different reasons behind the decisions made by migrants, there are also different types of return (Kuschminder, 2017). The return of different populations such as permanent or temporary migrants, refugees or asylum seekers, students, second-generation migrants, short-term returnees for health reasons or for employment, those displaced by political or environmental crisis, and those repatriated because of irregular migration must be addressed in different ways (Battistella, 2018).

Case in point - 3: Assisted voluntary return migration flows

The long-term consequences of the economic crisis of 2007 and the high unemployment rates within immigrant communities represent a motivation and a condition that encouraged both spontaneous and assisted voluntary return migration flows. The countries of origin and destination perceive return and reintegration differently. In the destination country return is mostly understood in terms of controlling migration and preventing irregular migration; while in the countries of origin, return receives low priority.

Assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) are programmes provided and managed by IOM, governments and, in some cases, also by non-governmental organisations and local authorities, to help migrants in a vulnerable situation in the country of residence, including people with health-related needs, victims of trafficking (VoTs), victims of economic crisis, unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) (IOM, 2018). The assisted voluntary return of migrants in vulnerable situations requires extensive preparation of the return and reintegration process, as well as a high level of coordination and cooperation with partners to ensure tailor-made solutions.

The largest assisted return flows occurred during two distinct historical periods: the first refers to migration returns during the period of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/2008; the second, with the migration and refugee crisis of 2011. Between 2017 and 2018, voluntary assisted return migration flows have decreased for several reasons, ranging from reduced asylum flows to changes in national migration and asylum policies. According to IOM (2018), in 2018 most of the people who returned were male (76%) and female (24%), between 18 and 24 (22%) and the 35 and 49 years old (20%). The rate of children in assisted voluntary migration has decreased.

The data available about these programmes is limited, which makes it difficult to estimate the immigrant population. In Spain, as suggested by Parella (2014), the only source that provides data of this type is the Self-Sustainable Variation Statistics. As a result, without access to data, an irregular parallel flow is more likely to occur outside of institutional return programmes. Assisted Voluntary Return Programmes may have been successful or fail. The failure of such programmes is caused by a lack of incentives, the rights the migrant loses if he or she decides to take part in the programme, as well as the worse situation in the countries of origin. One of the elements that should be taken into account when designing policies and actions for assisted voluntary return is precisely the deployment of measures that accompany the returnees in a continuous and coordinated way after they arrive in the country of origin.

Any return policy is condemned to failure if it does not include transnational programmes that coordinate both the countries of origin and destination (also taking into consideration the opinions of the returnees) to manage returns from a complex and global perspective (Parella, 2014). Managing programmes and successfully ensuring the return of people is not always easy, because the programmes do not contemplate sufficient follow-up mechanisms and support actions to guarantee the success of the return, their sustainability and scope depend on the action protocols of the associations that manage them. Unfortunately, there is little analysis on the monitoring, implementation, results and effectiveness of the various assisted voluntary return programmes (IOM, 2006). According to the European Migration Network (EMN, 2009), the monitoring process has the greatest variability between organisations. Thus, while some entities simply verify that the person has arrived at their destination, others offer more continuous follow-up protocols. In some cases, such as that of ACOBE or the NGO, América-España Solidaridad y Cooperación (AESCO), the destination countries (Bolivia and Colombia, respectively) have the infrastructure and technical and human resources to carry out post-return monitoring, which includes emotional, psychological and socio-labour support (Parella, 2014).

4.1.2.3 Environmental/Climate migration

Migration induced by climate factors has been presented as a new issue in the migration field and as a future trend in research (Piguet *et al.*, 2011). Nevertheless, for centuries, often seasonally, people have been moving in response to changes in the environment, so this kind of migration is not entirely a new phenomenon. Piguet *et al.*, (2011) pointed out that climate change and environmental factors would affect migration directly and indirectly as a result of the intensification of natural disasters, the increase in strength and frequency of tropical cyclones, heavy rains, floods and the consequences of rising temperatures. Other impacts that may reduce agricultural productivity and raise food commodity prices include droughts and desertification, public health and water availability, rising sea levels which make coastal areas uninhabitable, the competition for natural resources, which would increase tensions and even produce conflicts (Porter *et al.*, 2014; Mastrorillo *et al.*, 2016). In this sense, climate change does not directly displace people, but it produces effects that make it difficult to survive in the country of residence (Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009). All countries can be affected by the adversity caused by climate change, however developing countries are especially vulnerable for two reasons: the economic factor and the level of vulnerability. These elements are correlated with the risk of exposure to the shock, the level of poverty, the social structure, the diversification of assets and income, and the political situation, all of which play a decisive role in both the risk and response to natural disasters.

In 1985, El Hinnawi first introduced the paradigm of the environmental refugee, as subsequent researchers warned of mass population displacements owing to climate change. In the early 1990s the first publications related to mass displacement due to the climate emergency appeared (Myers, 1993; El-Hinnawi, 1985). Nowadays, the literature has addressed environmental drivers of human migration both from a theoretical perspective (McLeman, 2013b; Marchiori & Schumacher, 2011; Kniveton *et al.*, 2012) and from economic and statistical models (Piguet, 2010; Barrios *et al.*, 2006). In addition to the main causes of forced migration mentioned above, there is also climate change or forced migration due to environmental factors. Climate refugees are people who are forced to leave their country of origin due to sudden or long-term changes to their local environment. These changes could compromise the well-being or livelihood of the society at risk.

Migration flows caused by climate change or environmental factors depend on the seriousness of the disaster and its duration. Some natural disasters can be short-term and cause internal (rural-urban) displacement, usually without crossing state borders and often people are able to eventually return home (Mastrorillo *et al.*, 2016). Generally, long-term disasters initially drive internal migration that consequently leads to an increase in international migration (Marchiori *et al.*, 2012). Martin *et al.* (2017) noted a complex interplay of factors that lead to the mobility of vulnerable populations, while Lubkemann (2008) argues that the most vulnerable are often least likely to move. Carling and Collins (2018) trace the growing interest in the intersection between aspiration and external drivers to their complex and evident intersections in environmental migration. Researchers caution against the blanket use of environment as a factor for migration as it removes the onus from existing structures to

improve the conditions of vulnerable populations (De Haas et al., 2020; Castles, 2007). Instead, Faist and Schade (2013) suggest thinking in terms of a climate-migration nexus. To ‘focus on the social frameworks, the processes and consequences of migration in the context of climate change’ and to consider the ‘manifold structural social inequalities in and between national states’ (Faist & Schade, 2013, p. 4).

According to Mbaye (2017), natural disasters have increased the migration flows from developing countries to the six main OECD receiving countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the US. China, India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Nigeria were the five countries with the highest number of movements due to environmental disasters (IDMC & NRC, 2013). Forced migration flows due to climate change will exacerbate many humanitarian crises, conflicts and may lead to more people being on the move. There are many examples to take into account: the impact of climate change in the Sahel region or in Somalia, which have experienced drought conditions, caused an exodus of people displaced to Kenya and Ethiopia; the desertification phenomenon in East Africa and the Horn of Africa (UNHCR, 2012); and the hurricanes in the Americas and Asia. Migrants from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador have had to escape from violence, economic instability and government persecution, but also to escape the effects of climate change, including drought (El Niño), floods, increasing temperatures and the rise of sea-level. These factors, combined with a lack of food, are increasing internal and external displacement. A future problem, related with climate change are rising sea levels that will put over three quarters of the people living in the Global South (1.9 billion) at risk, principally in South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, areas that account for over 90% of the world’s low-elevation coastal zone rural poor (Barbier, 2015; Tol, 2007).

The missing link between migration theory, climate change and environmental factors

The possible links between migration, climate change and other environmental factors have sparked a heated debate between environmental scientists and migration specialists (Bettini & Andersson, 2014; Gemenne, 2011). Environmentalists state that the effects of global warming will lead directly to massive population displacements. They call for action and want to intervene to prevent the displacement of people, stressing the negative meaning of it. In contrast, several migration researchers have pointed out that migration is driven by a set of interrelated factors and cannot be considered a causal phenomenon. There are several points that should be taken into account when analysing migration due to climate change or environmental factors.

First of all, there is a gap between migration theories and the phenomenon of climate migration that can be found in the lack of a solid and unified theoretical approach. Although studies on climate migration have increased, they are still not able to produce such an approach (Tacoli, 2011b). Most of existing studies analyse the relationship between climate change and migration using historical data, without producing future projections.

Secondly, today it is increasingly common to apply the concept of vulnerability to environmental threats, where some groups will be able to deal with the consequences of natural disasters, while others will suffer the collapse of the social order and the escalation of violence (Beck, 2010: 258). Resilience refers to a positive form of adaptation, which is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbances and reorganise itself, while retaining essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedback (Walker *et al.*, 2002; Folke, 2006: 259). Resilience assumes that there are two separate sub-systems: the social and the environmental, which can affect each other, as in the case of some climate events or environmental factors that can alter the normal dynamics of society or the societies within the affected ecosystems (Holling, 2001). In any case, migration does not necessarily have to be the first or the only adaptive strategy chosen or, indeed, the most appropriate (Brown, 2008 cited in Gemenne & Blocher, 2017).

Case in point - 4: Growing climate-related displacement in Somalia

Somalia is experiencing significant rates of migration due to extreme weather events that can be directly linked to climate change. The persistent drought in East Africa since 2011 (with fluctuations) has devastated Somalia. During the later wave, which started in 2015 reached a peak in late 2016 and 2017, more than 800,000 Somalis fled their homes in search of water and livelihood. Even today, drought is a harsh reality of loss and survival shared by many Somalis. The latest drought hit just as the country was starting to recover from the drought from 2016 to 2017, which had led to the displacement inside Somalia of over a million people. Somalia is still the most affected African country with more than 900,000 displacements associated with drought in 2018 and 160,000 newly displaced people in 2019. In terms of the number of displacements caused by floods, Somalia was the second most affected African country (289,000 new displacements). Even as the country grappled with the drought, the above-average rainfall in April and May (2018) caused flooding in nine of country's 18 regions, many of which remain in a protracted state of displacement. Furthermore, as reported by the UNHCR (2019), worsening drought in many parts of the country has been caused by below average rains during the 'Gu' (April-June 2019) and 'Deyr' (October – December 2018) rainy seasons.

Natural and climate-related disasters including drought and resulting lack of livelihoods and floods are additional complex and interlinked drivers of displacement. As of today, more than 2.7 million Somalis are internally displaced due to armed conflict, insecurity and drought. According to UNHCR (2020), more than 300,000 additional people were forced to flee their homes in 2019 for an active search for safety, food, water, aid and work mostly in urban areas. Only in 2020, more than 220,000 Somalis have become internally displaced, including 137,000, due to conflict (UNHCR, 2020). People who are already displaced because of conflict and violence are also affected by the drought, at times disproportionately.

Since the civil war that began in the late 1980s, Somalia has been fragmented among competing local interest groups, with its natural resources vulnerable to theft by foreign interests and over-exploitation by local ones.

The successive extreme weather events have caused hunger and shortages throughout the country but especially in the rural areas, where consecutive seasons of poor rainfall and low river water levels have led to near total crop failures, reduced rural employment opportunities, widespread shortage of water and pasture – with consequent increases in livestock deaths. It is not only the agriculture and livestock sectors that have been affected. Somalia's rich fishery resources are being systematically looted by unlicensed fishing boats, and its forests stripped for export-oriented charcoal production. No national policies or laws are currently being enforced that could give hope for improvement of the situation.

Decades of climatic shocks and conflict have left more than 2.6 million people internally displaced. As of July 2019, an estimated 5.4 million people, including an estimated 2.7 million children, are likely to be food insecure and 2.2 million of these are in severe conditions needing immediate emergency assistance unless aid is urgently scaled up, with more than half a million on the brink of famine. 4.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. An estimated 300,000 children under age 5 are malnourished, including 48,000 who are severely malnourished and face a high risk of disease and death.

When all these elements - fragile and significantly degraded environmental resources, food and water shortage and being a conflict zone - are put together, the future of Somalis, looks very worrisome. Somalia is a country of origin, transit, and destination for many migration flows in and out of the East and Horn of Africa region. Experts confirm that Somalia, and in general the Horn of Africa, will continue to be heavily affected by the effects of climate change combined with armed conflict and protracted displacement.

Nevertheless, the decision to migrate represents a powerful adaptation strategy for populations faced with environmental and climate changes. The use of resilience could be perceived as the ability to employ adaptation strategies successfully; but it also implies that societies can be conceptualised as functional organisms from internal conflicts to their borders, that respond to external disorders, not only environmental but also political and economic (Miller *et al.*, 2011).

One interesting point at the theoretical level is the constructivist current of environmental sociology, an approach interested in understanding how consciousness and motivations, that mobilise social action, are constructed as a social fact (Lezama, 2008). The aim of environmental sociology is to understand the nexus between the transformation of scientific theories, the laws of nature and the different visions of sustainability that are decanted into social life (Leff, 2011). Nevertheless, the complexity of the relationship between environmental factors and migration, the lack of scientific knowledge in establishing predictions with no margin of error regarding the function of climate change, the unpredictability of human behaviour, the changes in demographic evolution, the dependence on technology shows that pure sociological theory alone is not enough, we need to go further towards a multidimensional vision of the phenomenon.

4.1.2.4 Lifestyle migration

Due to globalisation and modernisation, the impact of migration on human well-being can be seen as a hot topic. The notion of lifestyle is a result of the emergence of contemporary consumer society, a life project for the individual and a part of the reflexive project of the self (Giddens, 1991). This concept has been developed to explain a new stage in migration dynamics symptomatic of choices and individual trajectories. It reflects a suggestion that lifestyle migrants prefer alternative ways of life, rejecting some over others.

Specifically, the term lifestyle migration has been used to refer to the relative economic privilege of individuals in the developed world who take the decision to migrate, considering specific factors such as the relative cost of living, pace of life, health benefits and feeling of community (Benson & O'Reilly, 2009). Lifestyle migrants are considered privileged individuals who can use their capital to make it possible to reach their life goals in a new destination (Benson, O'Reilly & Osbaldiston, 2014; Knowles & Harper, 2009). Lifestyle migration incorporates different forms of mobility, such as international retirement migration, second-home ownership, residential tourism and also mobile professionals (Favel, 2008; Benson & O'Reilly, 2009). Knowles and Harper (2009) have defined lifestyle migration as an alternative way of thinking about migration, recognising the diverse labels that have been used for migrants from economically developed countries, who are described as privileged, skilled, or transient migrants (Benson & O'Reilly, 2016; Knowles & Harper, 2009). Commonly, the lifestyle migration flows are directed from the North to the South, and the motives of migration are related to a search of warmer climate, a more relaxed way of life and lower costs of living, implying greater possibilities for consumption (Benson & O'Reilly, 2009; Castles & Miller, 2003).

Lifestyle migration is related to the improvement of life ranging from economic, employment and physical and mental well-being. In Europe, the group of Northern retirees moving to Southern countries is the most widely researched within the field of lifestyle migration. Lifestyle movers are, due to their economic resources, a desired group of individuals who are often welcomed by local communities. One of the different kinds of mobility can be seen with Northern Europeans in the Southern coast of Spain (Giner-Monfort, Hall & Betty, 2016). An interesting point to analyse is that in the destination country migrants may not have access to proper health insurance, or they may have problems accessing certain specific services. Other elements to take into account are social exclusion and a combination of adverse social situations, such as unemployment, unfavourable work situations, low earnings, poor health and/or living conditions, and the inability to build social networks. Of course, if people are not helped to live safely or comfortably, they may eventually return to the origin country. Other discrepancies may arise at the religious, social and political level.

From lifestyle migration to the ideal type of lifestyle concept

While other conceptual approaches to migration arise from the social and/or economic characteristics of a migrant group, such as labour migration or retirement migration, lifestyle presents a limited approach at theoretical empirical levels. According to Benson and O'Reilly (2016), lifestyle migration does not define or identify a particular group of migrants, it merely provides an analytical framework for understanding new forms of migration. Nevertheless, in many analyses of this phenomenon, lifestyle has been used without taking into account possible underlying social dynamics (Inglis, 2014). For instance, Knowles and Harper (2009: 11), highlighted the inseparability of economic factors, like income and quality of life. In the same vein, Huete *et al.*, (2013: 337) stated that there is an economic dimension in lifestyle migration, recognising that the changes of economic circumstances might have an impact on lifestyle migration. Cresswell (2010) argued that lifestyle migration depends on economic conditions, power, communication technology and networks.

In this sense, the fact that current research overlooks many social dynamics behind 'lifestyle' and a 'better way of life', it omits several crucial aspects, such as consumption and identity, possible social and economic tensions within the movement, attachment to the immaterial or non-human aspects of the place and issues of otherness within the community (Benson *et al.*, 2016).

From a sociological perspective there are no theories of migration to support the phenomenon of lifestyle migration. Assuming that it is a typical ideal form of action used to explain new forms of migration, according to Benson *et al.*, (2016), it refers to the concept of individualisation, although the individualism approach received harsh criticism in the literature. Firstly, class remains a significant structural force in society (Atkinson, 2007) and second, the ability to choose is a fundamental characteristic of the privileged class (Savage, 2000; Skeggs, 2004). The influence of structure on the decision to migrate is important in making sense of how lifestyle migration relates to wider landscapes of migration theory where structural and material conditions have been central in understanding migration and migrant lives.

Case in point - 5: British pensioners moving to Spain searching for the 'good life'

As previously stated, emigration for lifestyle reasons represents a stage within the migration phenomenon. From the theoretical framework this form of migration has grown as a result of very particular historical and material conditions, particularly globalisation, individualisation and the increased mobility, flexibility and wealth. Cases of lifestyle migration can only be understood by examining the decision to migrate within the context of the migrants' lives before migration, but also by taking into account the new quality of life enjoyed in the destination country. One form of lifestyle migration is represented by retirement migration, since retirees do not work and do not require particular conditions, they only want to enjoy life after so many years of work, searching for the 'good life' (Benson and O'Reilly, 2009). The most studied case of lifestyle migration is that of British pensioners in Spain (O'Reilly, 2012). Once in the country of destination, this type of migration is affected by certain dynamics and difficulties, such as social problems or health problems that sometimes push these flows to return to their countries of origin; on the other hand, some older people have settled into routines and practices that firmly embed them into their Spanish way of life and they cannot imagine returning to the United Kingdom (O'Reilly, 2012). However, O'Reilly (2012) pointed out that most British migrants in Spain failed to integrate well and formed liquid or transient communities with ethnic organisations and fluid connections that were dissolved if there was a possible return home.

Lifestyle migration arises from the historical and material conditions of modernity, and it presents a long growth project ahead. Analysing migration by lifestyle, it becomes clear that there are no migration theories able to interpret the phenomenon, but rather only the concepts that can frame it. It is important to assume that lifestyle migration cannot be categorised as a form of migration, but as a type of action. For this reason, in order to analyse it, future research projects should examine its impact on the origin and destination communities and examine more closely the interactions between migrants and hosts.

Individualism is a main component of lifestyle migration and it is related to a particular geographical and cultural context, which raises doubts whether the interpretation of this phenomenon from the perspective of the process of individualisation is not biased by Eurocentrism.

4.1.3 Drivers and policies nexus

Drawing on the idea of a migration and policy nexus (Aras & Mencutek, 2015), we explore how policies (migration, foreign, integration, labour market and development) intersect with drivers in myriad ways to sustain, limit or perpetuate migration. The links between migration decisions and outcomes can be shaped overtly and inadvertently by policies. For instance, we see earlier how the decision of migrants to return depends on conditions in host and origin countries and policies often fail to consider a broader picture. Ruhs (2013) sees migration policies as a 'trade-off', where migrants who are likely to bring in more capital (social and economic) are afforded more rights and ease of passage, thus 'migrant rights cannot be studied in isolation from admissions policies' (2013, p. 3). Massey (2015) calls attention to the impact of 'self-interested actions of politicians, pundits and bureaucrats who benefit from the social construction of and political manufacture of immigration crises when none really exist' (Massey, 2015, p. 279).

4.1.3.1 Migration policy and the labour market

As explored in previous sections, skilled migration is a key aspect of 21st century migration (Hawthorne, 2014). While migration policy and labour market policies are typically separate bodies of

polymaking and governance, the two are intertwined when it comes to labour migration, with ‘migrant rights as instruments of labour immigration policy’ (Ruhs, 2013, p. 3). It is also one aspect of the labour market that policymakers can control (Cobb, Clark & Connelly, 1997, p. 688). This impacts education policies as well, as some states see international students as ‘semi-finished skilled migrants’ and create education to immigration pathways (Robertson, 2013). Thus, policies become filtering mechanisms, with favourable conditions for selected migrants and precarious conditions for those seen as undesirable. As discussed earlier, Castles (2003) alerts us to how illegal, forced and undocumented migrants also play key roles in sustaining the labour markets of the global economy.

4.1.3.2 Migration policy and development

The link between migration and development has been a policy preoccupation. A large focus has been the ideas of (brain gain/brain drain/), especially in a globalised world. The idea of development also ties in with a policy-preoccupation of ‘return’ of migrants to their home country. We see in Section 4.1.2 that in reality the number of migrants who return is much lower than estimated (Carling, 2015). There have also been links between migration policies and remittances in order to facilitate development in origin countries through returns from diaspora (Dumitru, 2012; Docquier & Marfouk, 2006; Brock & Blake, 2015). We see how the idea of ‘skilled migration’ also plays a critical role in contemporary policy formation, with many European countries opening borders to highly skilled migration in competition with the US (Hawthorne, 2010; Kapur & McHale, 2005). Ruhs (2015) notes that successful labour market policies cannot be employer-driven but have to be based on national interest (which implies considering the best interest of all parties, including domestic workers) (2015, p. 179). Aging populations and labour market gaps also drive migration vis-à-vis targeted policies designed to fill gaps in receiving states (Robertson, 2013).

4.1.3.3 Migration policy and the state

Migration policies work across different levels of governance and are influenced by different priorities accordingly. The state, embodied by politicians, pundits and bureaucrats are a critical element in shaping migration policies, especially if it is in their interest to highlight rhetoric around migration (Massey, 2015). Besides taking a critical look at the role of the state, it is important to understand that the ‘state’ itself comprises multiple actors. There are federal bodies that deal with international treaties between countries (e.g. EU-Turkey, US-Australia, Britain-Ancestral Migrants), special requirements, for example, nurses and ‘global care chain’ (Sassen, 2005) and programmes (Blue Card, O-Visa). There are also regional policies, where states or other regions have independent migration policies and organisations that address migrants. In Germany, certain regions received money from the national government for taking a number of migrants during the asylum crisis as a trade-off; In Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia have separate regulations. Then there are broader implications of EU-wide policies, which research indicates creates inequalities within and among EU member states (Madanipour *et al.*, 2000). Allen differentiates between residence rights and social citizenship rights and notes that within the EU migrants often denied social citizenship rights even though they are equal in terms of policy (Allen, 1998, p. 33).

4.1.3.4 Biases within policies

Contrary to popular rhetoric, since 1945 migration policies have become more liberal (de Haas, Natter & Vezzoli, 2018) and less restrictive. Family migration policies were introduced in most countries post WW II, while there are more restrictions for low-skilled workers, there is ease of access for highly skilled and education migrants. Watson (2018) grounds these ‘divergent reunification policies in the logics of the racial state’; Sirriyeh (2015) sees the introduction of policies such as minimum income level as evidence of a class bias while Freitas & Levationo (2012) see it as economic discrimination which prioritises those who can contribute to the global economy over those who cannot. Several researchers have pointed out a ‘liberal paradox’ in migration policy (Hollifield, 2004): policies

have to be seemingly merit-based and not prioritise any one class, ethnicity, nation over another, but these biases are masked in criteria such as skill and bilateral relations. Gal (2012) noted that these biases continue even in pan-European policies, with the EU creating a certain European bourgeoisie, which retains within it traditional east/west dichotomies. Several studies have analysed the link between public rhetoric and immigration policies. A US-based study found that despite the growing anti-immigrant sentiment, the policies have not become as restrictive as grandstanding politics indicate. De Haas *et al.* (2018) attribute this to the 'liberal paradox' as well, on the flipside, while rhetoric can be across the board, catering to public opinion or shaping it; policies themselves have 'embedded legal constraints', beginning with the fact that migrants are human beings and therefore have unassailable human rights.

4.1.3.5 Policy databases as an analytical tool

Biene *et al.* (2014) analysed various strands of studies on migration policies and noted that these approaches were hampered by the absence of comprehensive and comparative data on policies (and ratifications). In order to archive and better study migration policies, migration scholars have attempted to institute a few key databases such as the 2015 DEMIG (Determinants of International Migration) POLICY, MIPLEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2015) and IMPALA (International Migration Policy and Law Analysis). In an early analysis of the overall data in the DEMIG Policy Database (which covers 6,500 migration policy changes enacted by 45 countries from 1945-2013), authors noted that policies are often shaped in powerful ways by economic, social and political trends far beyond the reach of migration policies (de Haas *et al.*, 2019). They also stressed that 'essence of migration policies is not their growing restrictiveness but their increasing selectiveness' (de Haas *et al.*, 2018).

4.1.4 Demography/gender/hidden populations

In principle, immigrants not only come under routine scrutiny and surveillance (Fassin, 2011; De Genova, 2002), they are also a heavily documented population. From annually updated visas and work permits, to compulsory citizenship courses and language requirements (Spotti, 2010), there is a near constant policing - social, moral and political - of migrants. Despite this, and sometimes because of this, certain demographic groups and social inequalities are rendered 'invisible' (Kofman, 2000) at the policy and analytical level. In this section, we see how demographic groups are given differential rights and how existing policies can sometimes marginalise people within select groups, while their lack of representation further compounds these problems.

4.1.4.1 Feminisation of migration

Gendered migration is not a new phenomenon, but it has long been absent from research and underestimated by migration theories (Boyd & Grieco, 2003; Morokvasic, 2008). Some researchers consider it necessary to include male migration in the analysis of gender-based migration. More specifically, some scholars have started to challenge the construction of male migration as independent and labour oriented rather than related to family issues (Gallo & Scrinzi, 2016). Indeed, family and economic reasons, as well as individual aspirations, affect migration decisions for both men and women (Kofman, 1999). According to Gallo and Scrinzi (2016), male migration needs to be considered a gendered process beyond the economic approach and not simply seen as labour migration driven by structural forces or self-interested motives based on wage differentials or the needs of their families. Mahler and Pessar (2006) stated that it is necessary to avoid the dichotomisation of the experiences of women and men in social science and in migration streams too, because the presence of both is intimately related. The representative migrant model was economic and male, who provided for the family. Female migrants were represented as 'followers of their husbands or fathers', a stereotype that defined them as dependent and with no power to make decisions. The feminisation

of contemporary migration flows is largely due to the entry of women into the labour market and the shift of burden at the expense of and through the women of the South (Solé *et al.*, 2009). Through work such as that of Morokvasic (1984), women have acquired visibility in the migratory process, but this role that women take on has been determined by the dichotomy between the public/private sphere that characterised the feminist approach in that period. As a consequence, women are seen within migration as social and private beings, while men are seen as economic and public beings (Gregorio Gil, 2002, p. 23). According to Kofman (1999), when independent female migration for work was recognised as an empirical phenomenon, it was not given special attention because it was simply thought to mirror the independent economic migration of men. In migration studies the reference point is often male labour migration until the end of mass migration, followed by a period of predominantly female family reunification. This representation reflects an expectation that men produce, and women reproduce. However, women took part in labour migration as independent migrants before the blockade and when family reunification became the dominant form of migration, many young men were dependent on women (Kofman, 1999; Carling, 2005). The feminist contribution highlighted the meso level household dynamics within international migration, as well as the active role of migrant women not only in contributing to the household, but also in gaining personal independence. Achieving an active role is one of the expectations women have related to international migrations (Gallo & Scrinzi, 2016). Becoming more active is paralleled by their personal transformation projects outside the household as independent women, a condition that causes conflicts with their families (Gallo & Scrinzi, 2016).

Until the 1980s economics were considered to be the main driver for global migration flows and women's role in migration was seen as simply accompanying husbands (DeLaet, 1999). In the 1980s, with a special issue of *International Migration Review* on women (1984), gender was considered as a critical factor in understanding international migration. Although female migration was not a new phenomenon, 'feminisation of migration' has been a frequently used expression since then (e.g. Castles & Miller, 1998).

Although there has been a general consensus about the critical role of women in migration (Piper, 2003; Castles & Miller, 1998), the accuracy and empirical relevance of feminisation of migration have been criticised by some scholars (Vause & Toma, 2015; INSTRAW, 2007; Oso & Garson, 2005). Empirical facts show that the share of female migrants has not dramatically changed in the past 60 years. According to recent UN DESA (2019) data, females comprise 47.9% of total migrants globally. With this empirical fact in mind, scholars suggested an alternative explanation to feminisation of migration which means women are being incorporated to research and policy while their voices were previously excluded (see Buijs, 1993; DeLaet, 1999; Green, 2012). Therefore, feminisation of migration is not often about statistical dominance of female migrants but the acceptance of women's role in migration and statistical proof of their presence.

However, while a uniform feminisation of migration cannot be claimed, studies show that a visible feminisation is observed among migrants in some parts of the world (UN DESA, 2013). Therefore, female migrants are likely to be dominant category within specific geographies and around some service sectors (Tittensor & Mansouri, 2017).

There are wide ranging factors identified as drivers of female migration at global, state, community and household levels, including economic factors in sending and receiving countries, gender relations in sending and receiving countries, cultural perceptions of female migrants, family reunion, pursuing studies or businesses and fleeing from war, violence and conflicts (Kofman *et al.*, 2000; Franz, 2003; Hoffman & Buckley, 2013; Tittensor & Mansouri, 2017). In addition, economic factors as a macro level driver seem to create new forms of female migration such as sex industry, nursing and domestic work (Sassen, 2000).

Although broad structural issues have been raised to a certain extent, a focus on micro level analysis to understand drivers of female migration and experiences of women in migration journey is relatively

limited. The lack of sufficient analysis of this quantitative increase in female migrants conceals complex and variable dynamics behind women's migration and raises questions about the relationship between women's empowerment and migration (Kabeer, 2003). Therefore, feminisation of migration demands a careful analysis to understand how and why women participate in migration phenomena. Studies have shown that migrant women are overrepresented in domestic work (Castles & Miller, 1998) and low-paid niche sectors. Migrant women have also been traditionally present in care sectors - as nurses and teachers, and more recently in development and aid. As is the case globally, women are increasingly participating in STEM fields, education, medicine and other traditional male dominated spaces, and a large portion of female family migrants are now highly qualified (Riano, 2012; Kofman, 2000). However, due to academic bias and policy bias that continues to see female migrants as unskilled or lacking professional aspiration, women continue to be invisible in policy discussions around skilled migration. Timmerman *et al.* (2015) found that female family migrants in Belgium do not receive the same labour market training opportunities as there is an implicit assumption of traditional familial roles. Even the overrepresentation of women in domestic work is a mis-estimation of skill, as Friese (1995) found that several women have higher qualification but lack work opportunities – as there is a 'gap between who can capitalise on their education and whose qualifications have been devalued by economic restructuring' (cited in Kofman, 2000, p. 15).

4.1.4.2 Education migrants

While international students are a key factor in several countries' international outreach and research on education for immigration indicates that long-term migration is an inherent aspiration of international education, very few countries have migration pathways for students. Hawthorne (2014) notes that international students are a coveted talent pool for skilled migration as they have invested in acquiring local capital, learning the local language and establishing a network. However, there are few records of how many students find jobs and remain in host countries, thus making it difficult to estimate the loss of talent. There is also a need for gender disaggregated data on education migrants, in order to study overlaps between global and local trends. There is limited research on the education trajectories of migrants from other pathways, such as family migrants, refugees and even labour migrants, even though it is a significant stream.

4.1.4.3 Labour migrants

Calling contemporary migratory flows a 'highly skilled migration system', Iredale (2000) notes that skill is a person's biggest asset to trade and sell. Owing, in part, to earlier theoretical assumptions of brain drain/brain gain, discussions around skilled migration have largely worked within models of economic returns - whether an individual has better pay, how a country benefits economically from diaspora (or loses out). In migration policy, skilled migrants are favoured with special tax benefits, enhanced mobility schemes such as the EU Blue card, and lower thresholds for citizenships. In the earlier sections, we see how precarious the position of low skilled migrants and contracted labourers can be. However, skilled migrants also face professional glass ceilings, are often in jobs below their level of qualification and face a number of hurdles in getting their qualifications equalised/recognised (Chiswick & Miller, 2009). Koser and Salt (1997) explore another complication in the movement of skilled international workers, highlighting that a number of workers are posted for less than a year and do not fit the classical [administrative] definition of a migrant. Several authors have also called for a differentiation among skills and qualifications, as 'scientific' qualifications have a higher priority than skilled manual work.

4.1.4.4 Family: children, parents and others

Family migration is one of the key channels of migration today. While the obstacles and obscurity of female family migrants has been discussed in the previous section, children and other dependents fare no better in migration studies. Among the few studies on how migration policies view elderly

parents, notes that most countries do not allow migrants to bring their parents as dependents as there is an assumption that they will be a drain on the welfare system and resources of the country. In the case of countries that do grant permits to elderly parents, there is a likelihood that though they have citizenship, they choose to stay in their home country and visit - thus creating a gap between actual residence and residence on paper (Lanzieri/Eurostat, 2018). With regard to children, the matter is complicated. Though there are some studies on the integration of migrant children and the labour market outcomes of first- and second-generation immigrants, as we see in the data section, this field is hampered by a lack of common understanding on the lines between ‘natives’ and second generation (and subsequent) immigrants. In fact, some countries such as Belgium, are experimenting with new nomenclatures (e.g. *anderstaligen*/non-native speakers) to move away from the defining migrants in terms of countries of origin. Furthermore, there are no clear statistics on these intersections as ‘even countries that conduct regular surveys have no datasets that combine migration background and ethnic identity variables’ (Piemontese & Magazzini, 2019: 23). Some researchers bifurcate ethnicity and nationality and look at how these dual strands intersect in migrant families. Increasingly in public discourse, ‘the immigrant and minority ethnic families are ‘problematic’; their cultural practices reckoned unacceptable ...’ (Grillo, 2008, p. 9). In recent years, several countries have made it mandatory for family migrants to learn the local language and undergo citizenship courses. In countries where citizenship is not granted by birth, children born in host countries are sometimes counted as citizens and sometimes as migrants. Data registers and homogenising academic discourse does not differentiate between new migrants and settled migrants (Pietuk, 2020) making it further complicated to look how second-generation migrants fare.

4.1.4.5 Humanitarian

In 2018, the IOM counted 30,900 men, women and children as ‘missing’ en route to refuge. These numbers were extrapolated through interviews, data records in country of origin and other possible sources. There are several other complications when it comes to recording and studying the various vulnerable groups in this category. While family reunification is a right for refugees, the long process involved (especially for asylum seekers still waiting for their paperwork) pushes dependent children into precarious positions. Furthermore, there is no record other than vulnerability when it comes to this group of migrants - their level of education, professional experience and skill are not recorded, creating a blind spot in integration - civic and labour market - plans made for them. Kofman (2019) calls for gender disaggregated data on refugees in order to establish the heterogeneity of the refugee flows, which are gendered despite being assumed to be predominantly male.

4.1.4.6 Roma migrants and travellers

The Roma community is an interesting conundrum for migration practitioners as they are, in principle, documented but remain, to a large extent, homeless, stateless (or at least on the margins) and disempowered (Messing, 2019). Piemontese and Magazzini (2019) call for a need to problematise assumptions about the community. The Roma are an ethnic minority in Europe and a transnational community, with different European countries treating them differently. ‘The administrative category of the Roma is produced by specific narratives mobilised at the European level and by policies implemented in local contexts’ (Piemontese & Magazzini, 2019, p. 5). Though they are homogenised and treated as one group, there are significant variations in their languages, traditions and the ‘visibility of racialised features and level of social inclusion’ (2019, p. 19). Interestingly, many Roma identify with multiple ethnic identities owing to their histories, and census collections that allow for multiple identifications see double the number of Roma self-identifying as such (ibid; Bernat & Messing, 2016). Sardelic (2018) highlights narratives of Roma migrants in Slovenia who drive to Austria to work every day as labour migrants in an effort to challenge the stereotypical image of Romani mobility. Calling the Roma one of the ‘most discriminated against’ groups in Europe, Caglar and Mehling (2013) note that the Roma community challenges the idea of citizenship in the European Union. The

position of the Roma migrants indicates the 'larger politics of mobility as a constitutive nature of the socio-political formulation of the EU, it has also been as a limit to the EU's free movement policies' (Yildiz & De Genova, 2018). In another pause for migration research, Pantea (2012) found that Roma decisions to migrate are not simply poverty driven, but that social networks are the key for migration and that migration patterns tend to be community-specific and shaped by a locally shared culture. Tracing the mobilities and histories of the Sami nomadic community, Keskitali (2019) noted that it is problematic to put a lens of migration on a nomadic community for whom borders and national came later and interfered with an existing way of life.

4.1.4.7 Others

A final category of migrants is that of 'other reasons', an open-ended term that includes asylum seekers (in certain cases), diplomats, consular officers, retired people of independent means, and non-asylum discretionary permissions. During the course of our research, we were hard-pressed to find any study or disaggregated data on this category of people. In 2015, 9.6% of migrants were granted residence permits in the 'other reasons' category (Migali & Natale, 2017). Though the numbers are relatively small, a disaggregated look at the composition of this group is likely to throw up a number of interesting avenues for migration study. Where do diplomats fit in when it comes to skilled migration? What are the gaps between residence and physical presence (as in the case of embassy officials)? What are the causes and drivers accepted as 'discretionary permissions'? Probing the hidden population in this category is thus an important research agenda.

4.1.5 Geography/space

Migration complicates long-held assumptions of the social sciences and there is a growing need for theories to evolve new methods of studying the new ways of being. As we see in the next section data, migration is recorded differently around the world, despite it being a global phenomenon, it is also inherently local. In this section we explore some of the challenges thrown up by migration.

4.1.5.1 Static sociology to mobilities

Sociology, by its nature, is the study of settled societies, a sedenatarist framework that is then imposed on migration studies (Büscher & Urry, 2009; Amelina & Vasilache, 2014). The need for data and patterns is challenging in the face of migration, which is a fluid and dynamic process and requires theory than can span multiple locations at the very least - even in the simplest case of migration at least two locations are involved and interconnected. Anthropological approaches such as 'multisided' ethnography and gyres (Zabusky, 2009), and translocality (Anthias, 2009) have attempted to counter this problem. There is also a growing body of literature and methodologies on the study of 'mobilities' (Sheller & Urry, 2006), which explores the study of movement - people, cultures, ideas - as a new approach to migration theory. Koser and Salt (1997) found that highly skilled migrants tend to move to one area or city where jobs in their sector are concentrated. Similar enclaves tend to crop up among low-skilled migrants around the world, creating mini-cities based on ethnicity, profession or shared linguistic heritage. Thus, we see how mobility and stasis are constantly challenged by migration.

4.1.5.2 Methodological nationalism to transnationalism

The study of migration posits a powerful critique of methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003) and the links between identity, citizenship and belonging (Appadurai, 2000). Instead, new lenses of study suggest looking at migration processes (Glick Schiller, Basch & Szanton Blanc, 1992) and ideas of connectedness across nation states, simultaneous belonging, and 'transnationalism'. The anthropological notion of transnationalism focuses on the fact that migrants develop relationships across national borders that connect places of origin with places of settlement in complex ways. Geographers have examined the spatiality of transnationalism that may be described as

producing ‘transnational spaces’ (Jackson *et al.*, 2004). Smith (2001; 2005) coined the term ‘transnational urbanism’ in order to describe ‘distanciated yet situated possibilities for constituting and reconstituting social relations’ (2005, p. 237) in today’s cities. This is a call to research translocal agencies but not in the sense of romantically celebrating the emergence of transnational communities as alternatives to the capitalist nation-state. Quite on the contrary, ‘[transnational] actors are still classed, raced and gendered bodies in motion in specific historical contexts, within certain political formations and spaces’ (2005, p. 238). Anthias (2012) cautions that it is not to say that transnationalism or translocation does away with methodological nationalism, as the states continue to play a critical role in determining who is at the centre and who is at the periphery. Similar conceptual tensions appear in the related discussion about the geography of diasporas. The use of the concept has been expanded to various groups (Brubaker 2005) over time and several sets of criteria and typologies have been proposed (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1997; Dufoix, 2003; Brubaker, 2005). Mavroudi (2007) suggests ‘a flexible use of diaspora as process’ that echoes Mitchell’s (1997, p. 551) call for a geographical theorisation of diasporic (and hybrid) cultures that remains grounded in everyday practices and economic relations in which ‘in-between spaces and subject positions are produced’.

4.1.5.3 Regional locatedness

A significant part of geographical research on migration draws on the tradition of the idiographic or regional tradition in the discipline of geography. This tradition calls for the study of regional migration histories of various scales, either at the sub-national or at the international scale. The idea is that specific regional migration models develop within the context of specific socio-economic evolution processes. One typical theorisation of this kind is that of the Southern European migration model developed in the 1990s by Russel King and his collaborators (Iosifides & King 1996; King & Black 1997; King 1998; King, Lazaridis & Tsardanidis 2000). However, the main difference from the older idiographic approaches is that newer ones focus on the position of the regions under scrutiny in wider international and global transformations in a globalized world. Thus, for example, discussing contemporary immigration in Southern Europe, King (2000) stresses that part of it is explained by the ‘diversion effect’. Migrants unable to gain access to the most desired European destinations such as Germany and France, due to major shifts in policies of immigration control there since the 1970s, had to stay in Southern Europe which was turned from a transit route to a ‘waiting room’. At the same time, more in line with the idiographic geographical rationale, a wide range of factors and transformations are typically examined, including patterns of economic development, historically established international and inter-regional connections, developments in the labour markets, regulation regimes, demography, institutional arrangements, gender-related dynamics, geographical morphology etc. On the other hand, in the nomothetic side of the discipline of geography, there have also been significant efforts to consistent and general migration theories. As King (2011) argues, the geographical theorisation of migration stems from the simple fact that ‘the spatially uneven distribution of wealth, opportunity, and privilege is one of the key drivers of migration’ (2011, p. 135). For geographers, migration is first and foremost a spatial event (Boyle *et al.* 1998), hence their constant interest in spatial distributions and patterns of migration at various scales.

4.1.6 Temporality/timeliness

Another conundrum presented by migration is that it is a constantly evolving phenomenon and the reflective nature of social sciences fails to capture emerging trends or even account for the dynamism of migration. Exploring the ‘temporal’ aspect of migration, Collins and Carling (2018) challenge the idea that the decision to migrate entails a moment of decision making, arguing that it involves a certain investment of time prior and a certain aspirational investment of time after. Thus, migration becomes a process in time alongside being a movement in space.

Data collection and analysis where estimations of migrant roles and flows are made over long period of time and Migali and Natale (2017) argue that migration flows are typically studied on the basis of migration stocks i.e., migration is calculated on the basis of recorded migrants. Bijack (2011) in his assessment of existing migration theories points out that they are mostly useful in ex post analysis and cannot be used to forecast migration. Pietnuk (2020) further adds that data used in migration studies comes from census data or surveys, which are also typically available at least a year (or five years) after the fact.

There is a yet another gap in how migration deals with time. On the one hand, the very definition of a migrant is predicated on how much time is spent in another country. However, there is no agreed definition or theoretical approach that looks at how long it takes before one stops being a migrant. As studies on integration continue to look at second, even third generation migrants, the temporality of migration seems unending. However, in administrative processes, once citizenship or residence rights have been conferred, a person is a local, if not a native. Enright (2012) uses the term ‘second-generation citizen’ as opposed to the more commonly used term second-generation migrant, though her research indicates that either way the ‘subject’ has to assert their citizenship and belonging. Though recent scholarship has attempted to explore ideas of citizenship, solidarity, belonging and highlight that legal status does not correspond to social belonging nor vice versa (Baubock, 2017; Caglar, 2015), the infiniteness of a migrant identity, which spans generations, is a conundrum.

Despite the growing discussions around displacement due to environmental change and ‘development’ projects around the world, migration research has yet to give related issues centre stage. Any crisis situation affects migrants differentially (Faist & Schade, 2013). Large humanitarian emergencies in the past have alerted international communities to this. ‘Experience from all crisis events show that patterns of marginalisation and exclusion increase migrants’ vulnerabilities’ (Majidi *et al.*, 2020, p. 275). Current measures to get migrants out of crisis situation are at best ad hoc and very few countries have an action plan in place. In 2011, the Phillipines instituted an Overseas Preparedness and Response Team and the IOM set up a fund for a similar cause. ‘The availability of and rapid access to crisis funding, information and flexible migration policies can significantly affect the effectiveness of response efforts targeting migrant populations’ (2020, p. 274). As we see in the unfolding COVID-19 crisis, mobility is one of the first aspects of life to get impacted during a global crisis. Countries that could afford it, airlifted its citizens (tourists, students, seasonal labourers etc.) from badly affected areas. Due to lockdowns, a number of migrants were left undocumented and immigration offices scrambled to create special letters/licenses that could be issued by post or email. Seasonal labour, which is largely migrant labour, was unavailable, and (richer) countries such as Germany and Austria made special deals last minute deals with Bulgaria and Romania to ensure that in the midst of a global standstill cheap migrant labour was available to them. The impact of global politics and migratory flows on disaster management can be pre-empted with a multi-level approach to migration research, one that can build towards timely mechanisms despite methodological constraints.

4.2 Quantitative data sources and assessing the gaps

The previous section discussed the different aspects of the gaps in migration studies. A major challenge that migration scholars and practitioners face while developing evidence-based migration theories and depicting migration policies is the shortage of adequate data on emigrations, immigrations, migration patterns, reasons and drivers of migration. While the existing data are widely used for research and policy purposes, the quality and accuracy of the data have been under question by the experts of the field. Hence, this section focuses on the gaps in international migration data.

In 2022, it will be a hundred years since the adoption of the very first resolution on migration statistics by international labour conference, submitted by ILO’s commission on migration statistics. The resolution and recommendations of the conference emphasised the collection of international immigration and emigration data based on unified definitions, methodology and communication of

information among the ILO member countries (Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1997). Since then, many national states, international organisations e.g. UN, IOM, OECD, and NGOs, commenced their endeavour of recording data on migration. However, over time, certain problems regarding a lack of uniformed definitions and methodologies have persisted, while new challenges concerning international migration data have emerged.

In the recent decades, there have been, to some extent, improvements in the availability, quality and comparability of data on international migration (Willekens *et al.*, 2016), for instance, by the UN Population Division, the UN Statistics Division, the World Bank, OECD, the Global Migration Database among others. In 2016, the UN started to gather and make available estimates of migrant stock disaggregated by age, sex, origin and destination, for over 230 countries and areas in the world (Laczko, 2016a). Additionally, the European Commission and the Council agreed on an action plan in 2005 to take measures to improve the common analysis of migratory phenomena in all their aspects, such as reinforcing the collection, provision, exchange and efficient use of up to date information and data (M. Poulain *et al.*, 2006).

Despite efforts by international organisations, the improvements in international migration have not been a success. There remain huge gaps in migration data (Kelly, 1987; Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1997; M. Poulain *et al.*, 2006; Laczko, 2020; The Global Migration Group, 2017; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Statistics Division, 2017). Gaps include the fact that data is not uniformly defined in international migration data sources, some regions collect more data than others, the data is not readily available on time, some sorts of data are not collected or accessible, or they are incomplete, scattered across various sources, not disaggregated and not comparable among countries. Thus, even though there is a huge amount of existing data, there is very little possibility for national governments and international organisations to utilise it to understand current migration dynamics and draw relevant migration policies (de Beer *et al.*, 2010; Laczko, 2016a).

In order to draw empirically informed migration policies and prevent prejudice and stereotyping, there is a need for timely accessible, reliable and relevant data on migration (Laczko, 2015). The existing data on international migration are the combination of data from multiform sources with varying definitions, measures, release dates, inconsistent geographical scope, and inconstant ways of describing migration drivers. Such data could help us respond to simple questions such as the estimation of international migrants' numbers and the origin and destination of migrants. However, inadequate data will not only hinder decision makers around the world from developing effective policies but will also lead to miscalculations and make it difficult to navigate. Moreover, international organisations, NGOs and national authorities, researchers and policymakers continuously demand the improvement of the quality of international migration data. The United Nations, for example, in its 2016 Secretary-General's report explicitly stresses on bridging the gaps in data besides highlighting the insufficiency of data on migration (UN, 2016).

The existence of these gaps has been broadly discussed in a scattered fashion in the work of almost every scholar and practitioner of the topic (see, for instance, Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1997; de Beer *et al.*, 2010; Fassmann *et al.*, 2009; Kelly, 1987; Laczko, 2015, 2016a, 2020; M. Poulain *et al.*, 2006; Raymer & Willekens, 2008; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Statistics Division, 2017; Willekens *et al.*, 2016; Zlotnik, 1999 among others). However, to date, there has been no comprehensive study investigating international migration data sources in order to specify the gaps in migration data precisely. Thus, the objective of this section of the report is to identify the gaps in most relevant data sources on migration including UN DESA, OECD, IOM, Eurostat, and UNHCR. The second section of the paper provides a review of the literature on migration data to assess and categorise the gaps, the third section investigates the gaps in major international data sources based on the results of gap assessment in the previous part i.e. definitions and measurements, drivers and reasons, demography, geography and timely accessibility of the data. Finally, the fourth section discusses the gaps and provides conclusive remarks.

4.2.1 International data sources

The consistent demand for harmonised data on international migration by international migration scholars and policymakers over the last ten decades led the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to establish the Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) in 2015. The IOM's GMDAC work closely with other agencies collecting data on migration such as European Commission's KCMD, UN DESA, World Bank, UNICEF, McKinsey & Company, Economist Intelligence Unit, and the OECD to improve the collection, analysis and use of migration data for informed policies and programmes. The GMDAC hosts the 'Migration Data Portal' which aims at gathering the data that are scattered across different organisations and agencies. The portal does not collect the data by itself, but serves as a single access point to timely, comprehensive and reliable migration statistics for policymakers, national statistics officers, journalists and the general public (Laczko, 2016a). While the GMDAC's Migration Data Portal is considered to be a great development towards data harmonisation, the gaps in international migration data remains highly problematic (Laczko, 2015).

The first and foremost issue for data harmonisation is considered to be the differences in definitions and measures. In the data reported by countries for international migration data-sources, information is provided under varying definitions and measures. This problem has existed ever since the international organisations commenced gathering data on international migration. Almost every report and article on international migration data has emphasised the existence of gaps in the definitions. After the 1922 conference on migration, a second attempt at standardising definitions (of long-term and short-term migrants) was made in 1932 (Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1997). These recommendations were followed by several additional UN recommendations for the improvement of the migration statistics, including those made in 1949, 1978, 2002, 2017 and 2019.

Organisations that gather the data from countries are also challenged with the problem of comparability due to variations in the definitions. The OECD, for example, uses the data from its member states and the Eurostat. While the data from Eurostat is, to some extent, under unified definitions, the overall data suffers from a lack of consistency in standardised definitions with regard to statistics, immigration inflows, results, sources and methods (Lemaitre, 2005; Fron *et al.*, 2008a). Several researchers and experts have tackled the issue of definitions in the international migration data, i.e. (Kelly, 1987; Kraly & Gnanasekaran, 1987; Zlotnik, 1999; M. Poulain *et al.*, 2006; Willekens *et al.*, 2016; Lemaitre, 2005; Fron *et al.*, 2008b; Nowok *et al.*, 2006; Raymer & Willekens, 2008; Kupiszewska & Kupiszewski, 2011; de Beer *et al.*, 2010; Laczko, 2015, 2016a, 2020), among others. In the next section, we look at the differences and inconsistencies in the definitions and measures in the main migration statistics databases, including the UN DESA, OECD, IOM, Eurostat, and UNHCR.

A longstanding problem with the existing data on international migration is the missing aspect of the reasoning behind immigration and emigration (Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1997; Fassmann *et al.*, 2009; Kupiszewska & Kupiszewski, 2011; Laczko, 2016a). The data-sources do not always cover the reasons for departure as well as return. In some countries, the census records reasons to a certain extent, but in the majority of countries the data is missing or not represented (Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1997). Migration theories are built based on empirical evidence on economic, political, social, cultural, religious, psychological, emotional, and environmental motivations for the movement of the individuals, however, the existing data hardly corresponds to these reasons (Migali *et al.*, 2018). In many data sources, due to a high level of aggregation, the data are not broken down by reasons, except for Eurostat, which covers family, education, work and other reasons (Kupiszewska & Kupiszewski, 2011; Migali *et al.*, 2018). The category 'other reasons' by itself is a big part of data which is not explained in meta-data.

Another issue with data is that the official stated reason for the stay does not always describe the actual intentions of the immigration (Fassmann *et al.*, 2009). This problem arises when an immigrant undergoes the admission procedure for family reasons and the family members are also allowed to

work without having to change their status (Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1997; Fassmann *et al.*, 2009). Furthermore, even if the data on the reasons are collected in the surveys, they are not readily available for research (Fassmann, 2009). Additionally, another problem with ‘reason’ gap is that the system might allow registration for several motives for the same person and cannot distinguish between primary and other reasons (Fassmann *et al.*, 2009). The reason for the return as well as that for departure may be equally important. Hence, one of the gaps to be considered while reviewing the data-sources will be the (un)availability of reasons for migration.

Following ‘reason’, the most emphasised gap in existing data on international migration is geography or differences in the coverage of data across the regions (Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1997; de Beer *et al.*, 2010; Fassmann, 2009; Kelly, 1987; Kraly & Gnanasekaran, 1987; Kupiszewska & Kupiszewski, 2011). The coverage of data varies in each database. These differences arise as some countries are able to collect high quality data, others are obliged by law to do so, while some countries (especially developing countries) have considerably less data collection. In developed countries as well some populations remain out of coverage (de Beer *et al.*, 2010).

Migration is a demographic phenomenon that is particularly difficult to measure (Michel Poulain & Perrin, 2008). Traditionally, international migration statistics have been collected based on manpower and border crossings points of view (United Nations, 1949). The available data sets neglect, to a large extent, the demographic characteristics of global migrants. The missing demographic information include the details of irregular migrants, information on visa, intra EU mobility, travellers and other disadvantaged groups in the databases (Fassmann, 2009). In 2007, the UN’s expert group meeting on the use of censuses and surveys to measure international migration recommended that data should be collected based on sex, age group or single year of birth, country of citizenship, country of birth, country of previous or future residence, marital status, educational attainment, purpose and duration of stay abroad, occupation, status of employment and industry of employer in previous country of residence and in the receiving country, type and duration of validity of permit, and occupation, characteristics (United Nations, 2007). However, existing datasets have not managed to fully adapt to these recommendations so far. In the next part, one of the aims will be to analyse the demographic challenges in the data sources.

Timeliness is another prominent challenge in existing data on international migration. The temporality in data provided on migration will assist researchers and policymakers in relevant and accurate migration policies. Having access to timely data is not only emphasised in academic work but also the UN and other international organisations stressed on its importance (Laczko, 2016a; Revolution, 2014; United Nations, 1949; 2007). The 2014 independent advisory group on ‘Data Revolution for Sustainable Development’ of the United Nations Secretary General calls for, among others, timely and up-to-date data on international migration (Laczko, 2016a; Revolution, 2014). Certain issues about timeliness are directly related to harmonisation of data on internal migration. The data are collected at lower levels and then it’s published by national governments and international institutions (Fassmann, 2009; Kelly, 1987; Kupiszewska & Kupiszewski, 2011; Laczko, 2020). This is a very time-consuming process and the period differs in each country. For instance, some countries publish data on a yearly basis while others release it on a two, three- and five-year basis. Projecting these data under one harmonised data for international migration data significantly declines the quality of the data. These time lag issues are also considered while reviewing the data sources in the coming chapter.

The major challenges in the existing data on international migration are depicted above. It was shown that significant gaps could be categorised under (1) definitions and measures, (2) drivers or reasons behind migration, (3) geographic coverage of the data (4) gaps in demographic characteristics and (5) the time lag in availability of data. This section will present an overview of data gaps within major international migration sources based on the categories discussed above.

4.2.1.1 Definitions and measurement

There have been several attempts by the UN, International Labour Organisation, OECD, the European Union and other international organisations and NGOs to resolve the problem of gaps in definitions and measures of international migration data (de Beer *et al.*, 2010). However, there has not been much success in this endeavour. In 2007, the European Parliament adopted a regulation on migration statistics which provides relatively clear definitions of immigration and emigration and states the categories under which the data must be reported to the statistical office of the European Union, Eurostat. Nevertheless, there is no restriction on how the member states shall provide the required data, including their estimation methods (de Beer *et al.*, 2010; Fassmann, 2009). The EU regulation of 2007 defines an international migrant as ‘a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year’. This is in line with the definition posited by the United Nation in 1998 (de Beer *et al.*, 2010).

Another instance of the attempt towards harmonised international migration data is the creation of the Global Migration Data Portal in 2016. This initiative was taken by IOM and a cooperation of several other organisations and agencies to tackle the issue of timeliness, comprehensiveness, and reliability of migration statistics. The portal hosts the data from different data sources and projects the data which are scattered across different organisations and agencies. While this initiative is considered to be a great advancement towards harmonisation of data on migration, there is still more work required to fill the gaps in migration statistics. In this section we pinpoint the gaps in definitions of data used in the portal by different organisations, i.e., UN DESA, OECD, IOM, UNHCR and UNICEF.

UN DESA

The major share of data presented in UN DESA tables come from population censuses, population registers, and national representative surveys. The UN DESA international migration datasets present statistics and estimates based on total international migration stock, age, sex, origin and destination. Estimates are presented for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2019 and are available for all countries and areas of the world. The estimates are based on official statistics on foreign-born or the foreign population. The compiled data are sourced from more developed regions and less developed regions and least developed regions. More developed are Europe, Northern America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, whereas less developed regions include Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America, Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia and the Caribbean. The group of least developed countries encompasses 47 countries defined as such by the UN General Assembly. The data available in UN DESA databases includes statistics, an annex that classifies the countries by major area and region, and notes on specificities of the countries and areas covered. The data are presented in a consistent layout in which the first column indicates the sorting order of the items listed. There are five tables on migrant stocks by age and sex and by major area, region, country or area and three tables on migrant stocks by destination and origin.

However, there are a number of definition-related issues in the data that challenge the accuracy of the statistics. The data are collected from the countries’ censuses and population registers where available, if not available, estimations are used as of foreign-born population. Compiling data on foreign born citizens with the data from censuses and national registries to represent international migration stocks has serious shortcomings. The data for each country is collected under different definitions and measures and are compiled as one. The foreign-born or the foreign population by itself is a very broad definition/measure for international migration stocks. Moreover, in presentation of data, country of citizenship is used as a basis for the identification of international migrants. In some countries, country of citizenship is referred to as *jus sanguinis*, where citizenship is acquired by the nationality or ethnicity of one or both parents and/or as *jus soli*, where nationality could be acquired by the place where the person is born. In *jus sanguinis* countries, children born to international

migrants are mostly considered foreign citizens and in *jus soli* children born to international migrants are counted as citizens.

In practical terms, the data are readily available for the access to public. However, the meta data provided for the table are specifically weak and does not provide enough information on definitions under which the data is compiled, and a clear representation of estimating methodology is missing. A brief documentation piece is provided but it does not offer the comprehensive and explanatory detail needed to understand and analyse data gathered from such a wide range of sources.

OECD

The OECD publishes data on migration provided by national correspondents of its member states and the Russian Federation as part of their contribution to the continuous reporting system on migration. The gathered data is published after the approval of the authorities of the data providing countries. Since the data is provided by member states, they are not necessarily based on common definitions and measures and the OECD's continuous reporting system on migration has no authority to impose changes in data collection procedures. The lack of unified definitions from the member states compels the OECD to provide rather broad definitions for harmonised data i.e. all type of migrants as foreign population, and for entrance and exit of all types of migrants the terms inflow and outflow are used.

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

Across OECD countries the measures for inflows and outflows of foreign-born population (migrants) are not aligned. The estimates are based on varying sources e.g. the flows derived from population registers, residence/work permits, and some specific surveys. These sources can produce inflows and, to some extent, outflows for both nationals and foreigners. While it is relatively easier to document the inflows, the outflow is not easy to record as there is less incentive and legal obligations for emigrants to report their departures. The data recorded under work and resident permit categories within the reporting countries differs as well. The difference includes the type of permits issued to individuals and differences in the duration of work permits e.g. temporary and permanent permits are often counted as the same.

Key definitions used

Immigration has traditionally been defined and perceived in different ways across OECD countries. Some OECD countries are traditionally called 'settlement countries' (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), while others are non-settlement countries, such as European countries, Japan and Korea. Conventionally, settlement countries refer to immigrants as foreign-born population and non-settlement countries as foreign residents. The difference between the two concepts originates from the nature and history of immigration system and migration laws on citizenship and naturalisation in each country.

Foreign-born population

The data on foreign born population is presented from first-generation migrants which consist of both foreign and national citizens with a migration background. The history of migration flows and the mortality among foreign born population in the OECD data determines the size and composition of the international migrants. Moreover, the concept of foreign population among the OECD countries may include people born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin and the second or third generation migrants who were born in the host country. Foreign nationals are characterised based on a number of factors, i.e. natural increase in the foreign population and naturalisation, and the history of migration flows.

Data sources and challenges in measuring international migrants

The OECD data on international migration encompasses four type of sources: population registers, residence permits, labour force surveys and censuses. Countries that have a population register present the data based on residence permit, stocks and flow of migrants. However, some countries also use census data to produce the same type of data. To present stocks and flows using national registers or permit data, it is possible to underestimate the number of minors and family members of migrants, furthermore, some migrants do not require a resident permit due to free movement agreements among countries. The population registers also, in many instances, fail to record the departure of people in a timely manner.

Census data provides rather comprehensive but infrequent data as censuses are generally conducted every five to ten years. The labour force surveys had improvements with questions on national, place of birth, etc. Also, labour force surveys allow for more frequent, usually annual, stock data compared to census. Both sources cover a portion of unauthorised population, which are excluded from population registers and residence permit systems. However, both census and labour force survey data can present inaccurate number of immigrants. For instance, immigrants who do not always live in private households or those living in collective dwellings such as reception centres and hostel might not be properly counted.

Sources that OECD member collect data through

Population registers	Residence permits	Labour force survey	Censuses
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden	Chile	Canada, Greece, United Kingdom	Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Russia, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, United States

IOM

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is working with other UN Agencies and international organisations to enhance the capacity of governments to collect reliable and comprehensive data on international migration. IOM collects data related to resettlement, emergency and post emergency repatriation, assisted voluntary return, migration health, and counter trafficking (IOM, 2008). The IOM needs the support of national and regional governments, private agencies and other secondary parties to gather and publish these data. Hence, the definitions for collected data may differ in different countries which affects the comparability and reliability of the statistics.

The IOM actively supports national governments and other agencies involved in migration support to facilitate gathering quality data on international migration based on unified definitions, measurable, comparable and reliable specifications. In 2015, the IOM established the Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) to strengthen the role of data in global migration governance, support the IOM member states' capacities to collect analyse and use migration data and to promote evidence-based policies by using the IOM and other international data on migration. The centre launched the IOM's Global Migration Portal in 2017, to serve as a unique access point to timely, comprehensive, migration statistics and reliable information on migration globally (Mosler *et al.*, 2018). Besides projecting the above-mentioned data by IOM, the platform displays the data from external sources as well i.e. UN DESA, OECD, UNHCR, UNICEF, World Bank, among others. Assembling data from different sources with diverse definitions and measures makes it a challenge for the IOM to present rigorous international migration statistics.

Eurostat

Eurostat, which is the statistical office of the European Union, provides a wide range of statistics on migration. Data is gathered through national statistical offices and EU-survey (e.g., the European Union Labour Force Survey).

Concerning migrants, figures are generally available on both a) people that were born in a country different from the country where they reside, and b) people that have the citizenship of a country other than the one where they reside.

Data is on three main areas:

- *Demography and migration*.¹² This section provides figures on immigration and emigration flows and other aspects that relates to migration stocks (e.g., population without the citizenship of the reporting country, foreign-born population, acquisition of citizenship, marriages). Projections on net migration are also available.
- *Asylum & managed migration*.¹³ This section addresses non-EU citizens applying for entering, residing and working in the EU Member States. It includes statistics on asylum applicants, decisions on asylum applications; residence permits; enforcement of immigration legislation, and children in migration (third-country nationals less than 18 years old).
- *Migrant integration*.¹⁴ Based on the Zaragoza indicators (DG Home, 2013), this section provides information on different domains of integration of migrants in their country of destination, such as education, employment, active citizenship, social inclusion, housing, poverty, and health.

UNHCR

The United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) collect data on refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returned refugees, returned IDPs, stateless persons and others since 1951. The category 'others' include individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any other groups, but to whom the UNHCR extends its protection and/or assistance services based on humanitarian grounds. The data contains information about the general composition of migrants, such as their residence or origin, and their evolution over time. Since the data are managed and gathered by the UNHCR itself, the agency collects the data under unified definitions and measures. However, the UNHCR also gathers data collected by the UNHCR member states. These data to some extent suffer from the issue of compatibility in understanding and definitions of the type of population used by each UNHCR member states. For example, 'stateless persons' in Costa Rica refers to the population of undetermined nationality, while in Haiti, it refers to individuals without a nationality who were born in the Dominican Republic prior to January 2010 and who were identified by UNHCR in Haiti from July 2015 to September 2017, according to the UNHCR data code.

4.2.1.2 Drivers

The reasons for migration are not completely covered in the international migration data sources. This section focuses on the non-inclusion of particular migrant groups in the data sources. Particularly the absence or inclusion of nationals, students, asylum seekers or irregular (illegal) migrants in the data. In many datasets, asylum seekers are included only when they have been granted refugee status and have received a temporary or permanent residence permit (De Beer *et al.*, 2010). Below is a brief review of the gaps in migration drivers in international migration data sources.

¹² Eurostat. (2020). Your key to European Statistics. Retrieved 23 April 2020, from <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/background>.

¹³ Eurostat. (2020). What information is available?. Retrieved 23 April 2020, from <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/background>.

¹⁴ Eurostat. (2020). Migrant Integration. Retrieved 23 April 2020, from <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/migrant-integration/background>.

UN DESA

The United Nations Department of Social Affairs's population division collects data under empirical, estimates and based on some specific indicators. The empirical data encompasses number of international migrants by country of birth and citizenship, sex and age enumerated by population censuses, population registers, nationally representative surveys and other official sources. The empirical data contained in the UN DESA database are derived from numerous sources and does not include the reason behind migration. The estimated data are also calculated based on international migrant stocks, e.g. total migration stock by age, sex, destination and origin, therefore, it does not represent the reasoning behind migration of the individuals. The last group of data is presented under common set of indicators in collaboration with UNICEF and other members of the data and research working groups of the UN. The indicators include the adoption and legal instruments related to migration, population indicators (e.g. working age population, population estimates), development indicators and international migration by age group, country of origin and destination, refugee populations, and the number of tertiary students by country of origin. However, the indicators in the databases do not present information on the reasons and drivers of international migrants.

OECD

The OECD migration stock are available by permanent migration inflows, foreign-born population, foreign population, native-born employment, foreign-born unemployment, native-born participation rates and foreign-born participation rates. The reason for migration is of less concern for the OECD database. Only the worksheets on permanent migration inflows include drivers such as family, family member of the workers, workers, free movements, humanitarian reason and other reasons. Additionally, there is no explanation of these indicators included in the statistical annex for the data. Most of the data for common members of the EU and OECD comes from Eurostat where the category 'other' is a very broad term for a very high percentage of undescribed migrants. The humanitarian data is also a combination of the UNHCR and Eurostat.

IOM

The IOM collects data on migration for very specific reasons. Most of the data collected by IOM are a compilation of their operational statistics on migration. The data, collected routinely from over 133 countries, are on repatriation, resettlement and returns of refugees, victims of trafficking, stranded transit migrants, internally displaced person, unsuccessful asylum seekers, and soldiers who participated in demobilisation programmes (IOM, 2008). The IOM migration portal has the capacity to accommodate data based on reasons such as family reunification, types of permit, migration due to vulnerabilities, forced migration, and different types of economic migration. However, the gap in the statistics from the providing sources makes the data here incomplete as well.

Eurostat

The only statistics available linked to drivers (reasons for migrating) concern the reasons for first permit, namely family reasons, education or employment.

4.2.1.3 Geography

The data coverage for international migration statistics varies across different regions and countries. Some countries collect adequate data on migration while for many others, data collection is less of a priority. The variations in data collection across countries pose a problem for the UN and other international entities to project adequate data for all countries.

UN DESA

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) covers the data from about 232 countries or areas, where the availability of data on the number and basic characteristics of the migrant population differs significantly. The countries and regions are grouped into more developed regions, less developed regions and least developed countries for statistical convenience. The data is presented based on seven Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) regions classification of the United Nations Statistics Division. In terms of coverage, the UN DESA have the highest coverage among all the international data sources, however, the quality of data differs from one region to another due to socio-economic situation of the countries. The developed countries are able to provide better data compared to less and least developed countries. Majority of the data for less and least developed countries are based on estimations. In Sub-Saharan Africa for example, 14% of the countries did not have the ability to update their information on total number of international migrants since the 2000 round of population censuses. The 2019 UN migration stock documentation states:

In Sub-Saharan Africa, 14% of the countries does not have updated information on the total number of international migrants since the 2000 round of population censuses, 24% of the countries did not publish recent data on the country of origin of international migrants, while updated statistics on the age of international migrants is lacking for 33% of all countries. In Central and Southern Asia, 21% of the countries does not have data on the total number of international migrants since the 2000, 36% is lacking data on the age of international migrants, and 50% does not have recent statistics on the country of origin of international migrants. In the SDG regions Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, Northern Africa and Western Asia, and Oceania data on total migrant stock are available nearly all countries, but gaps in the availability of empirical data of international migrant stock by age and by origin persist. In contrast, updated information on the number of international migrants by age and country of origin is available for over 90% of all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Europe and Northern America. When the availability of data is measured by the share of migrants estimated based on recent empirical data, rather than by the number of countries with data, the data coverage is slightly higher for most regions and reaches 97% for the world.’ (UN DESA, 2019)

Figure 4. UN DESA data coverage across the regions and continents based on census stocks

TABLE 1. AVAILABILITY OF EMPIRICAL DATA ON THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK SINCE THE 2000 ROUND OF POPULATION CENSUSES

SDG Regions and number of countries or areas	Countries or areas with at least one data source						International migrants estimated based on empirical data	
	Number			Percentage				
	Total	By age	By origin	Total	By age	By origin	Number (thousands)	Percentage
World (232)	218	186	193	94	80	83	263,719	97
Sub-Saharan Africa (51)	44	34	39	86	67	76	21,126	90
Northern Africa and Western Asia (25)	23	18	17	92	72	68	46,722	96
Central and Southern Asia (14)	11	9	7	79	64	50	16,123	82
Eastern and South-Eastern Asia (18)	17	14	15	94	78	83	18,247	100
Latin America and the Caribbean (48)	48	45	45	100	94	94	11,673	100
Oceania (23)	23	17	20	100	74	87	8,928	100
Europe and Northern America (53)	52	49	50	98	92	94	140,900	100
Europe (48)	47	44	45	98	92	94	82,252	100
Northern America (5)	5	5	5	100	100	100	58,648	100

Source UN DESA (2019)

Figure 4 is a brief sketch of the UN DESA data coverage across the regions and continents based on census stocks.

OECD

The data covers statistics for all OECD member countries and Russia. Countries provide data to secretariat of the OECD and the data are published after the approval of the providing country and the OECD secretariat. The data provided by Israel also includes the data for Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. The data for Cyprus is not unified, it includes the southern part of the country under the control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, the data are not always available for all countries in all given years.

Eurostat

The statistics available from Eurostat are collected for the EU Member States and EFTA countries. There are sometimes gaps due to a lack of data from the country's statistical office. Furthermore, Eurostat sometimes makes available statistics on additional countries (e.g., other eastern-European countries, and Turkey).

Eurostat provides data at different geographical levels:

- country level;
- NUTS-1, which refers to the macro-regional level;
- NUTS-2, which refers to the macro-regional, regional/sub-regional (provinces) level (depending on the country);
- NUTS-3, which refers to sub-regional level (provinces or metropolitan areas, depending on the country).

Figures are mostly available at the country level. This allows for a comparative analysis of trends in different European countries. In some cases, statistics are also available at NUTS-1 and NUTS-2, for example on migration stock (number of migrants), employment and education of migrants. On migration stock, statistics on cities and greater cities (lower than NUTS-3) are also available. Eurostat provides also figures based on the degree of urbanisation (e.g. on migrant population, and employment and education), distinguishing between cities, towns and suburbs, and rural areas.

IOM

The organisation publishes the data gathered as a result of its operational missions and projects in over 133 countries. The literature by IOM on the data collection methodology and geographic coverage on international migration is scarce. The migration data portal managed by IOM covers a wide range of statistic from several primary and secondary data sources. However, a guide for the usage, methodology and geographical coverage of the existing data in the portal is yet to be made available. IOM strives to encourage and provide technical support for countries across different regions in the world to improve their data coverage on migration.

4.2.1.4 Demography/Gender/Hidden populations

Migration is one of the three demographic components of the population change along with births and deaths, and is often described as the most difficult component to measure, model and forecast (Skeldon, 2013). Migration is usually conceptualised as a move from an origin to a destination, or from a place of birth to another destination across international borders. While in fact, many demographic characteristics of migration such as education, gender, types of document, types and duration of movements are to a large extent not covered in the international migration databases. This section will review the major international migration data sources from a demographic point of view.

UN DESA

The UN DESA dataset entitled ‘International Migrant Stock 2019’ provides estimates of the international migrant stock by age, sex and origin for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2019 years. The datasets contain worksheets on total migration stock, migration stock by age and sex and migration stock by origin and destination. The total migration stock dataset includes six worksheets, the dataset on migration stock by sex and age includes five worksheets and the dataset on migration stock by origin and destination includes three worksheets. The worksheets cover estimations by age, sex, origin, destination, region, major area, country and area. These are interesting specifications for migration data to be collected, however, more demographic characteristics and indicators of migrants are needed to study and draw accurate migration policies. So far, the UN DESA data fails to collect or gather data under more specific and useful demographic characteristics of migrants.

OECD

The OECD data cover employment rates, unemployment, participation rates, and to some extent the sex, country of birth and citizenship of immigrants across the countries. The other demographic specifications of the migrants are not included in the data. The OECD in collaboration with the European Commission carried out a joint project on establishing a Migration Demography Database. The project aims at monitoring the demographic impact of migration and mobility and the contribution of migration to past and future labour force dynamics in selected EU and non-EU OECD countries. The project first evaluates the role of migration over the last five to ten years in shaping the occupational and education composition of the labour force, then focuses on potential contribution of migration to the labour force as part of the range of alternative scenarios. Additionally, the project also aims at projection over the 2015-2030 period and to identify the drivers of the changes in working-age population and active population in Europe, particularly the role of migration flows.

Eurostat

Eurostat provides breakdowns of the statistics by various characteristics, usually age, sex, country of birth and citizenship. For many topics (e.g., on ‘Demography and migration’ and ‘Migrant integration’), Eurostat allows also for comparison with non-migrants. Data on minors are also presented, especially on ‘Asylum & managed migration’.

IOM

The IOM itself focuses on very specific types migrants’ conditions that include, vulnerable migrants and the assisted voluntary returns cases by age, sex and vulnerability type. Additionally, IOM is a major partner with ‘Counter Trafficking Data Collaborative’ which aims at providing data on identified and reported victims of human trafficking. The data are presented based on 66 variables on socio-demographic profile of victims e.g. gender or level of education, the trafficking process and the exploitation type (Global Data Hub On Human Trafficking, 2017). The demographic characteristics of immigrants in the migration data portal coordinated by IOM remains under-covered and varies across data sources.

UNHCR

The UNHCR data contain information about refugees, asylum seekers, returned refugees, internally displaced persons, returned internally displaced persons, stateless persons and other population of their concern. The data are broken down by sex, age, as well as by location within the country of residence, whenever available and such data are available since 2000.

4.2.1.5 Timing and accessibility

Another very important challenge with migration data is the availability of data at the appropriate time. The data publishing time is often lagged behind and it changes for every region and data source.

The publication of migration statistics usually takes place with a considerable delay. It takes from one to five and sometimes even ten years to update or publish migration statistics. For instance, it takes usually up to two years to identify and record the people who have stayed at least one year, as migrants (de Beer *et al.*, 2010). The data are collected under different definitions, e.g. long term, short term, and to combine that data under unified definition for projecting international migration makes the process longer. The relatively high-quality migration data is often from the censuses; however, it takes several years to gather census data. The census data from 17% of countries in Africa and 8% in Latin America and the Caribbean ages to years prior to 2005 (Laczko, 2016b), for example. This section will provide a review of the availability of international migration data in different databases over time.

UN DESA

UN DESA has published estimations for migration statistics between 1990-2019. Estimates refer to 1 July of the reference year, namely 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2019. Data revision was planned for 2017 which was then updated to 2019. Although there is a small improvement in timeliness of the UN DESA data, the estimates do not differ significantly in time however more attempts to have more accurate and timelier data will be helpful.

OECD

The data are available for 1995 to 2016 and updated on an annual basis, however major gaps exist in the statistics provided by countries for some years. The gaps are mainly for the non-EU countries as they are not legally required to collect annual data. The latest data available is from 2016, which is almost four years behind the data from the EU.

IOM

The data collected by IOM as part of their operative missions are collected and published online on an irregular basis. In the recent few years, there have been improvements in timely publication of data but there is still a minimum of a year lag in the data published online. IOM updated the data on assisted voluntary returns for the period between 2012 to 2018. The data is usually updated with a lag of between one or two years. The IOM missing migrant's data are published since 2014 and includes the registered cases for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. Since the data are collected by IOM representative offices, it would be possible to project timelier and even real-time data as timely data on vulnerable populations would help the law enforcement and policy-making bodies to control criminal activities.

Eurostat

Eurostat provides annual statistics, as of the 1990s. However, coverage is discontinuous until 2009, both in terms of countries and years. Starting from that year, statistics are generally updated every year and for nearly all the EU-28/EFTA countries. This allows for an analysis of trends and changes over time.

4.2.2 Data sources on migration policy indices

A combination of factors contributes to initiate and perpetuate migration to destination countries (forced or voluntary) over time. Migration dynamics emerge as an interaction between structural factors (related to state (trans-) formation, natural and human resources or economic and social structures), formal and informal ruling institutions and individual agents (e.g., social contacts).

Among these factors and migration drivers, a (mediating) role is played by migration policies of the destination country. The openness/closeness of migration policies may enable or constrain migration. Migration policies can provide (or constrain) specific migration infrastructures and shape migration flows and stocks, e.g., they may influence the number and the characteristics of migrants entering in a country and staying (Czaika & de Haas, 2013; Helbing & Leblang, 2019). Over the last twenty years, researchers have undertaken systematic comparisons of migration policies by creating sets of indicators at the national level, and then aggregating them into an index. Gest and colleagues (2014, p. 274) underline that indexes ‘are understood as highly aggregated, composite measures of immigration policy, while indicators are understood as more specific, disaggregated elements that are individually coded’. These indicators are designed to analyse the differences and trends in migration policy and then used by the research community to assess the determinants and effects of policy. This section provides an overview of the existing sets of indicators and indexes.

4.2.2.1 Definitions and measurement

Key in the analysis of migration policy is the distinction between outputs and outcomes (Gest *et al.*, 2014; Solano & Huddleston, 2021a). Policy outputs refer to the formulation of laws and policies, while outcomes are - at least in part - the result of the implementation of those laws and policies. Both are different from the implementation, which stands in-between and refers to the concrete application of the on-paper policy outputs. ‘Implementation’ indicators measure whether these laws and policies are properly interpreted and delivered as practices. Existing indexes and set of indicators on migration policy mainly focus on policy outputs.

On the analysis of policy outputs (laws and policies), previous projects have analysed the nature of those by using two main methodologic approaches. The majority of previous projects carried out an overall assessment of migration policies in one or more areas (e.g., integration policies; admission policies). For example, IMPIC (Immigration Policies in Comparison; Helbling *et al.*, 2017) focuses on admission policies of a given country and a given year, by analysing the state of admission policies for different kinds of admission (labour migration, family reunification and refugees and asylum). Similarly, MIPEX (Huddleston *et al.*, 2015; Solano *et al.*, 2020) benchmarks current laws and policies against the highest standards on one topic (e.g., access to compulsory education).

Other projects focused on tracking policy changes in a specific country. They addressed the changes occurred in the policy framework over time and they assessed the nature of each change (e.g., introduction of a new law). In this case, the unit of analysis is the single law/policy and the nature of the introduction of this law/policy. For example, Ortega and Peri’s index of tightness of immigration reforms over time measures policy change by classifying laws based on whether they tighten the requirements of entry or stay in the country (Ortega & Peri, 2013). This approach makes it possible to understand the change in migration policies over time, but it does not allow for cross-country analysis (Scipioni & Urso, 2018).

Concerning the conceptualisation of migration policy, namely the topics that have been considered under the umbrella of migration policy field (Bjerre *et al.*, 2015), migration policy indicators and indexes have addressed many topics. However, sets of indicators and indexes are disproportionately concentrated in a few areas of migration policy research. The majority of policy indicators relate to admission and citizenship policies. Integration policies are underrepresented, if compared to the high number of articles on integration in migration studies (Pisarevskaya *et al.*, 2019; Solano and Huddleston, 2021a and 2021b). Other significant areas of research - irregular migration, return and diaspora policies - are covered by a small number of policy indicators, while other areas, such as gender, are largely absent from systematic efforts to measure and compare policies.

4.2.2.2 Drivers of migration

The detailed information in STATIV allows for evaluating how migration inflows may respond to changing policies overtime. For example, the research team at MAU is currently using STATIV to

analyse the effects of Sweden's labour migration policy reform in 2008, which abandoned any requirement on skill level and allowed the employer to select workers directly from abroad, in order to attract more labour migrants from non-EU countries. The preliminary findings show that the reform exerted a noticeable impact on the inflows of labour migrants, as well as on the population characteristics of these newly arrived immigrants.

4.2.2.3 Geography

Existing indexes widely vary in the number of countries covered – from 3 to 200+ countries covered. Most of them do not cover more than twenty-five countries, most frequently less than twenty. The UN Inquiry among Governments on Population and Development has the widest geographical coverage, as it covers 206 countries, both developed and developing countries. Focusing on a more limited topic, the MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Database (Vink *et al.*, 2015) covers dual citizenship for migrants in 200 countries.

Many indexes analyse European countries - often, EU Member States - or, at best, OECD/developed countries. Countries such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom are among the ones that are almost always included in the analysis. Some exceptions to this tendency are represented by sets of indicators that address emigration and diaspora policies, such as EMIX (Emigrant Policies Index, Pedroza and Palop-García 2017) the Diaspora Policies (Ragazzi, 2014) and the Diaspora Engagement Policies (Gamlen, 2008), which focus on both developing and developed countries.

4.2.2.4 Demography/Gender/Hidden populations

While many indexes focus on immigrants in general, others address specific categories of migrants, or they distinguish between them. Comprehensive indexes, which often focus on admission policies, address labour migrants, migrants under family reunification, asylum/refugees and international students. All four are included in DEMIG (Determinants of International Migration, de Haas *et al.*, 2016), IMPALA (International migration Policy and Law Analysis, Beine *et al.*, 2016), and IMPIC (Immigration Policies in Comparison, Helbling *et al.*, 2017). The United Nations' Inquiry among Governments on Population and Development gathers information from governments of 206 countries on the existence of policies concerning the annual level of regular channels, high-skilled workers and family reunification. In addition to these comprehensive indexes, specific categories of migrants are also well-covered by more sectoral indexes: migrants under family reunification and permanent residents by MIPEX and low and high-skilled labour migrants by Cerna (2014), IMMEX (Migration Policy Group, 2012), and Ruhs (2018).

4.2.2.5 Timing and accessibility

The temporal coverage of existing indexes is limited, as most of them focus on a limited number of years. Most frequently, indexes cover one or two years. The timeframe that is covered the most is the period between 2000 and 2010, while the most recent years are covered to a lesser extent.

There are indexes that encompass more years such as CITRIX (Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index), Commitment to Development Index (Centre for Global Development, 2018), ECN index (Index of fees and economic requirements for naturalisation, Stadlmair, 2018), IMPIC (Helbling *et al.*, 2017), Inquiry among Governments on Population and Development, Multiculturalism Policy Index (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013), and MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index, Huddleston *et al.*, 2015; Solano *et al.*, 2020). This is sometimes done by assessing policies for either a number of continuous years or every *n* years. IMPIC, which covers four decades (1980-2018), and MIPEX, which spans twelve years (2007-2019), are examples of the former, while the Multiculturalism Policy Index (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013) is an example of the latter, as it covers 1980, 2000 and 2010.

4.2.3 Migrants and migration in the EU Policy Framework Surveys: EU-SILC and LFS

Large-scale population surveys are key instruments for measuring public opinion and for policy-making in many areas including migration. Such national and international surveys provide the fundamental data for national governments as well as intergovernmental agencies to determine the state of the art with regard to the characteristics and the perception of the population. When it comes to the international large-scale surveys, migration and migrants have never been the centre of attention - with the exception of some occasional ad hoc modules. Hence, it would not be inappropriate to start with the observation that the topic of migration as a whole is mainly missing in international large-scale surveys. In this section, several large-scale international surveys that are widely used in (inter)national policymaking are discussed.

We have inspected two major cross-national surveys and the information they provide regarding the migration background of the respondents:

European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) collects cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimensional microdata on income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions since 2003¹⁵ (started in seven European countries and then started covering the whole EU as well as some other countries that participate on the voluntary basis). The EU-SILC provides two types of data: (1) cross-sectional data concerning a given time or a certain time period with variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and other living conditions, and (2) longitudinal data concerning individual-level changes over time, observed periodically over a four-year period. Information on social exclusion and housing conditions is collected mainly at household level, while labour, education and health information are obtained from individual persons aged 16 and over. Also, income variables at detailed component level are mainly collected from the respondents.

European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is conducted in all Member States of the European Union, four candidate countries and three countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The data collection covers the years from 1983 onwards. The EU-LFS is a large household sample survey providing quarterly results on labour participation of people aged 15 and over as well as on persons outside the labour force. All definitions apply to persons aged 15 years and over living in private households. Persons carrying out obligatory military or community service are not included in the target group of the survey, as is also the case for persons in institutions/collective households.

4.2.3.1 Definitions and measurement

Let alone being defined, migration is not even in the spotlight in the international large-scale surveys that inform policymaking. There are several variables that approximate migration background in these surveys. These are mainly the country of birth, nationality, and sometimes the countries of birth of the parents and the number of years of residence in the country of residence.

Migration is not a main point of study in either EU-LFS or EU-SILC. There is not much information with regard to migrants and migration except very few factual data regarding nationality and country of birth. In EU-LFS, these data are available also about the parents of the respondents (if they live in the same household). Moreover, the number of years of residence in the current country, and the age since the respondent became a resident are also asked. In EU-SILC, another measure that can be considered as a proxy to immigration status is the 'year of immigration'. This measure is important, because the number of respondents who reported a year of immigration do not correspond to the number of respondents who were not born in the country and/or the ones who do not have the nationality of the country of residence.¹⁶

15 Note that the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) - a panel survey in which a sample of households and persons were interviewed year after year covering a wide range of topics concerning living conditions such as income, financial situation in a wider sense, working life, housing situation, social relations, health and biographical information - has preceded the EU-SILC having run for eight years (and eight waves) from 1994 to 2001. ECHP was conducted in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. As of 2003/2004, the EU-SILC covers most of the above-mentioned topics.

16 Note that this variable was coded as missing for the whole sample in Iceland, Malta, and Slovenia.

4.2.3.2 Drivers of migration

The drivers for migration are never investigated in any of the surveys we looked into. There is only one exception to this: the EU-LFS ad hoc modules focusing on the 'labour market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants'. So far, this ad hoc module was run twice, in 2008 and 2014; and this module will be repeated in 2021. The majority of the questions in these modules are related to the integration phase that starts after migration. However, on top of the integration-related questions, migrant respondents were also asked the main reason for migrating. The reasons among which the respondents could choose are (1) employment - job found before migrating, (2) employment - no job found before migrating, (3) study, (4) international protection, and (5) family reasons (the latter is further specified in two categories in 2014: accompanying family/family reunification or family formation). Furthermore, in 2014, the migrants were also asked the last country they worked abroad before migrating to their current host country (if they migrated within the last ten years). This is a very big step in integrating the element of migration in the European policy-making scheme. Nevertheless, despite asking extra questions to migrants who were identified during the interviewing process, it seems that there have not been additional efforts to increase the sample size of the migrants living in the country.


4.2.3.3 Geography

Both the EU-LFS and EU-SILC are administered in all European Union Member States (EU-28) as well as the United Kingdom, three EFTA countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), and four EU candidate countries (Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey).

4.2.3.4 Demography/Gender/Hidden populations

In 2008 and 2014, EU-LFS has administered migrant-related ad hoc modules titled 'labour market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants'. However, even though both ad hoc modules of 2008 and 2014 are concerned with the labour market situation of migrants, they barely contain the same questions. For example, in 2008, the respondents were asked the duration of their current residence permit, whether their legal access to labour market was restricted, whether they needed to improve their knowledge of the host country language in order to find a job, and the main person or institution that helped the respondent to find a job. In 2014, these questions were dropped or formulated in a more general way to cover a wider range of areas that are relevant for migrants, and the questions regarding migrants were grouped under two headings: background of target population' and 'obstacles to labour market participation'. For instance, the respondents were asked to identify the first and second biggest obstacles to getting a job in the host country (language skills, qualifications, discrimination, etc.), host country language skills and whether courses were followed, etc. These differences make it difficult for researchers to scientifically compare the data collected in these ad hoc modules.

Figure 5. The difference between the number of non-nationals in the country captured by EU-LFS 2018 and the official numbers provided by Eurostat for 2018 (based on population register)



Only migrant-related ad hoc modules administered by the EU-SILC are ‘Intergenerational transmission of disadvantages’ which was conducted in 2011 and the 2019 version of ‘Intergenerational transmission of disadvantages, household composition and evolution of income’. It is crucial to mention that, these ad hoc modules have some more migration background variables, however they do not focus on the migrant population in the EU countries.

Figure 6. The difference between the number of people born outside the country of residence captured by EU-LFS 2018 and the official numbers provided by Eurostat for 2018 (based on population register)




Figure 7. The difference between the number of non-nationals in the country captured by EU-SILC 2014 and the official numbers provided by Eurostat for 2014 (based on population register)





Figure 8. The difference between the number of people born outside the country of residence captured by EU-SILC 2014 and the official numbers provided by Eurostat for 2014 (based on population register)



In the figures above, the percentages of the two major proxies for migration background (non-nationals and residents born outside of the country) from EU-SILC 2014 and EU-LFS 2018 are presented vis-à-vis the actual percentage of non-nationals and the people born outside of the country as recorded in the official population register of each country. Note that the data from the EU-SILC and EU-LFS were weighted - where the number and the demographic composition of the respondents are 'corrected' taking into account the population of the country, gender, socio-economic status, place of residence, etc. The figures show a chronic undersampling of migrants in these surveys. Moreover, note that, migration background is not taken into account in either EU-LFS or EU-SILC when

computing the weights. Besides the undersampling of migrants in most countries, this is the reason why we see such a drastic difference between the actual numbers and the number of people with a migration background represented in the surveys. Hence, both undersampling and the lack of migration background in the computation of the weights contribute to inaccurate demographic information about this large segment of the European population.

4.2.3.5 Timing and accessibility

EU-LFS has a relatively prompt release schedule. Normally, each quarterly as well as the annual data are published within four months from the end of data collection.¹⁷ EU-SILC takes longer to prepare and disseminate the data: approx. 11 months for the cross-sectional component and approx. 15 months for the longitudinal component.¹⁸ Hence, EU-LFS data are disseminated sooner than EU-SILC data on a regular basis. Despite the relatively short amount of time needed to make the available, we cannot be sure about the timeliness of the end-data.

The EU-SILC and EU-LFS microdata are strictly protected. Researchers need to send an official application to Eurostat explaining the reasons why they need such data. After a relatively lengthy procedure which may take several months, if the researchers are granted access to the data, they get access to a more aggregate version of the data. For instance, in EU-SILC, the country of birth or the nationality of the respondent is not available - these are coded in an aggregated way (e.g. EU, non-EU, etc.). In the EU-LFS, the exact age of the respondent is unknown - this variable is coded in five-year brackets.

4.3 Discussion

When we take a brief look at analytical tools that can help mitigate the gaps and pitfalls in migration research, we see that as a field of study with fast evolving variables and few universalised (or theoretically grounded) assumptions, these suggestions offer a starting point towards a well-rounded methodological approach in studying migration.

Though migration theory is predicated on dichotomies and classifications, the need to approach them as part of a nexus or continuum is increasingly evident. Here research methodologies such as 'mixed migration' (Vullnetari, 2012), 'migration projects' (Timmerman *et al.*, 2015) 'push-pull plus' (Van Hear *et al.*, 2018) and 'migration nexus' (Kwak, 2013; Robertson, 2012) that move beyond the dichotomies and alert us to contextual factors that impact migration will allow for a broader understanding of the factors that facilitate and sustain migration. In doing so, one must keep in mind how migration and policies are intertwined as well. 'Migrant rights cannot be studied in isolation from admission policy, both in terms of positive and normative analysis' (Ruhs, 2013, p. 25). Approaching migration and policy as a nexus locates migration within larger discussions of neoliberalism and development.

Building on the temporal turn (Carling & Collins, 2018), it is analytically useful to think of migration as a long-term process, driven by aspirations for dynamic roles - from student to worker, refugee to settler and so on. This allows for the perspective of drivers to move from the individual to a unit such as the family and to consider contextual factors as well. It also makes room for dynamic data collection that goes beyond singular categories and one-time data such as first residence permit issued. In this scheme, migration becomes a process of adaptation. To think in these terms will also alert research to the 'effects of the unexpected structural changes, which had their equivalents in the history' as a way of 'predicting the outcomes of political events, which otherwise would be very difficult to foresee' (Bijack, 2011, p. 239).

¹⁷ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1978984/6048829/LFS_release_announcement.pdf/d0e85313-1429-4ab0-9ce8-9179e4f31ab3.

¹⁸ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1012329/1012398/ReleaseCalendar_SILC.xlsx.

Moreover, demographic data on migrants should be disaggregated in terms of multiple variables – gender, language, skill, ethnicity, age. This will allow us to better understand the heterogeneity within and similar among different migrant categories and alert us to new patterns of subjectivity and discrimination (Vertovec, 2007; Kofman, 2018). Analysis and records of migrant identities and demographics that allow for multiple subjectivities, whether as ethnic identities, motivations for migration or aspirations will also make space for new diversities (Vertovec, 2007). Pietnuk (2020) also calls for records of profiles of incoming migrants (flows) and not just settled migrants (stocks). Furthermore, a theoretical exploration of geography in the context of migration allows researchers to be alert to spatial politics. When looking at ‘mobilities’ and ‘events’ instead of migration per se, analysis can consider how movement is facilitated by structures of power and transnational connections can sustain spatial unevenness.

When we move to the shortcomings in migration data in major international migration data sources, our focus is on differences in definitions and measurements, drivers or reason for migration, geography covered in the data source, demographic specificities of migrants, and timeliness of the data released for public and researchers. Several issues were pointed out for all the data sources under study.

The quality and availability of data vary across regions and countries. More developed countries collect rather accurate statistics with more variables that economically challenged countries cannot provide. Yet, most of migration happens in developing countries and regions. Overall, in line with GMDAC conclusions on gaps in international migration data, it is shown that relatively more data exist on conventions-based international migrants, students, migrant stocks, remittances, and human trafficking and fewer data are gathered on irregular migrations, migrants’ health, migration policies, recruitment costs, return migration, smuggling, integration, missing population and migration flows.

The metadata for the existing data in all data sources are incomplete and not elaborated. UN DESA, for example, have a very brief PDF file for all types of data on international migration and there is no explanation for the definitions based on which the data were collected, and no explanation of the methodology used for estimations. The metadata for IOM, OECD and Eurostat is relatively better, but they do not explicitly provide explanation for certain group of data, like the category other in Eurostat encompasses a big amount of data but there is no proper guidance on which type of migrants are included within that group of data.

International organisations use the data from primary sources of their member states. If a country is a member of more than one international organisation that collects data, that country provide the same data to several organisation. Then, the organisations share the data among each other, but since different organisations use varying definitions and variables, the same data ends up being published under different definitions and measures. Collecting data under dissimilar definitions and putting together the data with varying measurements reduces the quality of the data and decreases the chances for comparing data across the countries. This issue has existed ever-since the international organisations gather data on migration. In recent years there has been some improvements in some regions e.g. the European Union, however, more efforts and endeavours are needed to encourage more and more countries to adopt harmonised definitions.

In addition, the drivers for migration is an important factor for policymakers. In the existing data, collection system, the registration categories define the focus and the groups of interest are refugees and asylum seekers, remuneration activities permit based migrants, and students. All other factors behind migration are not entirely included in the data systems. That is to say, the current migration databases are collecting data based on the past migration assumptions and flows, while the current data do not allow us to understand what shapes international migration. The current data degrade the understanding of present and future migration dynamics only as seeking protection, workers and irregular crossings. The data on migration should allow us to understand the patterns and actual drivers of migration (Migali *et al.*, 2018) e.g. migration due to environmental changes, migrants due to ideological believes, migrants’ social networks and demographic changes, among others. A possible

explanation concerning current state of data on migration and mobility may be the fact that data is designed and collected, at least to a great extent, within the framework and limits of national and or international institutions legislations/policies.

Geographical coverage of migration data sources varies among the regions and within different sources. The OECD and the EU get the data from their member states. The UN covers the data for almost all the regions around the world. Additionally, migrations that have already moved to another country are counted differently in the receiving country. There are different assumptions and attributes to the regions such as Maghrebians migrants may refer to Algerians in France, Moroccans in Belgium. The same way, Latin Americans could be seen differently in Belgium and Portugal. This means that the same data could refer to very different realities, given the receiving destinations' assumptions. Moreover, not many countries, especially in the developing world who are significant sending countries, collect data on migration, which requires to be improved.

Many data sources are traditionally structured to collect data based on the limited variables and/or types of migrations such as humanitarian and economic. However, new migration dynamics and drivers require more space for additional variables to cover all types of migrant populations and their demographic specificities. These sorts of population are often referred to as missing population or undefined mobility. Missing population that are not included in the statistics include travellers, Roma people, intra EU migrants, even the homeless and so forth. In many datasets, asylum seekers are included only once they have been granted refugee status and received a temporary or permanent residence permit while in some other instances, they are registered at an earlier stage of the asylum process and the status often doesn't change in official statistics despite receiving an approved or rejection decision (Beer *et al.* 2010). There is a grave need to improve the inclusiveness of the data sources by adding the missing population and more demographic characteristics of such people.

Timely and up to date data is unencounterable in any of the reviewed data sources and the other data sources out of scope of this study. Even some sort of data which are collected by the UN agencies directly are made available with huge time lag. Huge time lags exist between each data update at national, regional and international levels. The cycle of updates also differs in each country or region. Some countries (like in the EU) update their data on a yearly basis, while other do so every two years or five years. Making data available with less time lag will help researchers and policymakers improve the migration policies.

In addition to the above-mentioned datasets and data sources, migration policy indicators and indexes have addressed many topics. Even so, sets of indicators and indexes are disproportionately concentrated in a few areas of migration policy research as the majority of policy indicators relate to admission and citizenship policies and integration policies. Comprehensive indexes, which often focus on admission policies, address labour migrants, migrants under family reunification, asylum/refugees and international students. However, irregular migration, return and diaspora policies are underrepresented. Irregular migration, return and diaspora policies are covered by a small number of policy indicators, while gender, are largely absent from systematic efforts to measure and compare policies. The temporal coverage of existing indexes is limited, and most indexes cover one or two years in the period between 2000 and 2010, while the most recent years are covered to a lesser extent.

Last but not least, EU policy framework surveys do not primarily concentrate on migration. There is not much information with regard to migrants and migration except very few factual data regarding nationality and country of birth. EU-SILC has the information for the year of immigration which aims to capture immigrant respondents. Most elaborate data can be derived for the migration background through the nationality and/or country of birth of the parents who live in the same household. Although both LFS and EU-SILC had migrant-concerned ad hoc modules, they barely contain the same questions. Although these ad hoc modules have a few more variables on migration background variables, they do not focus on the migrant population in the EU countries. The drivers for migration are never investigated in any of the surveys we looked into. The one exception is the EU-LFS ad hoc module on the 'labour market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants'

where migrant respondents were also asked the main reason for migrating. Despite the relatively short amount of time needed to make EU-SILC and EU-LFS data available, we cannot be sure about the timeliness of the end-data.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

This extensive report comprised three sections: a brief overview of major theories of migration, the theories and contemporary migration realities nexus and a gaps assessment in theories and data. The discussion of each part is based on detailed and critical reviews. A final analysis of the different perspectives in each section highlights the following findings and recommendations. The next section serves as an updated and elaborate list of long-lasting shortcomings of migration theories and data. Although suggestions of solutions are not part of the specific objectives of this report, the identified gaps will be the starting point for the assessment and validation of alternative data sources and new methodologies to develop better understanding of the migration scenarios. In addition to that, the recommendations developed present the findings of this report to help policymakers, data collection institutes and researchers with decision making on future actions regarding the improvement of the knowledge on migration scenarios.

5.1 Main conclusions

Conceptualisation of migration. The fragmentation of traditional migration theories with a strong individualistic line involves limitations in explaining contemporary migration phenomena. The strength of the individual decision making theories is the provision of an analytical framework for the conceptualisation of subjective and social determinants of the decision to migrate. However, it is crucial to take into account the variety of individual migration motives that are hidden when migrants are seen primarily in terms of the legal categories of the receiving country's migration policy, for example as asylum seekers, labour migrants or family migrants. Contemporary research attempts to move beyond these limitations with studies on phenomena such as environmental migration or gender-driven migration. However, there is a need to rethink migration as multi-causal and theories to develop multilevel analysis, in order to systematically bring together these various strands of the migration process.

Who is a migrant? Migration is a field of study with fast evolving variables and few universalised (or theoretically grounded) assumptions. These suggestions offer a starting point towards a well-rounded methodological approach in studying migration. To begin with, an updated and consistent definition of a 'migrant' is necessary. Given the increasingly complex patterns of mobility in the 21st century, thinking of migration in terms of country of nationality and country of birth do not reflect reality anymore. Some suggestions to this end include collecting parental information (country of nationality/birth), this can help identify descendants of migrants. However, it should also be defined how many subsequent generations are included in the definition - whether fourth generation migrants, for instance, should be asked for their ancestral history. Furthermore, if definitions focus on physical movements across borders, intra-EU mobility will be insufficiently documented, even though it is substantial. These definitions inform policy decisions and policy responses for specific categories of migrants; thus, it is important to have clarity in how migrants entering and living in the EU are typified. Asylum seekers, refugees, internally displaced persons, victims of trafficking, smuggling migrants, stranded migrants, irregular migrants are not only difficult to identify in a mixed

migration flow for data collection, but sometimes their definition is not clear enough to allow for such an identification in the first place.

Intersectionality of typologies. Though migration theory is predicated on dichotomies and classifications, the need to approach them as part of a nexus or continuum is increasingly evident. Current migration categories are initiated by policy needs and visa procedures, hence the registered statistics cover reason-based categories (economic, education, family, asylum, other) which are not mutually exclusive. A family member of a recognised refugee is granted a family unification visa and registered as a family member and categorised in the same group as a family member of a highly skilled migrant. It is analytically useful to think of migration as a long-term process, driven by aspirations for dynamic roles – from student to worker, refugee to settler and so on. This allows for the perspective of drivers to move from the individual to a unit such as the family and to consider contextual factors as well. It also makes room for dynamic data collection that goes beyond singular categories and one-time data such as the first residence permit issued. In this scheme, migration becomes a process of adaptation. To think in these terms will also alert research to the ‘effects of the unexpected structural changes, which had their equivalents in the history’ as a way of ‘predicting the outcomes of political events, which otherwise would be very difficult to foresee’ (Bijack, 2011, p. 239).

Moreover, demographic data on migrants should be disaggregated in terms of multiple variables – gender, language, skill, ethnicity, age. This will allow us to better understand the heterogeneity within and among different migrant categories. Analysis and records of migrant identities and demographics that allow for multiple subjectivities, whether as ethnic identities, motivations for migration or aspirations will also make space for new diversities (Vertovec, 2007).

Migration and policy nexus. Given the need for a longer-term vision when it comes to dealing with migration, impact of policies on migration data collection cannot be overlooked as migration and policies are intertwined. ‘Migrant rights cannot be studied in isolation from admission policy, both in terms of positive and normative analysis’ (Ruhs, 2013, p. 25). Approaching migration and policy as a nexus locates migration within larger discussions of neoliberalism and development; furthermore, the policy needs become a significant factor in the regulations of data collection on migration as well as the content of the information needed.

The need for better, comparable and timely data. Adequate data is key for evidence-informed policymaking. The global-level migration indicators are relatively under-developed; hence, countries are expected to improve capacity to generate timely, reliable, and comparable data on migration to help guide policymakers in devising evidence-based policies and plans of action to tackle migration aspects of the SDGs. The current migration statistics are mainly based on regular migration and integration, while obtaining data on dark numbers or unreported statistics are often partial or incomplete at global and regional levels and thus more challenging to collect and access. Looking at data limitations has brought to light that many international and EU-level datasets and sources depend on the same set of national data, such as population registries, census data, information from immigration authorities. However, due to the shortcomings listed above, comparability of data is hard to achieve.

The shortcomings of migration data from the major international migration data sources are differences in definitions and measurements, drivers or reason for migration, geography covered in the data source, demographic specificities of migrants, and timeliness of the data released for the public and researchers. The quality and availability of data vary across regions and countries. More developed countries collect relatively accurate statistics with more variables than economically challenged countries. Yet, fewer data are gathered on irregular migrations, migration motivations, migration policies, return migration, smuggling, missing population and migration flows.

Quantitative data is considered as the main source of evidence-based policymaking, yet qualitative data is just as crucial. Models that hinge on economic drivers for migration do not address the socio-cultural context, the complexity of social behaviour and individual choice in decision making. In addition to the qualitative data, alternative data sources and novel methodologies can serve to collect hard-to-find data and complement the available information.

5.2 Recommendations

- Following a holistic approach for migration concepts and statistics, different methodologies and knowledge from numerous disciplines are needed. Qualitative approaches should be used more in order to gain information about the features migration statistics fail to address.
- Even if one all-encompassing theory seems very unlikely, considering the multifaceted nature of migration, returning to a metatheoretical way of theorising seems one promising way forward. In any overarching theoretical framework, key dimensions such as economic, political, demographic, environmental, educational, agencies and intersectional typologies of drivers should be included.
- Besides official statistics, more detailed migration indicators should be included in large-scale surveys. These surveys are used as policy frameworks, the representation of migrants should be improved through targeted sampling methodologies and language variations.
- International collaborations are required for harmonised definitions and standardisation in the application of definitions; including regular capacity building activities on data collection.
- It is crucial to work on developing datasets on specific cases where data is not available or is incomplete, such as environment-related migration, human trafficking, etc.
- The impact of policies, even those that do not seem to be directly relevant to migration, should be studied in order to examine how they (indirectly) affect migration along with the collection of migration statistics.
- There is an urgent call for cooperation between the main players in data collection, e.g. Eurostat, OECD, IOM and UN, to harmonise definitions, share the experiences and collaborate on potential remedies for the existing shortcomings. Moreover, information sharing between EU member states should be increased.
- The timeliness of data availability depends on the administrative process durations and bureaucracy. Extra effort should be made to provide timely evidence for policymakers as having access to the most recent data (which is not older than the political agenda of the moment) is a vital aspect.
- New technologies and consequent methodologies should be explored and exploited to collect hard-to-find data and complement information available.

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HumMingBird

ABOUT HUMMINGBIRD (2019-2023)

Enhanced migration measures from a multidimensional perspective

Migration has become a matter of significant social, political and broader public concern. It has therefore shifted very high on the agenda of national and EU authorities. Well-informed, evidence-based migration policies should be based on reliable evidence, beginning with a thorough understanding of existing data as well as the demographic, economic, environmental and political drivers of migration. There is a need for tools to forecast migration flows in order to minimise shocks and tensions and to foster good governance. HumMingBird's objectives can be summarised as follows:

- to assess the quality and comparability of existing statistical concepts and data (stocks as well as flows) relating to migration in the EU;
- to explore and validate the use of alternative data sources – including various types of big data (such as social media or telecommunication);
- to understand the changing nature of migration flows and the drivers of migration; to analyse patterns, motivations and new geographies; to hear the voices of migrants in various 'hubs' around Europe;
- to nowcast short-term flows and forecast longer-term patterns of migration, while identifying uncertainties;
- to examine the interactions between migration flows and policies, and
- to estimate the potential impact of alternative policy scenarios.

In order to fulfil these objectives, the HumMingBird consortium (consisting of 16 partners from 10 countries) brings together research centres, private companies, NGOs and a European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC). The consortium combines a wide range of scientific disciplines (from anthropology and political sciences to statistics, telecom engineering and computer sciences). Partnerships between academic researchers and civil society organisations working with migrants will carry out qualitative research to enrich, interpret and supplement the statistical analyses. Sixteen partners from 10 countries (including European expert centres) are involved, and many of the participating researchers have a migration background.

COORDINATOR

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